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Between March, 1917, and the beginning of 1920, the 
British Army, first in France, and then in occupied terri­
tory, employed an establishment of Chinese coolie labor 
which at one point totalled over ninety-two thousand men.l 
The so called "Chinese Labour Corps" was the result of a 
somewhat complicated series of understandings and maneu­
vers between the War Office, the Foreign and Colonial 
Offices, the High Command in France, and the Chinese gov­
ernment in Peking.
This corps of laborers which so dramatically began 
to materialize behind the lines in the spring of 1917 has
^The exact total remains uncertain. The official 
statistics place the number at its peak at 92,129, while 
a reliable War Office source suggests a maximum figure in 
August, 1918, of 95,594 men and 956 officers. See: Sta­
tistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire dur­
ing the Great War, 1914-1920 (London: H.M.S.O., 1922),
p"! l60, London. Public Record Office. War Office papers, 
category 107, file /or box7 no. 37, Report on the Work of 
Labour with the B.E.F. during the War, "Notes on Chinese 
Labour," August, 1918, para. 8. (Hereafter Public Record 
Office citations will adhere to the pattern of the follow­
ing shortened form: P.R.O./W.O. 107/37. This reference
shall hereafter appear as Labour Report.)
2had little to memorialize it during the course of the 
last fifty years. Public references to it at the time 
were few, often quite inaccurate, and occasionally de­
liberately biased for the purposes of Allied propaganda. 
The War Office wittingly discouraged contemporary comment 
for fear that organized labor in Great Britain itself 
would raise its voice in protest, not so much at the 
exploitation of Chinese workers in France, but against 
their possible use in dilution or substitution schemes 
then contemplated or in operation in England.
The strategists in Whitehall also learned that their 
political superiors feared repercussions of a different 
nature involving, perhaps, embarrassing parallels with 
the importation into South Africa of nearly fifty-thou­
sand Chinese coolies in 1903 and 1904. These laborers, 
whose indenture was approved and facilitated by the Con­
servative and Unionist government of J. Arthur Balfour, 
worked in the Rand mines under conditions which even 
British officials who sanctioned the plan for their use 
admitted were inhumane. Criticisms of Balfour and his 
colleagues made on that occasion by the Liberal party 
had been a prominent but intangible element in their 
return to power in December, 1905.^
2r . C. K. Ensor, England: 1870-1914 (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 377. Current interpretations 
tend to give the issue greater substance. One writer has
3The Liberals kept alive for many years the memory 
of "Balfour's Blunder" and "Chinese Slavery," and regarded 
their crusade on behalf of the coolies as something of a 
confirmation of the principles which Mr. Gladstone had 
imparted to them before his death in 1898. When the use 
of Chinese workers in France was first contemplated in 
mid-1916, many of the leading actors in this earlier 
drama, men like Sir Edward Grey, H. H. Asquith, and Arthur 
Balfour himself, remained recognizably prominent in the 
political arena. They all played some part in the rais­
ing of the Chinese Labour Corps, and it lay in all of 
their interests to subdue the least hint of public out­
rage. Not surprisingly, the major newspapers remained 
strangely muted and uninformed, with the comments that did 
filter through to the public subject to close scrutiny at 
Whitehall and liable to bring prompt indications of dis­
pleasure.^ At the same time, the War Office was willing
called the Chinese Labour question without doubt the se­
cond main plank in the Liberals' 1905 campaign, tariff 
reform being the first. See R. Hyam, Elgin and Churchill 
at the Colonial Office, 1905-1908 (London: Macmillan,
1968), p. 48.
^Through one of its military attachés, the British 
Legation in Peking protested vehemently to the War Office 
concerning an article hinting at the proposed use of Chi­
nese Labour which had appeared in the November 15, 1916, 
issue of The Manchester Guardian. See P.R.O./W.O. 106/33, 
History of the Chinese Labour Corps, Alston, Peking, to 
Director of Military Intelligence Td .M.I.), London, De­
cember 21, 1916. (Hereafter cited as C.L.C. History.)
4to sanction a quasi-official coverage of the Chinese pre­
sence in France once the Chinese Labour Corps had become 
a fait accompli there.
The leftist and labor oriented press, while failing 
to mind so urgently the government's quest for circum­
spection or outright abstention from comment, remained 
characteristically preoccupied with domestic and parochial 
matters, or with interpretations of socialist theory. The 
Parliamentary and Independent Labour Parties both express­
ed anxiety over the use of colored labor in general, but 
their concern extended only to the effects this might have 
upon the British Isles.
This paper will seriously examine for the first time 
the decision making process which led to the use of the 
Chinese coolies. It will also attempt to fit them into 
the context of the social, political, and military ethos 
of the times. The Chinese Labour Corps will be seen as 
a part of the Imperial response to the demands of total 
war. The use of the Chinese under harsh conditions and 
terms will be presented as an event considered regrettable 
but nonetheless sanctioned and legitimated by the continued 
manifestation of Britain's Imperial destiny and the need 
to preserve the Empire from the hands of the enemy.
When committed to employing Chinese workers in 
France under dubious conditions, Britain's political and
5military spokesmen could clothe their actions with sur­
prisingly plausible defences. To understand why this was 
possible it is essential that some of the ingredients of 
the mentality which subsisted among the men who raised 
and directed the Chinese be clarified and understood.
If this is done, the main thrust of the attempt to place 
the Chinese Labour Corps within a social, political, and 
military perspective can be given added depth and sub­
stance, and the conditions and men governing its use can 
be appreciated more readily. The decay in standards of 
political morality that these plausible defences came to 
represent may also become suggestively apparent.
The problems of clarification and understanding are 
historically grounded. They lay in the early years of 
the present century, which saw the development among all 
classes of a specific ethos with regard to the treatment 
of the contemptuously named subject races. As Evelyn 
Baring, the first Earl of Cromer and cousin to Sir Edward 
Grey, phrased it in The Spectator on the eve of war.
We reluctantly admit the necessity of com­
pulsory labour in certain cases . . . we do 
not stigmatise as slavery such labour when, 
under all possible safeguards against the oc­
currence of abuses, it is employed for recog­
nised and indispensable purposes of public
utility.4
^Cromer, "What is Slavery?" The Spectator, January 
17, 1914, p. 135.
6If such labor were recruited under the "safeguards" of 
commonsense and legal respectability, British concepts 
of fair play and decency, as understood in pre-war days, 
were not compromised. So long as no sordid private pro­
fit motive were present, and only the "benefit of the 
state" were served, the work of impressed labor could in 
no sense be regarded as slavery. Grey, as Foreign Secre­
tary, said as much in a speech before the House of Com­
mons in August, 1907.5
This serene confidence in the ability of her admini­
strators to do the right thing was born of Britain's ac­
knowledgment of a moral responsibility for the welfare 
of the natives who came under her charge. It was part of 
her colonial burden. Later, the responsibility came to 
imply a trusteeship, followed in modern times by a re­
cognition of a principle of accountability which has in 
turn led to the granting of independence to Britain's 
colonial possessions.® Naturally, this process was not 
foreseen before the war.
In the days before the advent of the great conflict 
it was the Liberals who were most preoccupied with the
SOreat Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates 
(House of Commons), 4th series, August 1, 1907, col. 1317
6w. D. McIntyre, Colonies into Commonwealth (New 
York: Walker, 1967), p. 147.
7moral regeneration of British colonialism. The Empire 
as they saw it was to be a civilizing force transcending 
mere Anglo-European comprehension.? It was true that 
natives were to be treated in line with the canons of 
civilized European society, but the impact of this bene­
fit would, it was hoped, create a world wide community 
of decent men who owed their allegiance to Britain.
The Liberal ministry which came into office in De­
cember, 1905, was committed to the administration of an 
empire at the apogee of its power and extent. Their 
rhetoric committed them too to the belief that justice, 
fair play, and Christian morality® were synonymous with 
the civilizing mission which they saw as one of the pri­
mary rationales for continued Imperial status. Men like 
the ninth Lord Elgin typified this confident outlook.
As Colonial Secretary from December, 1905, to April, 1908, 
Elgin set an enlightened pattern for the direction of 
colonial natives by substitution of persuasive for co­
ercive methods in their handling.® His conduct in office
^H. Samuel, Memoirs (London; 1945), p. 33, quoted in 
R. Hyam, Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office, p. 51.
®The conscience of English Nonconformity was present 
in the House as never before in the ranks of the Liberal 
Members of 1905. See J. F. Glaser, "English Nonconformity 
and the Decline of Liberalism," The American Historical 
Review, Vol. LXIII, January, 1958, pp. 352-53.
®Hyam, Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office,
p. 25.
8influenced a whole school of Liberal Imperialists, among 
them Asquith and Grey.
It was Elgin who had to clear up the problems that 
the previous government bequeathed him concerning the use 
of Chinese labor on the Rand. Elgin, influenced by the 
moral commitment of his own government to end the scheme, 
still saw the legal and economic problems which faced him 
in the repatriation of the coolies. Legal restraints pre­
vented the immediate ending of the labor scheme, and he 
feared the economic ruin of the Transvaal mine investors 
should he act precipitately. On this occasion it was the 
Prime Minister, Campbell-Bannerman, who reminded Elgin and 
the country of the Liberals' identification with the prin­
ciples of morality in the handling of natives,10 thus 
bringing the Colonial Secretary back to the substance of 
the party's view on colonial policy.
But was this substance merely window dressing? One 
authority on the period believes that to many Liberals the 
issue of Chinese labor on the Rand became a symbol of 
capitalist and Tory inequity, rather than a real moral 
dilemma.11 The Liberals "refused . . . to be deflected 
from realistic course of action by the pressure of their
IOl . T. Hobhouse, Liberalism (London: Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1964), p. 5 Ô .
llRyam, Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office,
p. 93.
9radical rank and file, whom they pejoratively referred
to,_^ . . . as sentimentalists. "12
Was it then in the minds of the "radical rank and 
file" that the true substance of the Liberals' moral out­
look on the rule of natives lay? It is true that some at 
least of the more radical among party members and adher­
ents believed themselves to be the genuine recipients of 
the Gladstonian code of human values promulgated in the 
1870's. They professed an anti-imperialism if not an 
anti-colonialism, and their opposition to the worst fea­
tures of the Imperialist mentality received a boost from 
the debacle of the Boer War.
By 1900 the criticisms expressed by some of the 
Liberal radicals were fairly well organized. They repre­
sented something of an intellectual synthesis as well as 
a response to the added burdens of extended Empire.13 
Views ranging across a wide spectrum of interests and 
concerns found a single means of expression. Dilke, for
example, showed a deep concern for the cultural attributes
14
of subject peoples, Labouchere was equally vocal. As 
early as 1900 he had advocated the establishment of labor
l^Ibid., p. 531.
13b . Porter, Critics of Empire: British radical at­
titudes to Colonialism in Africa, 1895-1914 (London: Mac­
millan , 1968), p. 35.
14lbid., p. 84.
10
bureaux in the Transvaal to prevent the exploitation of 
native labor. Wedgwood, C. V. Harcourt, and E. D. Morel^^ 
were also prominent, along with Henry Broadhurst, the 
Lib-Lab and sometime protégé of Gladstone.
But still this synthesis, with its important ves­
tiges of Gladstonian high-mindedness, was not sufficient 
to have any profound influence upon the government's con­
cern for the plight of exploited natives. One suspects 
that it was used most often and most effectively as a 
stick with which to beat incumbent ministers and compla­
cent party colleagues. In short, the Radical critics of 
Empire remained narrow minded in their outlook. Harcourt, 
for instance, was a Little Englander, who merely saw the 
economic disadvantages to Britain of continued colonial 
exploitation.^®
Their overall cry was one of non-involvement rather 
than of active intervention to secure better conditions in 
imperially administered territories. As a result their 
critique turned out to be vague and disappointing. It 
is true that Courtney could call imperial administration
l^Morel's reaction to the plight of the natives in 
the Congo is well commemorated in E. Halévy, A History of 
the English People in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. VI;
The Rule of Democracy; 1905-1914 (London; Ernest Benn, 
1961), pp. 40-43.
IGporter, Critics of Empire, p. 84.
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of subject races "an engrossing arrogance,"1? something 
that left no room for humanitarian considerations, and 
which led to the exercise of a sterile legalism often 
allied to executive brutality. But it was at home that 
he and his colleagues looked for evidences of the worst of 
Imperial mismanagement. They found it in the vulgarity, 
chauvinism, and materialism of the Jingoes, and when 
they spoke of these offensive crudities as "a violation 
of the principles of rational morality in international 
a f f a i r s , " 1 8  they were verbalizing prejudices against their 
compatriots rather than coming to grips with the real is­
sues confronting the Empire in its management and direc­
tion of vast alien populations. But they cared, and 
their views affected many thoughtful men of that pre-war 
generation.
Organized labor and its representatives consistently 
emphasized the element of capitalist exploitation which 
they believed they discerned in the processes of colonial 
government. This essentially theoretical principle be­
came a p r e o c c u p a t i o n . 19 one scholar at least has main­
tained that this pinched outlook on the part of Labour
17Ibid., p. 88, quoting Courtney, Letter to L. S. 
Amery, November 30, 1899. Courtney Papers, Vol VII, p. 49.
ISlbid., p. 91.
l^See Broadhurst's excoriation of the Tories on this 
head during debate on Chinese labor in South Africa in 
Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 4th series, Feb-
12
politicians in particular began to change after 1906,
when the Labour Representation Committee returned twenty-
nine Members to the House. Then, it is suggested. Labour
began to form a defensible and substantive anti-colonialist
i d e o l o g y . 2 0  But any progressive ideology formed by Labour
on the question of native rights was always likely to be
compromised by the strong racist feelings shown by many
rank and file and trade union members, among whom there
subsisted what can only be described as a strong xenophobic 
21streak. ^ The fear of natives as potential immigrant 
strike breakers persisted long after the Labour Aliens 
Bill of 1906, and became an ingrained part of the working 
class response to questions dealing with colonial p o l i c y . 22 
A generalized feeling of moral outrage at the ex­
ploitation of natives continued to animate the far left, 
with figures like G. N. Barnes, Keir Hardie, and J. R.
O Q
MacDonald ^ as well established spokesmen, but the resul­
tant rhetoric concealed an inability to come to grips 
with the problem in realistic terms. It echoed the Lib­
erals’ demands for respect, fair play, and justice in
ruary 16, 1904, cols. 1579-1580.
20porter, Critics of Empire, p. 137.
21j. A. Garrard, The English and Immigration, 1880- 
1910 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 71.
22ibid., p. 20.
23see especially J. R. MacDonald, Labour and the Em­
pire (London: n.p., 1912), passim.
13
dealing with the Black and Yellow subject races, but it 
rarely, if ever, explicitly repudiated the right of the 
white man to rule. Later in these pages it will be seen 
how the actions of Labour and the left in the response 
to the use of Chinese coolies during the war tend to 
support the view expressed above.
Among yet another stratum of society, the profes­
sional civil servant class, the ethos which governed the 
direction of natives was better developed. It stood apart 
from the gesturings of the cheap press and the politicians. 
With the permanent staffs of the Colonial, Foreign, and 
War Offices the outlook on native rights and welfare was 
primarily a socially inherited one, molded by a tradition 
of leadership and cultural superiority inculcated at the 
public school level, and confirmed in the cloisters of 
Oxford and Cambridge. Appointments in these departments 
of state were made on the basis of personal assessments 
of character. Candidates were required to display an 
attitude that comprehended a blend of practicality, hon­
esty, and gentlemanly conduct.^4
This mentality was to filter down to most of those 
whose positions involved them in the raising and direction
24This process is well described in H. Heussler, Yes­
terday's Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Ser­
vice (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963), ¥3-
46, and see G. H. Nadel and P. Curtis, eds., Imperialism 
and Colonialism (London: Macmillan, 1970), passim.
14
of the Chinese Labour Corps. The rigid code it stood for 
forbade any hint of sentimental sympathy with colonial or 
subject peoples. Sternness in dealings with the heathen 
became a virtue never to be compromised; they were chil­
dren to be judged, ruled, and directed. And yet mixed 
with this arrogant belief in racial domination one often 
finds elements of incredible ignorance concerning, say. 
Oriental or African customs and c u l t u r e s . F r a n k l y ,  it 
was easier for the average educated Englishman of the day 
to identify with the far off era of Greek and Roman civ­
ilization. The largely imaginary rigors of the moral code 
of Classical Antiquity meant more to him than the savage 
world of Oriental or African politics and society, and 
was infinitely more worthy of preservation. If he was in 
the colonial service or involved in the government of 
natives he had little wish to learn about the cultures 
he ruled, and when a few intellectuals like Mary Kingsley 
or Marjorie Perham dared to suggest a species of cultural 
relativism which spoke of the similarities rather than 
the disparities between British and native customs, he 
was likely to be shocked, but remained steadfast in his 
prejudices. To such men it was preferable to keep in
25v. G. Kiernan, The Lords of Human Kind : Black
Man, Yellow Man, and White Man in an Age of Empire (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 196&), p. 321.
15
mind the words of the patriotic historian, J. A. Cramb, 
who remarked "Britain shall become the name of an ideal 
as well as the designation of a race, the description of 
an attitude of mind as well as of traits of b l o o d .
It was a part of the myth of superiority generated
in these pre-war days that in particular no Oriental was
capable of lasting "improvement." Even the progressively
minded Hubert Bland, writing in 1912, stated.
Education at Harvard or Oxford may imbue the 
Chinese student with ideas and social tenden­
cies, apparently antagonistic to those of the 
patriarchal system of his native land; but 
they do not, and cannot, create in him . . . 
the Anglo-Saxon outlook on life, the stan­
dards of conduct and the beliefs which are 
the results of centuries of our process of 
civilisation and structured character . . . 
the Chinese remains true to type . . . Æ n d 7  
will revert in six months to the ancestral 
type of morals and manners . . .^7
This attitude helps to explain why the War Office was so 
reluctant to admit the existence of intelligent and ver­
satile men within the ranks of the Chinese Labour Corps, 
and unwilling to train them once their talents had been 
discovered.
Back in the political world the Tory leader. Lord 
Hugh Cecil, was more sanguine than Bland. Writing in
26j, A. Cramb, The Origins and Destiny of Imperial 
Britain (London: J. Murray, 1915), p. 219.
2?H. Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies in 
China (London; n.p., 1912), p. 150.
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the same year he suggested, "our vocation has been to 
undertake the government of vast uncivilised populations 
and to raise them to a higher level of l i f e . "28 Cecil 
repudiated the carping of the Liberal moralizers who 
urged "that in foreign affairs there prevails an immoral 
doctrine, disregardful of the rights of other nations and 
inconsistent with honest dealing . . . and the normal mor­
ality of Christians."29 Writing the year before in the 
same vein of political ideology the Liberal, L. T. Hob­
house, summed up his views in an unusually vitriolic 
sally:
If men say equality they mean oppression by 
forms of justice . . .  In such an atmosphere, 
perhaps, our safest course, so far as princi­
ples and dedication avail at all, is to fix 
our eyes on the elements of the matter, and 
in any part of the world to support whatever 
method succeeds in securing the 'coloured' 
man from personal violence, from the lash, 
from expropriation . . . ^ n d 7  from the white 
man himself.39
Such words were a blow to those who complacently believed 
that in colonial administration they saw at work "British 
law, the most enlightened distillation of the best in the 
human intellect."31
28Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservatism (London: Thorton
Butterworth, 1928) , p. 211T.
2 9 i b i d . , p. 2 0 0 .
39Hobhouse, Liberalism, p. 27.
31r . Koebner, "The Concept of Economic Imperialism," 
The Economic History Review, 2nd ser.. Vol. II (1949), p. 15.
17
Hobhouse called on "principles and dedication."
Cecil had larger guns at his command, and shrewdly called 
for support on "the normal morality of Christians." As 
a Tory he saw clearly how important was the dispensation 
of the Established Church in maintaining a religious 
framework for the work of "civilising" the native. Cromer 
regarded the Christian church in general as "an ally with­
out whose assistance continued success /Tn the government 
of subject races? was unattainable."^^ The granite rock 
of the Christian code was the only really necessary 
foundation, he felt, in dealings with such natives as "the 
Child-like Eastern . . ."^3 it was a belief such as this 
which led the War Office in 1916 and after to employ 
Christian missionaries in efforts to raise and manage its 
coolie laborers. Although these missionaries were drawn 
mainly from the Baptist and Presbyterian persuasions, 
they knew enough of the workings of the Establishment and 
its code to appreciate the necessity of supporting the 
exclusive racial attitude of their compatriots who handled 
the Chinese.
This is a brief outline of the system of values 
against which the men who handled the Chinese Labour
^^Cromer, "The Government of Subject Races," in 
Political and Literary Essays, 1908-1913 (New York: Books
for Libraries Press, 1969), p. 9.
33 Ibid., p. 43.
18
Corps functioned. It represents a mixture of vague mor- 
alizings, confidence in Britain’s world destiny, belief 
in the paramountcy of her rule of justice and law, re­
cognition that there was a "commonsense" way of doing 
things, and certainty that in many ways the subject races 
would benefit from their albeit unwilling exposure to 
British cultural patterns. A colonial administrator, or 
one in charge of native labor, had merely to adapt this 
consensus "to suit the customs and intellectual standard 
of the subject race with which he has to deal."34 por 
all its vagueness it seemed like a wonderfully workable 
formula.
And yet compounded in this ethos was a very real fear 
of the hordes that Britain had so providentially come to 
govern and exploit. The prominent French historian, E. 
Halévy has suggested that this fear became more tangible 
after the victories of Japan over China and Russia. Could 
these triumphs and the restlessness of Africa be regarded 
as the first actions in a general insurrection "of the non- 
European races against western domination?"35 But so 
long as the natives subject to Britain remained amenable 
to the discipline under which they were kept all was well. 
Complacency could reign. Of all the colonialists of the
3 4 ibid., p. 44.
35Ralevy, The Rule of Democracy: 1905-1914, p. 43.
19
pre-war era, the Englishman could survey current history 
"with a conscience more serene and less clouded with 
d o u b t " 3 6  than any other. But should the hordes become 
agitated and unstable to any great degree, or should they 
attempt to probe the limits of the authority set over them, 
more genuinely repressive measures would be necessary 
which might seriously compromise the satisfying moral 
value system of their white masters.
As the history of the Chinese Labour Corps unfolds 
in the following pages it will be seen how this process 
of reaction actually did evolve until, by 1919, only 
rigid and cruelly authoritarian management kept the dis­
affected coolies in check. Their treatment was a por­
tent, symbol of the end of British colonial reign. Al­
though non-colonial in origin, the Chinese experienced 
the full impact of the pre-war colonial-imperial ethos as 
it modified to meet the challenges of a new and uncertain 
chapter in the ruling of subject races.
It was probably the Liberals and their Radical fel­
low travellers who cared most what happened to the native 
victims of pre-war colonial oppression. It is a commentary 
upon the debasing and dehumanizing effects of war that this
S^The words are those of Aimé Césaire, the Black Mar­
tinican, in A. Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, trans.,
J. Pinkham. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 51.
20
concern barely survived to 1918, and had in fact been 
seriously decayed long before that date. When the Chinese 
were used after the Armistice of 1918 in the collecting 
of war material for the enrichment and profit of the 
British government they became, according to Grey's own 
definition of 1906,3? little more than slaves. The high 
moral tone the Liberals tried so hard to maintain as part 
of their politics collapsed in the face of the harsh 
realities of a new age. It was the death of security and 
respectability.38 The events of the war were the final 
blow. When the war ended it was not the Liberals, but 
the newly coherent Labourites who were most clearly 
identified with the "moral tone" in politics. If the 
story of the raising and management of the Chinese Labour 
Corps shows the decline in tne standards of the Liberals, 
it also points up the same decline in the social and mili­
tary spheres of the British Establishment.
II
There are important background themes against which 
this study will unfold. Some of them have been touched
3?Supra., p. 5.
38This belief has been expounded in the well-known 
Dangerfield thesis. See G. Dangerfield, The Strange Death 
of Liberal England, Capricorn Books (New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1961), passim.
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upon above. For example, in the procedures of British 
officialdom during the raising and direction of the 
Chinese Labour Corps it is possible to discern a recog­
nizable, if sometimes ephemeral, feature of the psychol­
ogy of the times. This feature is the accommodation 
sought between the legal distinctions of a given situ­
ation and the often pressing exigencies which impinge 
upon it and must also be given due weight and considera­
tion. The Chinese actually furnish two examples of this 
theme, which cuts across party lines.
It has already been seen how, in the months before 
the election of 1905, the Liberal party adopted the stance 
of condemning the government's support for the importation 
of coolies into South Africa. Political exigency in the 
shape of campaign promises imparted a momentum which 
served to keep the Liberals' efforts on behalf of the 
coolies alive even after the former had returned to office 
in December. But the Liberals were legalists as well as 
moralists, and they quickly found upon assuming government 
that the pledges they had given to immediately end the 
exploitation of the Chinese would have to be subordinated 
to the juridical aspects i n v o l v e d . S t a t e d  simply, it 
proved impossible to terminate the legally binding con-
^^Supra., p. 7.
22
tracts of the coolies, and it was not until 1910 that 
the last laborer left the R a n d . 4 0
The same conflict between exigency and legality be­
set some of the same politicians and civil servants in 
the two or three years after the initiation of the Chinese 
labor scheme of 1916. On this latter occasion, however, 
the bias was more in favor of the Chinese.
Despite its ambiguous nature, a contract to inden­
ture and protect the coolies had been drawn up and sub­
scribed to by the Liberal government. It must be admitted 
that this contract offered very advantageous and economical 
terms to Britain, and that this was one reason for any 
failure to modify it, but it did contain in addition 
some clauses which benefited the Chinese. For example, 
they were to be allowed their religious holidays, op­
portunities for the special burial of their dead, and 
guaranteed repatriation. There can be no doubt that the 
government experienced pressures to alter this situation 
to the detriment of the coolies, especially as manpower 
needs became more crucial and every man was needed to sup­
port the Allied combat effort. In practice, as one may 
easily envisage, strict observation of fine legal nicet­
ies sometimes broke down under the stress of manpower 
shortages, the sudden reverses of war, or the indiffer-
40Ensor, England: 1870-1914, p. 390.
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ence sometimes manifested by local commanders in the 
field, whose primary consideration in the use of the 
Chinese often extended only to the completion of a given 
task in as little time as possible. But the important 
point is that the demands of the military effort, how­
ever great they occasionally became, failed to provoke 
any official breakdown of the complementary compromise 
between legality and expediency upon which it had origin­
ally been decided to base the establishment of the Chinese 
Labour Corps.
This is not to say that Whitehall or the politicians 
involved would not have bowed completely to fresh exigen­
cies had they perhaps been great or intimidating enough. 
All that is trying to gain establishment here is the 
recognition of the existence of a certain psychology at 
’ T^'k throughout the British dealings with the Chinese.
As has already been suggested, it was a part of the ethos 
of the times. Statesmen called it "fair play," and hoped 
the Chinese themselves might someday emulate it. Others 
spoke of the long traditions of British justice and the 
wonder of their continued existence under the threat of 
global war. It has already been hinted that this common- 
sense modus vivendi between legalism and expediency was 
indeed close to collapse by the war's end, but this con­
tention should not obscure the fact that in 1916 the modus
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vivendi still worked and, although tenuous on occasions, 
worked in favor of the Chinese to prevent their complete 
and utter exploitation at the hands of che armies which 
they served in France.
Yet another important point, to which more detailed 
reference will be made in the body of this work, consists 
in the role the Chinese workers played in the overall 
manipulation of labor resources by the army establishment 
during the war. The Chinese constituted a significant 
element in what may be construed as a revolution in the 
use of labor to sustain hostile action. An attempt will 
be made to offer some brief analysis of this role.
Before the war and during its early stages the 
utilization of available labor resources was poorly 
planned and organized. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to 
suggest that no coherent plan for the use of labor exist­
ed before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. It was 
always hoped by British strategists that any country in 
which the army fought would provide auxiliaries to do 
the heavy work, as was the case during the Boer War, or 
that colonial subjects would rally to the flag and pro­
vide the additional manpower s t r e n g t h s . T o d a y  it has
41p.R.O./W.O. 32/8303, Organisation of Colonial 
Troops for Imperial Service, 19o2, p. 2, para. 5. (Even 
at this juncture though the possible future usefulness of 
African and other native forces as conscripted ancillaries 
was noted, and the optimistic belief in spontaneous colon-
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grown trite to accuse the military planners of pre-1914 
days of infatuation with outdated nineteenth century 
concepts of warfare in which the logistical elements 
were always underestimated. In mitigation, it must be 
recalled too that before 1914 three additional factors 
inhibited the strategists in the planning for labor re­
sources. They expected any war to be relatively short, 
they feared the cost of budgeting for a labor establish­
ment, and they had no wish to needlessly arouse German 
passions by providing even on paper for an army of la­
borers to serve in any future European war.
The advent of trench warfare swept away many inhi­
bitions and brought to bear on hitherto inflexible minds 
the value, extent, and importance of modern technology, 
as well as the need for a unique and unanticipated re­
liance upon vast masses of common labor to accomplish 
the tasks of digging defences and communications trenches, 
laying railway lines, building heavy gun emplacements, 
handling vast quantities of ammunition, unloading moun­
tains of provisions, and generally maintaining the status 
of hundreds of thousands of unusually static combat 
personnel.
It was into this situation that the Chinese blindly
ial aid doubted. This realism was dictated by the experi­
ences of the South African campaigns.)
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stepped. They became part of an exercise in the mar­
shalling and exploitation of a great labor reservoir which 
borrowed its managerial techniques both from the early 
days of the so-called Industrial Revolution and from 
modern and supposedly advanced notions involving con­
cepts of scientific labor direction. Later, when they 
were used on a profit producing basis, the Chinese came 
to be regarded purely as "a business p r o p o s i t i o n . "42
No wonder that serious differences of opinion re­
sulted among officers responsible for the direction of the 
coolies. Some preferred literally to exult in the fact 
that before them lay tens of thousands of manual workers 
upon whom they could draw prodigally when any emergency 
demanded. This attitude proved damaging to the effi­
ciency of the Chinese Labour Corps. Large contingents 
of coolies could wait impotently in base camps until 
needed to plug a gap in the resources of some "employer" 
in the forward positions.
The more progressive school of military labor man­
agers, attempted to use logical and centralized management 
methods, and assigned the Chinese specific and clearly
42j, Blick, "The Chinese Labour Corps in World War 
I ," East Asia Regional Studies Seminar, Harvard, Papers on 
China, Vol. IX (l655), p. 122% fMiss Blick*s represents 
the only academic attempt to date to deal with the Chinese 
Labour Corps. Unfortunately, the work is necessarily super­
ficial owing to its brevity and to the unavailability of 
official sources at the time during which she wrote.)
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outlined tasks under the aegis of one "employer." This 
school relied heavily on graphs and charts of performance, 
wished to predict and control performance, and expected 
a genuine return in completed work for their manpower 
investment. Careful experiments were designed and staged 
in order to determine more clearly the levels of achieve­
ment to which the coolies might a t t a i n . ^3 These levels 
could be phenomenal. Not surprisingly, some officers 
responsible for the deployment of military labor refused 
"to admit that certain work could possibly be done by 
other than British labour.
It is impossible within the compass of this work to 
do more than hint at the outlines of the lively controver­
sy which sprang up around the implementation of the view­
points just described. The war was on the verge of con­
clusion before either side won a clear advantage, and the 
changing patterns of strategy had by then begun to reduce 
the contest to the realm of the academic. But even an ad-
43p.R.O./W.O. 107/37, Labour Report, "Notes on Chi­
nese Labour," August, 1918, para. 4. (One such experiment 
made use of groups of six coolies chosen at random from the 
Corps' strength. One of the parties excavated at the rate 
of 230 cubic feet of chalk and flint and about 1 foot of 
surface soil per man per 8 hours. I t  was this kind of per­
formance that astonished the labor management officers and 
provoked uncomplimentary comparisons with the work of white 
laborers.) See Supra., Appendix "C", p. 267.
44lbid.
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umbration of the problems suggests an addition to the 
history of capitalist and labor relations, compressed in 
this instance into a frenzy under the pressures generated 
by the first of modern wars, and suggests too an answer 
to questions of how well the Chinese were exploited. To 
do them credit, some socialist theorists of the day saw 
what repercussions the lessons learned during this period 
might have on the civil sphere after the war's end.^^
Another aspect of the use of Chinese labor in France 
upon which the following pages will touch is the poten­
tially emotive one of the religious involvement of British 
missionaries, many of whom undeniably saw the contrived 
circumstances of the coolies' existence in France in 
terms of an unrivalled opportunity to proselytize for the 
Christian faith. Missionaries gathered from China and 
elsewhere received encouragement in pursuit of this goal 
from the military establishment in Whitehall, some even 
entering positions of command as officers in the Chinese 
Labour Corps. It was felt by the War Office that the 
application of religious principles would render the 
ccolies tractable and more subservient to the conditions 
of military discipline which prevailed in their camps.
The Foreign and Colonial Offices believed in addition
45j’or example, see "Capitalism After the War," The 
New Statesman, February 3, 1917, p. 413.
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that the religious influence exerted by missionaries 
would encourage a nucleus of converted Chinese to view 
with favor the extension of British influence in their 
homeland after the war. Missionaries, many working under 
the auspices of the Young Mens' Christian Association, 
were eventually permitted to conduct classes in reading 
and writing for the uneducated members of the Chinese 
Labour Corps. These efforts signified an unrivalled 
opportunity to put across British views of politics, 
society, and religion in the simplest and most effective 
manner. They also exhibit the natural outworking of the 
value system outlined in the first half of this intro­
ductory chapter.46
III
It is appropriate to conclude with a note on the 
sources employed in the construction of the work as a 
whole, although additional comments will appear from 
time to time in the following text.
Recently revealed official documents, mostly from 
the War Office files in the Public Record Office in Lon-
46a typical description is found in the following ex­
tract from an officially sanctioned article in The Times. 
"^The coolie7 is also taught to conform to British ideas of 
sanitation, cleanliness and discipline . . . "  "An Army of 
Labour," The Times, December 28, 1917, p. 8 .
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don, comprise the bulk of the original material used.
The war diaries of units using Chinese labor were scanned 
to provide some hint of the actual conditions under which 
the Chinese worked. These official diaries vary in qual­
ity from the perfunctory one-line-a-day variety to those 
containing more elaborate descriptions of day-to-day events. 
This promising source fails to reveal as much as could be 
hoped about events at the company level because in 1917 
some armies in the field ordered the discontinuation of 
such diaries in favor of those written by officers com­
manding at various group headquarters.
The files of the Colonial Office were also consulted, 
but many dispatches on the topic of Chinese labor sent out 
by it and the Foreign Office are found in duplicate in the 
War Office records, and have been cited under the latter 
heading as often as possible. There was at one time a 
Chinese Labour Corps Record Office housed in Whitehall, 
but this important resource has disappeared, perhaps as a 
result of enemy action during the last war. Copies of 
some of the material originally deposited in it can be 
found among files at the Public Record Office, however.
The Newspaper Library of the British Museum at Colin- 
dale provided examples of contemporary press comment on the 
Chinese Labour Corps. This source was not as forthcoming 
as one might have wished, for the War Office carefully
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withheld information on the Corps from the press. Ex­
amples of officially approved press releases can still 
be found in some of the relevant War Office files. They 
furnish an interesting sidelight on the extent of press 
censorship during the war.
Because the Corps was quickly forgotten after the 
war, secondary material on its existence is so slight as 
to be negligible. Thanks are due to Mr. Rigby of the 
Library of the Imperial War Museum in London for suggest­
ing avenues of approach to the problems of providing an 
adequate preliminary bibliography on the topic, and for 
sharing photographs and other memorabilia of the Corps' 
existence as an aid in forming a tangible impression of 
the actual conditions under which the Chinese worked.
Material on the missionary involvement with the 
Chinese is also disappointingly sparse. Much of it was 
not saved in the first place, or was lost during the last 
war. The London headquarters of the YMCA, The Baptist 
Missionary Society, and the Christian Missionary Society 
were all most helpful in attempting to find existing 
original material. The libraries of the TUC and the Labour 
Party furnished important indications of the attitudes of 
organized labor toward the use of the Chinese, and especial 
thanks are due to Mrs. Wagner of the latter institution 
for suggesting the use of the exchange of letters on the
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issue between J. S. Middleton and H, H. Asquith which 
definitely, though briefly, outline labor's stand on 
the question. The Library of the School for Eastern 
Studies at the Birkbeck Institute provided essential 
background reading on the topic.
Some attempt was made to communicate with surviv­
ors who once directed or officered the Chinese. Through 
the medium of announcements in the Journal of the Royal 
British Legion and elsewhere some thirty-five persons 
were contacted, and their reminiscences solicited. But 
because of the very subjective nature of many of the re­
sponses gained it has proven possible to include only a 
few references to them in the body of the text.
CHAPTER II
THE ORIGINS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE 
LABOUR CORPS: 1916-1917
In an address to the House of Commons in July, 1916, 
Mr. Winston Churchill, then temporarily between admini­
strative offices, raised the question of the employment of 
native l a b o r . ^7 He regarded the colored population of the 
British Empire as a vast and important reserve that would 
have to be tapped and employed in labor battalions if man­
power strengths on the various fronts were to be maintained.
This flamboyant and typical sally of Churchill's did 
not meet with the approval of the War O f f i c e . ^8 gut it 
echoed authentically the growing development among the 
Chiefs of Staff of an opinion that the large scale con­
scription of non-white labor was indeed likely to become 
necessary if the armies in France were to be sustained.
The Army Council discussed the possibility of recruiting
47parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser., 
July 24, 1916, col. 1379. p ’l would not even shrink from 
the word Chinese for the purpose of carrying on the War.")
48p.R.O./W.O. 32/11345, Recruitment of Chinese Labour, 




Chinese workers already in residence in small numbers in 
London and Liverpool, and also resolved to approach the 
Foreign and Colonial Offices in regard to the raising of 
Chinese, perhaps in Hong Kong, for work in F r a n c e . ^9 
Here was the first concrete step in the raising of what 
was to become the Chinese Labour Corps.
The Army Council had been stimulated to action by 
the urgings of David Lloyd George, who had succeeded the 
drowned Earl Kitchener as Secretary for War in the same 
month of July, 1916. Lloyd George was a passionate and 
consistent advocate of the need to exploit the manpower 
resources of China. Three days before the Army Council 
meeting just referred to, he had pressed the Colonial 
Secretary, Bonar Law, to prepare to embark upon the se­
curing of coolies for work in France at the earliest 
possible opportunity.50 in the Secretary for War's fer­
tile imagining it seemed as though vast coolie contingents 
were already on hand ready to ease the manpower burden in 
France. He apparently thought that men raised in Crown 
territory at Hong Kong would provide the cheapest, most 
readily available, and most accessible source of manual 
labor. When the Army Council accepted this latter belief
49p.R.O./W.O. 163/21, Minutes of the Proceedings of 
the Army Council, 1915/1916, Precis 832, meeting of July 
2Ô, 1 9 1 6 .
50p R.O./W.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, Secretary for 
War to Colonial Secretary, London, July 25, 1916.
35
and approached Bonar Law on the matter he rather diffi­
dently estimated in response that perhaps ten thousand 
Chinese might be enlisted there.51 Lloyd George, as 
prime mover, was disappointed at the small number. Law, 
on the other hand, saw possibilities in so small a scheme, 
and agreed readily with the suggestion of the Army Council 
that this potential labor force might be conveniently or­
ganized into battalions of one thousand men each, to be 
employed for the duration of the war.
It is apparent that Law lacked an appreciation of 
the extent of Lloyd George's plans for the possible uses 
of Chinese labor. The Secretary for War saw as many as 
two hundred thousand coolies at work not only in France 
but in England as well, and there can be no doubt that 
some military members of the Army Council particularly 
appreciated this latter aspect of Lloyd George's vision. 
But Law understood that any of his colonial Chinese used 
in England would be employed solely to ameliorate "the 
existing shortage of men available for agricultural and 
industrial work at h o m e , ” 5 2  and never as substitutes for 
men who might be ordered to the fighting fronts. Later, 
when it became generally known that Law had uncritically 
accepted the view that Chinese might work in Britain it-
51lbid., Army Council Memorandum, August 2, 1916.
52ibid. , noted in War Office Memorandum to Commander- 
in-Chief, B.E.F., France, August 5, 1916.
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self, he was accused along with others of originating 
the Chinese labor scheme specifically in order that white 
men working on the home front could be released for com­
bat duties. There is no evidence to connect Law with 
such an outlook. He saw any coolie presence in Britain 
as numerically small and as purely supernumerary, and not 
as part of a dilution or substitution plan. He later re­
gretted his hasty endorsement of Lloyd George's enthusi­
astic suggestions in regard to the use of Chinese, made 
as it was without any satisfactory assurances as to the 
planned scheme's scope or intent.^3
Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign Office was much more 
cautious about supporting Lloyd George's grand designs, 
even if they did emerge from the comparatively sober circle 
of the Army Council. He remembered the "Chinese Slavery" 
issue of 1905, and had joined his Liberal colleagues on 
that occasion in opposing Balfour's Tories. Now he was 
being asked to sanction a new scheme for the importation 
of Chinese coolies. He determined to proceed very care­
fully. When asked, he voiced two very immediate and press­
ing objections to the scheme as it appeared to him to be 
emerging from the Army Council and the Colonial Office.
What, Grey wanted to know, would be the impact upon
53p.R.O./C.O. /Colonial Office? 521/33, Correspondence 
on the Chinese Labour Scheme, Memorandum of A. Bonar Law, 
1918.
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public opinion and morale if it became known that the 
government intended to repeat the fundamentals of the 
South African experiment? Surely the indictment that was 
likely to follow any such revelation would be given ad­
ditional momentum by the fact that it was proposed to 
gather coolies from Hong Kong, whose warm blooded south­
ern natives were likely to collapse under any prolonged 
subjection to the rigors of a French winter campaign.
With these practical and sensible cautions Grey also 
coupled a plea for the greatest circumspection in case 
the suspicions of the press were aroused, and the whole 
tentative project be jeopardized by sensationalist spe-
C4
culation. Obviously he believed that the nation's moral 
value system would not support the blatant exploitation 
of natives even under the stresses of war.
Grey at this juncture enjoyed his own trusted source 
of information in China in the form of Colonel D. S. Rob­
ertson, a senior military attaché in the Peking legation. 
Robertson’s reports, although generally addressed formally 
to the Director of Military Intelligence in W h i t e h a l l , 55
5^P.R.0./F.0. /Foreign Office? 17/7273, Correspondence, 
1916, Grey, Foreign Office, to Under Secretary of State, 
Colonial Office, London, September 11, 1916.
55Robertson correctly addressed all his communications 
to the Director of Military Intelligence, but he tacitly un­
derstood that most of them would be read and digested by his 
friend. Captain Denny, of M.I. 3. Citations of Robertson’s 
official correspondence which follow will be headed D.M.I.
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often contained material compiled especially for the eyes 
of Grey. Robertson had himself long been an advocate of 
the use of Chinese manpower resources in some form by 
the British armies in France. By coincidence, he had 
forwarded Grey one of his special reports touching upon 
this particular topic, and it arrived on the Foreign Sec­
retary's desk during the very week of the Army Council 
conference which sanctioned the first formal moves toward 
the setting up of the Chinese Labour Corps. Incidentally, 
this particular communique later enabled Sir John Jordan, 
the British minister in Peking, to claim that the idea 
for the Chinese Labour Corps actually originated within 
the confines of his own l e g a t i o n . 56
The Robertson report to Grey is worth examining in 
some detail, for it proves that Grey was aware of mili­
tary thinking on the question of the use of Chinese man­
power resources and also of the full utilization to which 
those resources might be put. Robertson's recommendations 
on this occasion were outspoken. Chinese should be used 
in British factories to release men for the colors, said 
Robertson, explicitly enjoining that Chinese labor re­
serves, once opted for, be ruthlessly exploited by the
56p.R.o /WO. 106/33, C.L.C. History, "Report on 
China; no. 31, 'x,' Chinese Labour Corps," Sir John Jor­
dan, Peking, January 20, 1920.
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Imperial government. The military members of the Army 
Council would be in full accord with this, he added. But 
Robertson was aware, too, of the trouble which might arise 
were British trade unions to learn of the extent of the 
planned uses he foresaw for coolies. The French, he ob­
served, had already experienced problems in this direction 
when embarking upon a similar scheme to employ Chinese in 
early 1916, only they had forged ahead regardless. Some­
how, not only for factories at home and trench digging in 
France, but so that Britain's prestige and influence 
could be sustained in the Far East after the war, "this 
inexhaustible supply of human material"^? in China had 
to be exploited. If Britain did this, claimed Robertson 
arrogantly, she could legitimately "claim a share in the 
policy of China, should this require to be done under 
foreign supervision _/Ffter the war7."^® It is not clear 
what Robertson was suggesting here, but clearly he felt 
that the use of Chinese by Britain would in some way help 
to extend her influence in Chinese politics at some later 
date.
57p.R.O./W.O. 106/35, Proposed Employment of Chinese, 
"Memorandum on the Employment of Chinese for War," Robert­
son, Peking, to D.M.I., London, July 23, 1916. (The memo­
randum was copied and forwarded under a covering note from 
Jordan to Grey by D.M.I. on July 25.) (This file will here­
after be cited Employment.)
SGibid.
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Robertson also impressed upon Grey the economy of 
using coolies for the heaviest labor. The Russians, he 
noted, already used large numbers of them in their Don 
and Ural mines, and for a fraction of the cost of their 
own indigenous labor. But, went on the attache, "In Eng­
land we should without doubt meet . . . difficulties from 
our Labour Party . . . though of course use of Chinese 
would release for combatant work a number of able-bodied 
miners, transport workers, etc. In conclusion, Rob­
ertson saw no objection to the use of Chinese as fighting 
troops. Why not engage them ostensibly for non-combatant 
purposes and afterward enlist them voluntarily for com­
batant work at increased pay, he mused.
What effect this memorandum had upon Grey is not 
known. Certainly it must have caused him to reflect that 
the initiatives of Lloyd George and the Army Council were 
steering the government perilously close to parallels 
with earlier and discredited schemes for the indenture of 
native labor. Perhaps he felt that the resolution of the 
matter lay out of his hands once having been declared 
militarily sound by the Army Council, but his close at­
tention to the scheme as it developed and his occasional 




The Army Council, having sounded out both the Col­
onial and Foreign Offices, was eager to move ahead with 
the implementation of the coolies' collection and ex­
ploitation. At first it authorized the War Office to 
explore fully the possibilities of raising the necessary 
natives in Hong Kong, thus ignoring Grey's concerns on the 
unsuitability of the colony's coolies. Robertson in 
Peking was surprised that the Army Council had chosen 
Hong Kong, for he too believed that its inhabitants would 
never stand the pace of a winter in France. Later he re­
marked that.
The first impression gained was that the Gov­
ernment and the Array Council for political 
reasons were fighting shy of reviving anything 
in the shape of the South African indentured 
coolie Convention and therefore had asked the 
Hong Kong Government to arrange the matter 
quietly.GO
It seems more likely that the endorsement of Hong Kong as 
a recruiting ground was made because of Bonar Law's en­
thusiastic espousal of the idea. He saw in it a means 
of keeping control of the scheme under his own department, 
besides which the vision of colonial natives rallying to 
the flag in time of Imperial distress appealed to his 
views on the solidarity of Empire.
Law clung tenaciously to the Hong Kong proposal even
GOp.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Robertson, 
Peking, to D.M.I., London, September 19, 37916.
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after its feasibility had long been rejected by the War 
Office and the Army Council. As late as November 21,
1916, Law was in contact with the Governor of Hong Kong,
May, asking him if it were still possible to raise a se­
parate contingent of coolies t h e r e . S o  annoying had 
Law’s continued interference become by then that the 
Army Council itself responded by asking the Colonial 
Office to desist finally from any further prosecution of 
a plan to raise men in Hong Kong. Law, who had also been 
attracted to the lower pay scales obtained for Hong Kong 
coolies,62 was obliged to submit. He saw, too, that the 
Colony could never have, supplied the huge numbers of men 
that Lloyd George had in mind. Law's independent line 
on the matter offers an interesting glimpse of the stub­
born nature of his character and of his refusal to co­
operate with his Liberal colleagues in the Coalition.
Sir Edward Grey, in harmony with his earlier cautions, 
had already made perfectly clear his repudiation of Law's 
preoccupation with Hong Kong as a labor recruiting g r o u n d . 63 
It had not taken the Army Council long to abandon
61p.R.O./W.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, Law, London, to 
Sir H. May, Hong Kong, November 21, IÔ1 6 .
62p.R.O./C.O.521/32, Wei-hai-Wei Correspondence, Bon­
ar Law, London, to Commissioner, Wei-hai-Wei, September 30, 
1916.
63p.R 0 /W.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, Grey, London, 
to Jordan, Peking, September 30, 1916.
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the Hong Kong project. On August 14, 1916, it informed 
Aristide Briand, President of the French Republic, of the 
British Army's intention to employ large numbers of Chi­
nese in F r a n c e . G4 Briand apparently saw no objection.
Two days later a conference at the War Office discussed 
the merits of Hong Kong as a recruiting ground and came 
to the decision that it was inappropriate to seek workers 
there. Lloyd George and Mr. Asquith were i n f o r m e d . ^5 
Asquith had been one of the most outspoken Liberal op­
ponents of what he called "Chinese Slavery" during the 
campaign against the Tories twelve years e a r l i e r . 66 
is both ironic and saddening that he should now have been 
involved in the process of approving a similar and much 
more extensive employment of Chinese laborers. His in­
ability to contribute any substantial comment on what he 
had once regarded as grossly reprehensible behavior in­
dicates both the subsidence in the Liberals' moral value 
system and the erosion of his own hold on government. He
6 ^Ibid., War Office Memorandum, August 14, 1916.
(The French were already employing substantial numbers of 
Chinese coolies in France and in their North African pos­
sessions. The British and French schemes remained entirely 
au conomous, however.)
GSibid., War Office Memorandum, August 17, 1916.
H. Asquith, The Chinese Labour Question: Speech 
in the House of Commons, March 21, 1904, in Support of the 
Vote of Censure (London: Liberal Publications Dept., 1904)
passim.
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was content to let Lloyd George handle the situation in 
conjunction with the military establishment.
By the early days of September, 1916, the Army 
Council was quite sure that it should press ahead with 
plans to recruit coolies from the northern Chinese pro­
vince of Shantung. These men were tougher by far than 
their Hong Kong brothers, and used to a colder climate. 
The Council had been under considerable pressure from the 
Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig, to produce addi­
tional laborers for use in France. Having given pledges 
of assistance to its importunate C.-in-C.,^? it had no 
option but to move as quickly as possible to produce some 
of the desired men. The War Office was instructed to 
send a representative out to the Far East to superintend 
the early stages of a massive labor recruitment effort.
But so hasty an action was frowned upon by Sir John 
Jordan, British minister in Peking, who insisted to his 
London superiors that the War Office be restrained until 
the full political and diplomatic ramifications of the 
plan to raise coolies had been thoroughly explored by him 
and his professional advisors on the spot.®® Jordan’s
®?P.R.O./W.O. 32/5094, Substitution of Coloured for 
White Personnel in France, C.-in-C., B.E.F., France, to Army 
Council, London, September 1, 1916. (Hereafter cited Substi­
tution. )
®®Jordan referred to his irritation at this time dur­
ing the course of a later complaint on the continued bla- 
tency of War Office tactics in China. See P.R.O./W.O.
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London colleagues at the Foreign Office agreed with his 
call for restraint. These professional civil servants 
often had resented the virtual autonomy enjoyed by the 
war establishment, especially in time of crisis. Now they 
were determined to see the War Office consult with them 
if the coolie scheme were to succeed. Chinese recruitment 
direct from China was bound to provoke the fullest atten­
tions of the government in Peking, and to require the 
mediatory powers of the Foreign Office experts both in 
London and in China. It is no exaggeration to suggest 
that this inter-departmental rivalry, evident in the 
sources examined, considerably delayed the eventual ma­
terialization of the Chinese Labour Corps in the European 
theater of operations.
A compromise was eventually agreed upon which satis­
fied both sides. The Chinese government was nominally 
neutral. It was also unstable. It was clear that any 
compromise would have to bear these two factors in mind 
and must be drawn up so as to allow control of the situa­
tion to reside in British hands while at the same time 
preserving the face of the Chinese. A line somewhere 
between obvious exigency and strict legality must be ar­
rived at. To facilitate this, close cooperation between 
the Foreign and War Offices was an obvious necessity.
32/11345, Recruitment, Jordan, Peking, to Foreign Office, 
London, November l2, 1916.
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It was the Colonial Office that broke the deadlock. 
Within its confines arose the suggestion that the desired 
number of coolies be raised in Chinese territory by means 
of contracts with independent recruiting companies, and 
then directed®® to Wei-hai-Wei, a small Crown enclave at 
the northeastern end of the Shantung peninsula. This 
suggestion effectively brought Bonar Law back into the 
picture, for the Colonial Office was responsible for the 
administration of Wei-hai-Wei through its commissioner 
there, Lockhart.
As it transpired, Wei-hai-Wei was indeed to offer 
the perfect compromise solution to the problem of securing 
the Chinese laborers. To understand why, it is necessary 
to spend a moment in reviewing the enclave's origins and 
status. In area, Wei-hai-Wei measured approximately two 
hundred and eighty-eight square miles, with Port Edward 
as its administrative center. Infinitesimal in terms of 
economic as well as geographical scope, the dependency 
had received a smalx annual grant from the Exchequer since 
its acquisition by the Crown, which saw the possession as 
a useful counter for Russia's seizure of Port Arthur in 
1895. The circumstances of its acquisition are thus 
fairly clear. Grey always believed that China had given
69"Allowing them to find their way" was the cautious 
official phrasing eventually employed.
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Wei-hai-Wei " w i l l i n g l y ,"70 and he always regarded it as 
a legitimate possession. But the situation regarding the 
enclave's actual status is not so easy to determine. The 
original lease under which Britain took possession was 
dated July 1, 1898. The official documents are silent 
on the territory until early 1901, when the enclave was 
in the hands of one Major-General Donwarde. He was vir­
tually self-appointed, his courts were dispensers of a 
rigorous variety of colonial justice, and their proclama­
tions were adhered to "as if they had the force of law."71 
When the Colonial Office examined Wei-hai-Wei's 
status in 1916 it found itself unable to clarify the actual 
legal situation obtaining there. The original lease was 
ambiguous. The administration of the enclave had appar­
ently never been legitimized by Orders in Council. The 
succeeding Commissioners had functioned almost independent­
ly, and had long since arrived at an agreement with the 
Chinese in neighboring Shantung province concerning the 
practical direction of the enclave's day to day affairs 
and its relations with the Chinese government. There was 
no mandate to govern. Neither was Wei-hai-Wei a colony.
Few if any tangible payments had been made China for its
70e . Grey, Twenty-five Years: 1892-1916 (London;
Hodder & Stoughton, 1025), Vol. II, p. 24.
71p.R.O./C.O. 521/32, Wei-hai-Wei Correspondence, 
Memorandum on History, 1Ô16.
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possession. In late 1916, when it suddenly became the 
unwonted cynosure of the combined staffs of the Colonial, 
Foreign and War Offices, Wei-hai-Wei owed the only alle­
giance it knew directly to Commissioner Lockhart, an 
autocratic governor of the old school.
These ambiguities suited London perfectly. They 
could be fallen back upon by the Chinese in explaining 
British actions there in regard to the assembling of cool­
ies for shipment to France. At Wei-hai-Wei, too, the 
coolies could sign or affirm their contracts on soil that 
was de facto British; an important point for the legal­
ists in Whitehall. The Germans would be irritated, no 
doubt, but impotent in the face of China's "inability" 
to stop Britain doing what she wanted on her own soil. 
Britain, on the other hand, could claim that Wei-hai-Wei 
fell outside formal regulations governing most Crown col­
onies or possessions contiguous to neutral states. In 
additional bonus the War Office found that Wei-hai-Wei's 
port facilities would allow the operation of large trans­
port ships.
And so this compromise was offered the Peking gov­
ernment, along with strong hints of a possible remission
72"Notes on Chinese at Wei-hai-Wei," The Empire at 
War (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), V, C. Lucas,
e d ., pp. 45-46. See too P.R.O./W.O. 32/8244 and P.R.O./ 
W.O. 32/8245, Military Intelligence Reports, China"! (The 
territory was handed back to China in 1931.)
49
of, or moratorium on, the British share of the outstand­
ing Boxer Indemnity, should a reasonable amount of co­
operation be forthcoming.73 Although still greatly 
afraid of German r e t a l i a t i o n , t h e  Chinese administra­
tion could not resist such inducements. If it failed 
to lend an active hand in the working out of the Wei- 
hai-Wei compromise, it at least did nothing to hinder 
it. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the Chinese were 
strong enough to have opposed British designs had they 
wished to.
Shantung province itself presented problems to the 
implementation of London's plans. It had never been an 
easy area for the Chinese to control, although geographic­
ally close to Peking. In 1895, Germany insisted upon the 
virtual cession of the province in compensation for the 
murder of one of her missionaries, and German presence 
there remained strong until China's belated adherence to 
the Entente in August, 1918. Rebel Chinese warlords daily 
increased the civil unrest in the province, and the Japan­
ese eyed it greedily as a potential sphere of influence.
73p.R.o./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Alston, Peking, 
to D.M.I., London, September 1, 1917. (The reference is to 
events of 1916.)
74ibid., Jordan, Peking, to D.M.I., London, January 
18, 19181 [Here Jordan revealed that one reason for Chi­
nese diffidence had been fear of reprisals against one 
hundred Chinese students interned in Germany and Austria 
as "hostages" for her good behavior.)
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If anything, the Chinese government in Peking seemed to 
have regarded the British efforts to raise men there as 
a possible release valve for some of the pressures gen­
erated by rural poverty, hunger, and disaffection; a 
view that they held earlier when negotiating with the 
Russians for a supply of c o o l i e s .
And so it was to Shantung that Britain now resorted 
as the major source of manpower for her so called "Raw 
Importation"^® of laborers. With the manifest inef­
fectiveness of the central government in controlling the 
course of events in the province, it rested with local 
Chinese officials to approve the moves Britain intended 
to make. Bribery of these men was readily sanctioned by 
the British legation in Peking, and resorted to freely, 
the funds coming from the legation's military intelli­
gence budget.77
The War Office was happy to accept the Wei-hai-Wei 
expedient, and the major threads of the immediate situa-
75p.R.o./c.o. 873/482, Memoranda of Wei-hei-Wei 
Commissioner, Lockhart, Wei-hai-Wei, to Colonial Office, 
London, September /?/, 1916. (Lockhart reveals the Rus­
sians hoped to use Wei-hai-Wei.)
76xhis phrase occurs frequently in the documents, 
hence its employment in the title of this work.
77p.R.o./w.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Robertson, Pe­
king, to D.M.I., London, October 30, 1916. (Robertson la­
mented the extra cost this would involve Ibid., Robertson, 
Peking, to D.M.I., London, December 16, 1916.)
51
tion passed for a time more decisively into the hands of
the Foreign and Colonial Offices. Grey thought the plan
a splendid one. He proposed a procedure for recruitment:
The procedure proposed is that local recruit­
ing agents who would be Chinese should en­
deavour in Chinese territory to get Coolies: 
large numbers to go to Wei-hei-Wei where they 
would be regularly recruited as though they 
were ordinary inhabitants of that district, 
in order that battalions may be externally 
/sic7 British . . . there would seem to be no 
reason why Chinese Government should be 'of­
ficially' cognisant . . .
Grey particularly hoped to avoid the kind of formal agree­
ment or convention that had proved so damaging to his 
political opponents in 1904, when the South African coolie 
scandal broke. Since he himself was now involved in a 
parallel undertaking, he urged Jordan at whatever cost to 
come to "a private understanding"?^ with the Chinese 
authorities if it looked as though they were likely to 
demand guarantees in regard to the recruited coolies.
But what actual processes should be adopted for re­
cruitment? Grey's advice was vague in relation to the 
realities involved, for it was one thing to recommend 
the use of "Local recruiting agents who would be Chinese," 
another to find such persons in the middle of the turmoil 
and confusion of Shantung province. Before London could 
grapple with this issue a more important one arose that
?8p.R.o./w.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, Sir Edward Grey, 
London, to Jordan, Peking, September 30, 1916.
79ibid.
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would have to be settled even before the raising of the 
coolies actually began.
The legal experts at the War Office bad come up 
with serious doubts about whether or not coolies could be 
"recruited" by the British Army. For them the right 
choice of word involved far more than a mere semantic 
issue. They saw the expediency of the Wei-hai-Wei com­
promise, but they also had to think in strictly legal 
terms as well, and would be responsible for the result 
long after the emergencies of war had ceased to exist and 
the reputation of British justice was standing on its own 
once again. The War Office was advised that "enrollment" 
rather than recruitment was the best term under which to 
determine the coolies' legal status. Recruitment would 
imply enlistment, and enlistment in turn implied the 
government's formal and lasting responsibility in terms 
of pensions, gratuities, and benefits. There was a pos­
sibility that Section 95 of The Army Act, which provided 
for certain classes of camp follower, could be revised to 
cover the coolies, but this too would have involved the 
government in distinct liabilities for the coolies' 
maintenance and welfare after demobilization. All of 
this was most undesirable so far as Whitehall in general 
was concerned.80
80p.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Memorandum on 
the Legal Status of Chinese Labour, 1916.
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What the legal experts really wanted was some form 
of convention with China that would release Britain from 
liability. This was undesirable, too, because if any 
agreement became public it would call forth unpleasant 
comparisons with former coolie schemes, perhaps even the 
South African affair. Under such circumstances it was 
reasonably certain that the Chinese government would de­
mand sizeable tangible benefits in return for jeopardiz­
ing its "neutrality." Besides, Robertson doubted that 
any form of agreement could ever "be twisted to apply" to 
the essentials of the Wei-hai-Wei c o m p ro m is e .
In Peking Sir John Jordan too had addressed himself 
to the problem. Jordan was a product in part of the ethos 
that was described during the first chapter of this work. 
He was desperately eager that the good name of Britain be 
preserved in her dealings with the Chinese. He knew it 
was necessary to stoop to bribery to win Chinese support, 
but this he rationalized by reflecting that it was a time 
honored custom in the East. The concept under which the 
coolies were to be raised was different. It must be as 
just, fair, and as legally defensible as the situation 
permitted. He recommended enrollment as the best all 
around solution, and as the one most likely to uphold the
Sllbid., Robertson, Peking, to D.M.I., London, Sep­
tember 19, 1916.
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neutrality of the Peking g o v e r n m e n t . ^2
What emerged from Whitehall as a result of these 
considerations was a piece of casuistry pure and simple 
under which coolies were recruited in Shantung and "en­
rolled" at Wei-hai-Wei. As a result, the Chinese laborers 
stood in something of a legal hiatus, and had no defens­
ible or strictly logical relationship to their ultimate 
employers in Europe. Happily for London, this legal 
fiction was never construed in a court of law. It serves, 
however, to emphasize the insubstantial nature of the 
ground on which expediency, legality, and moral values 
met over the composition of the Chinese Labour Corps.
The coolies were to remain de jure aliens, but were com­
pletely at the disposal of the British with little hope 
of any recourse to their own government.®^
Having cleared this issue from its path, the War 
Office was most eager to get on with the actual process 
of raising and enrolling the men it had promised Haig for 
use in France. The weeks were passing, and little of a 
constructive nature seemed to have been accomplished.
82p.R.O./W.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, Jordan, Peking, 
to War Office, London, September Ô6 , Î916.
83 Chinese legation officials in London were supposed 
to watch over Chinese Labour Corps workers. See H. F. 
MacNair, "The Chinese as Contract Labourers," China Weekly 
Review, Vol. XXV, June 2, 1923, p. 4.
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Satisfying all the parties concerned was proving harder 
than anyone had anticipated when the Army Council made 
its initial move back in July. In fact, though, the War 
Office had not allowed discussion to hold it back, and 
had already set the wheels in motion through its at­
tachés, Robertson and Alston, in Peking, who had been 
instructed to see what private firms would offer the 
most suitable terms for the raising of coolies in Shan­
tung province.
Apparently Jordan, who was always nervous concerning 
the actions of the military attachés in case they offended 
the Chinese government's sense of n e u t r a l i t y , 84 did see 
eye to eye with Colonel Robertson when it came to select­
ing these contractors. Why not let "local British firms 
. . . who have had experience of recruiting for South 
A f r i c a " 8 5  t>e used, opined Jordan. A day or two later 
Robertson, who had reluctantly agreed on the necessity of 
maintaining a low military profile during these delicate 
negotiations, wrote to Military Intelligence in London,
"we are now collecting as many of the recruiting agents 
who worked in the South African scheme as p o s s i b l e . "86
84p.R.o./w.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, Jordan, Peking, 
to Sir Edward Grey, London, October 2, Ï916.
85ibid.
86p . R 0 . /W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Robertson, 
Peking, to Ù.M.I , London, October lO, 1916.
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London agreed that the cost of these efforts to raise 
men, when underway, should be borne in London, the Ex­
chequer paying direct to designated agents like Forbes 
and Company, of Canon Street.
Recruitment, then, was to be handled by British con­
tractors in China, who would raise coolies and then direct 
them to Wei-hai-Wei by means as clandestine as possible. 
Agents in the employ of the British legation in Peking 
would supervise this enterprise, and the Chinese govern­
ment would, it was confidently hoped, continue to turn a 
blind eye.
Grey remained very closely identified with this pro­
gress. He had in his hands clear recommendations from 
Jordan and Robertson which spoke of methods very similar 
to those which he and his colleagues in the Liberal Party 
had outspokenly condemned a decade earlier. Even closer 
parallels with that earlier situation existed, as Grey 
soon learned. He discovered, for example, that the 
barracks at Wei-hai-Wei in which it was planned to as­
semble the laborers while they awaited transportation 
to France where none other than the buildings employed 
for a similar purpose during the South African emigration
B7p.R.O./C.O. 521/32, Wei-hai-Wei Correspondence, 
Commissioner, Wei-hai-Wei, to Colonial Secretary, London, 
October 10, 1916.
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Fortunately for the already tarnished reputation of 
what has been called Grey's "puzzled rectitude,"88 it 
was Bonar Law who handled the barracks issue. The Col­
onial Secretary agreed to approach the Witwatersrand 
Native Labour Association of Johannesburg, premier im­
porter of Chinese in 1903 and after,®® to ascertain 
whether these buildings in Wei-hai-Wei which belonged to 
it could be rented or borrowed by His Britannic Majesty's 
Government for the duration of the war.®® The government 
of the Union of South Africa kindly responded to Law's 
queries by suggesting that Britain make full and free use 
of the somewhat dilapidated Wei-hai-Wei installation for 
the remainder of hostilities.®^
No wonder that in Robertson's estimation the advice 
of the Peking legation's Chinese Secretary, Barton, might
88a.J.P. Taylor, English History: 1914-1945 (Har-
mondsworth: Penquin Books, 1970), p. 45Ô.
®®A. Bailey, Speeches on the Chinese Question (Cape 
Town: Cape Times Ltd., 1904), p. 5
®0p.R.O./W.O. 32/ 11345, Recruitment, Under-Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, London, to Commissioner, Wei- 
hai-Wei, October 11, 1916.
®lp.R.O./F.O. 25/0933, Correspondence, 1916, Buxton, 
for Government of Union of South Africa, to Colonial Sec­
retary, London, October 26, 1916. (The cost of repairing 
the barracks was lower than anticipated - 2,563 Mexican 
dollars at ten to the pound. See P .R.O./C.0. 843/488, 
Wei-hai-Wei Memoranda, Commissioner, Wei-hai-Wei, to Col- 
onial Office, London, October /?/, 1916.)
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just as well be followed and the whole machinery for the 
immigration handled "something like the Coolies in the 
R a n d . "92 indeed, Robertson reported to London that one 
Mr. Jameson, who actually directed the Chinese camps on 
the Rand after 1903,93 had been considered by the lega­
tion's military staff, to which he had returned as an 
advisor, as potential organizer of this new effort to 
raise native labor. Grey may have been relieved to find 
that Robertson doubted very much whether this unhappy 
reminder of the South African experiment would be satis­
factory under the conditions of restraint involved in 
1916, for Jameson displayed a violent temperament, and 
was generally considered "very d i f f i c i l e . " 9 4
It was also proposed in China that the ships used 
for transporting the Chinese to France be modified in 
exactly the same way as for the South African arrange­
ment.®^ And to further underline the similarity between
92p.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Robertson, Pe­
king, to D.M.I., London, October 17, 1916.
93it was Sydney Buxton who at the time said the po­
sition of the Chinese in these camps was a moral question 
of the highest significance. See Parliamentary Debates 
(House of Commons), 4th ser., February l6l 1904, col. 1555,
94p.R.o./w.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Robertson, Pe­
king, to D.M.I., London, October 30, 1916.
95p.R,o./w.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, Jordan, Peking, 
to Foreign Office, London, October 2S, IÏÏ16.
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the schemes of 1903-1904 and 1916, one sees that even the 
sum asked for each coolie by the local recruiting syndi­
cates in China stood at one pound seventeen shillings
and sixpence; the same amount paid them by the Rand im- 
96porters.
II
By the end of October, 1916, the War Office had set­
tled on someone to represent it at Wei-hai-Wei, and to 
take full responsibility for coordinating the enrollment 
and shipment of the coolies. This individual was T. J. 
Bourne, former Engineer in Chief of the Pukou-Sin Yang 
Railway in China, who now owed his allegiance directly 
to the Directorate General of Military Railways, presided 
over by Sir Eric Geddes. In deference to the Foreign and 
Colonial Offices, and in order to be brought up to date 
by Robertson, Bourne was ordered by the War Office to go 
first to Peking. He was specifically instructed to leave 
in the hands of Jordan and his legation the delicate diplo­
matic situation which existed outside Wei-hai-Wei itself.97 
The conciliatory attitude adopted by the War Office in
96ibid., Jordan, Peking, to Foreign Office, London, 
October 22, 1916.
97Ibid., War Office Memorandum, October 6 , 1916. 
(Bourne left London post haste on October 9.)
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choosing Bourne, a civilian, and in sending him to Peking 
to consult, indicates that a degree of working cooperation 
and accommodation had at last been arrived between it and 
the other parties interested in the prompt formation of 
the Chinese Labour Corps.
After his visit to Jordan and Robertson in Peking, 
Bourne set about consolidating the agreements these two 
had been making with firms of local British contractors 
operating mainly in the province of Shantung, but also 
with interests in Chihli and elsewhere. More agents in 
the pay of the British legation also materialized in Shan­
tung to help maintain the subterranean and delicate bal­
ance between the labor contractors and local Chinese 
civil servants. Bourne settled in at Wei-hai-Wei to await 
the expected influx of coolies. Bonar Law had already 
cabled from London to remind Commissioner Lockhart once 
again that the men who would soon be raised from the 
farms and villages of the Chinese countryside were to be 
filtered quietly and unobtrusively into the enclave, "in 
the name of the Government of that T e r r i t o r y . " 9 8
Bourne soon encountered frustrations. For one thing, 
it proved hard for London to agree on what form the con-
^ P.R.O./C.O. 521/32, Wei-hai-Wei Correspondence, 
Colonial Secretary, London, to Commissioner, Wei-hai-Wei, 
October 6 , 1916.
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tract under which the coolies were to enroll should take. 
Whitehall was most anxious that the contract not commit 
the British government to any long standing liability in 
relation to the coolies. Repatriation would be guaran­
teed, but after this responsibility must cease. The Army 
Council had before it copies of the old South African con­
tract and was aware too of the contents of contracts used 
by the French in their Chinese labor scheme. The text of 
the so called South African Labour Ordinance bears some 
resemblances to the British contract of 1916, especially 
on matters of transport, hygiene, and segregation, but it 
was a much more lengthy and complicated document, and was 
not intended to be read or even understood by the coolies, 
who merely affirmed that they accepted its contents.
The Army Council was agreed with the rest of Whitehall that 
the British contract should be simple in form even if 
deliberately vague in phrasing. The Peking legation also 
gave a hand in the composition of the contract.100 But 
the discussions and draftings took time, and Bourne con-
B^Chinese Labour Ordinance, as Amended in Committee, 
and Submitted to the Legislative Council of the Transvaal 
by the Attorney General (London: New Reform Club, n.d.), 
passim. (The Council got a copy of the latest French con­
tract from Robertson, who remarked that it was "usefully 
vague on purpose" and might be worth some emulation. See 
P.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Robertson, Peking, to 
D.M.I., London, October 3o, 1916.)
lOOfbid., Alston, Peking, to D.M.I., London, Novem­
ber 24, 1916.
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tinued to fret in Wei-hai-Wei, aware as he was of the War 
Office's impatience to get the scheme under weigh. After 
the war it was frankly admitted by the History of War 
Committee that the framing of the contract had been a 
major cause of delay, and also of "a certain amount of 
misunderstanding and difficulty,"101 not to say variations 
of interpretation.
It was to be the end of the year before Bourne had 
in his hands the final contract which the coolies were 
actually to sign and take with them to France. He him­
self marvelled at the composition of the document, with 
its clever ambiguities and occasional deliberate dupli­
cities,102 and appreciated that it represented a clever 
modus vivendi between the desire of the legalists to 
have a specific document under which to enroll the coolies 
and protect the British government, and the exigencies of 
war which made it desirable to get the Chinese to France
lOljbid., A History of War Committee Report, June 5, 
1919, "Formation of Labour Corps." ("It gave us power to 
hold them for a long period with the option of getting rid 
of them in a moderately short time.")
I02unfortunately, no final draft of the contract 
seems to be extant, although a number of tentative drafts 
and suggestions exist in the relevant War Office files. Ex­
amples of the ambiguities and deliberate duplicities refer­
red to above may be found in the following citations. Others 
will be discussed in specific detail in a later chapter.
See P.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Alston, Peking, to 
D.M.I., London, December 3, 1916, and P.R.O./W.O. 32/11345, 
Recruitment, Jordan, Peking, to Foreign Office, London, 
October 13, 1916.
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without delay. He saw clearly how it was designed too to 
protect the post-war reputations of those who had always 
maintained that British fair play and justice were the 
cornerstones of Britain's mandate to rule the subject 
races.
After having been forced to admit the temporary sus­
pension of his activities due to difficulties with local 
officials in Shantung, Bourne was at last able to report 
on December 3, 1916, that one hundred coolies had actual­
ly enrolled at Wei-hai-Wei preparatory to shipment to 
France. Many more laborers had arrived within the con­
fines of the tiny e n c l a v e . O n e  reason for the hesita­
tion of the coolies to enroll appeared to be the Chinese 
government's non-involvement policy, which apparently 
fostered a climate of doubt, suspicion, and uncertainty 
among some of the imaginative coolies, who feared sanc­
tions or recriminations as a result of their defection to 
Wei-hai-Wei. But this belief, which existed only in the 
minds of the laborers, was easily dispelled once the 
willing support of local Chinese bureaucrats in Shantung
103p.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Alston, Peking, 
to D.M.I., London, February 19, 1917. (the contents of 
this dispatch reveal that initial policy was "to rush as 
many coolies as possible" into Wei-hai-Wei in order to take 
the Chinese authorities by surprise, thus causing them to 
realize that any belated obstruction inspired by the Ger­
mans was futile.)
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had been b o u g h t . ^^4
Bourne soon discovered more substantial reasons for 
the coolies' hesitations. He took into account the civil 
turmoil which racked the northern provinces, and realized 
that it contributed to the confused and rootless state of 
some of the men who arrived in quasi-secrecy, having been 
propelled across the border by the contractors' agents.
But he learned too of the appearance of French recruiters 
in Shantung around Christmas, 1917. The French syndicates 
had no intention of abiding by the British pay scales and 
contract terms which Bourne had laboriously established, 
and they further claimed to be empowered to raise all the 
laborers needed for the Allied war effort. An unseemly 
wrangle ensued as the prices of flesh as a commodity were 
d i s c u s s e d , b u t  the damage to the coolies' confidence 
had already been done.
The French provided yet another frustration for 
Bourne in the form of a sudden territorial claim in 
Tientsin to land considered due to them as compensation 
for the Boxer uprising of a decade earlier. Why they
lQ4p.R.O./W.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, Unsigned/ 
Memorandum from Wei-hai-Wei, to War Office, London, De­
cember /?7. 1916.
105p.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Alston, Pe­
king, to D.M.I., London, February 22, 1917. (The French 
effort collapsed. See P.R.O./W.O. 083/5022, China Reports, 
1917.)
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unaccountably chose late 1916 and early 1917 as the time 
in which to assert this belated claim is not clear, but 
the action provoked a political and diplomatic storm 
whose impact Bourne felt as he struggled to respect Chi­
nese government policies and to enroll the disturbed and 
sometimes resentful coolies. It was at this juncture 
that he even countenanced some sub rosa efforts to win 
laborers from Chilhi province, as was later admitted.^®® 
Fighting the French for coolie labor was an occupa­
tional hazard, admitted Bourne, but having to fight his 
fellow countrymen as well should not have been necessary. 
Since late 1916 a campaign had been on foot to recruit 
coolies for the British campaign in Mesopotamia. It was 
carried on by the garrison command at Singapore on behalf 
of the Indian Army and its headquarters at Simla. For 
many years the Indian branch of the service had enjoyed 
a special freedom to design and conduct its own campaigns. 
It regarded the Mesopotamian business as its own especial 
preserve. It needed a few hundred coolie laborers and so 
resolved to get them from Shantung, where, it learned, 
the coolies were supposed to be tougher and more resil­
ient than their southern brothers. Ignoring the possi­
bility of compromising the official London-directed
lOGp R  0 ,/w.O 106/33, C.L.C. History, Robertson,
Peking, to D.M.Ï., London, October 2 , 191Ÿ.
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scheme,107 or of embarrassing Bourne, Singapore sent its 
agents to Shantung to raise the needed men. The efforts 
of these agents were blatant beyond belief, and soon 
threatened what little goodwill Bourne enjoyed in the 
province. The support of the local Chinese functionaries, 
always a frail foundation upon which to base reliance, 
was strained by the arbitrariness of these men. The 
fickle trust of the coolies faltered, veering instead in 
the direction of believing the propaganda offered them 
by the Germans to the effect that their destination was 
bound to be a combat zone somewhere on a front line ex­
posed to the murderous fire of Krupp cannon.
It is certain that both Singapore and Simla enjoyed 
some support for their operation within the confines of 
the War Office in London, otherwise they could not have 
persisted for as long as they did to the undeniable de­
triment of Bourne's work. At last the War Office offi­
cially demanded Simla's reconsideration of its labor 
policy. But it was not abandoned even then, and continued 
to afford reason for complaint for as long as the Mesopo­
tamian Campaign remained the exclusive sphere of influence 
of the Indian Army, which always refused to acknowledge the 
seriousness of London's representations on the q u e s t i o n . 108
lO^lbid., Alston, Peking, to D.M.I., London, Novem­
ber 18, 1916.
l08p.R.O./W.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, G.O.C., Singa-
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From the involvement with the Singapore and Simla 
issue Bourne learned something of the effectiveness of 
the German propaganda barrage he was up against. The 
German legation, under von Hintz, guessed the planned 
extent if not the exact purpose of the events taking 
place in and around Wei-hai-Wei. The lurid broad-sheets 
that had frightened the Mesopotamia-bound coolies appear­
ed in ever-increasing numbers, and promised any coolie 
who sold himself to the British a life cut short by Ger­
man shells. The compass of the German effort can be 
gauged when it is recalled that the German consulate in 
Shanghai disposed of a budget of six thousand pounds a 
day, derived from the Boxer Indemnity, for use solely in 
espionage and related subversive activities. In early 
1917 the War Office in London had good reason to suspect 
that the bulk of this sum was being spent in opposing 
the Wei-hai-Wei compromise.109
Bourne had no idea of how to cope with this type of 
opposition. He wrote to London for advice. But Colonel
pore, to War Office, London, October 12, 1916. A strenu­
ous representation against Singapore and Simla may be found 
in P.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Jordan, Peking, to 
Foreign Office, London, January 3, 1917. Hints of the fate 
of the Chinese in Mesopotamia are in P.R.O./W.O. 161/17, 
and P.R.O./W.O. 161/18, Mesopotamia: Narrative Accounts
of Operations of A.S.C. Units.
199p R o./w.O. 32/5348, Action Against German Agents 
in China, 1916, passimü
68
Robertson's contact in Whitehall, Captain Denny of Mili­
tary Intelligence, had already grasped the possible im­
pact of German opposition in China. He proposed a cam­
paign of deliberate intimidation in return which might 
force the Chinese government to oust the Germans alto­
gether. He advocated threats of arrest of Germans by 
Chinese, and even demands for the seizure of the German 
consulate in S h a n g h a i . There is no doubt that Denny 
saw the situation as a fruitful opportunity to encourage 
Chinese adherence to the Entente Powers in open defiance 
of Germany, whose eventual post war role in the far east 
the British had every intention of undermining.
But the Foreign Office objected to extreme provoca­
tion, and told the War Office so.Ill In early 1917 Bourne 
was informed only that a counter propaganda strike would 
be launched under the aegis of the British legation in 
Peking. The legation was allowed to pressure the Chinese 
government,112 and the harrassment of Germans it succeeded
llOp.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Memorandum 
from Captain R. B. Denny, M.I.3, London, November 21, 1916,
llllbid., where urgent cautions from the Foreign 
Office are registered on the back of the Memorandum.
ll^Attaché Alston remarked that if Britain could 
oust the Germans and secure China's adherence to the En­
tente, "we should have the whole field of China open to 
us for labour recruiting." In Ibid., Alston, Peking, 
to D.M.I., London, February 4, 1917.
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in effecting by this means did have a significant influ­
ence upon China's entry into the war upon the Allied 
side.
It is hard to estimate the effectiveness of the 
counter propaganda offensive mounted by the British. Ap­
parently it was directed at the more literate among the 
Chinese population, or at government levels in Peking 
i t s e l f . 114 The Germans, on the other hand, shrewdly 
concentrated on alarming the inhabitants of the villages 
and farms from which the enrolled coolies came. Already 
in Europe angry questions had been asked in the French 
Chamber concerning German insinuations regarding Allied 
use of Chinese labor, and the French government expres­
sed eagerness to join in the British propaganda operation. 
Mr. Woodhead, of The Peking and Tientsin Times, and Mr. 
Donald, of the prestigious Far Eastern Review, were named 
by Military Intelligence in London as Britain's premier 
organizers of biased publicity on the Wei-hai-Wei s c h e m e , 1^^
llSibid., Memorandum on Enemy Activity and China's 
Entry into the War, 1918. (There were only 3,290 enemy 
aliens in China, and 1,724 of these were minors, but the 
Germans combined to mount an opposition out of all pro­
portion to their numerical strength.)
ll^The Times (London), May 28, 1917, p. 5.
llSlbid., January 18, 1917, p. 7.
116p_R,o_/w,o 106/33, C.L.C. History, Memorandum
from Captain R. B. Denny, M.I.3, London, November 21, 1916
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while the London and China Telegraph was employed for the
same purpose at home where it provided a popular forum for
117the defence both of British and French activities.
On occasion the Foreign Office itself dictated the 
texts of articles designed to quell Chinese fears on the 
use of c o o l i e s , 118 ^^d British missionaries were pressed 
into service to distribute material in Shantung and else­
where explaining their government’s point of v i e w . H ^  But 
still the Germans persisted, Bourne was annoyed to find 
some of their more inflamatory propaganda productions in 
Wei-hai-Wei itself, a circumstance that was repeated fre-
(A sample of the efforts of the Far Eastern Review can be 
found in B. Manico Gull, "The Story of the Chinese Labour 
Corps: A Highly Efficient British Organization to Protect
the Personal and Financial Interests of the Chinese Cool­
ies Labouring Behind the Lines in France," The Far Eastern 
Review: Engineering, Finance, Commerce, Vol. XIV (April,
1918), p p . 125-135. Here, Wei-hai-Wei was described as 
"the gateway to an Eldorado." The article, although late, 
is typical of the counter propaganda rhetoric employed 
after March, 1917. The Gull material can still be_found 
quoted as an authoritative source. See N. Wales ^Helen F . 
Snow7, The Chinese Labour Movement (New York: Books for
Libraries Press, 1971), p . 25.
ll?For example, see London and China Telegraph, 
February 26, 1917, p. 5.
118^ suggested text, discussing the use of the cool­
ies, commented, "England has been guided by no selfish 
motive and will reap no material benefit." See P.R.O./W.O. 
106/35, Employment, Foreign Office, London, to Alston, 
Peking, March 12, 1917.
^^^P.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Robertson, 
Peking, to D.M.I., London, January 8 , 1917.
71
quently until the German's projected expulsion from 
China in 1918.^20
The Chinese government remained well aware of the 
value to the Allied cause of its vast manpower resources. 
It watched the propaganda battle with care, and never 
failed to extract advantage for itself from any support 
given the Allies. One anonymous Chinese politician noted 
in an English language communique, "My country's ability 
to supply manual labour is a point of supreme v a l u e , "121 
and trusted that China's growing manpower contribution, 
whether covert or openly agreed to, would one day earn 
her something more tangible than the mere gratitude of 
the victors. It is correct to suggest that China saw the 
Labour Corps transaction as a potential foot in the door 
when it came to the question of her post war status vis- 
a-vis Franco-British intentions in the Far East.
T. J. Bourne disliked the sinister and sometimes 
underground form of warfare that has been discussed above. 
He preferred to get on with the paramount task of inden-
120xhe Germans cleverly exploited various aspects of 
the Chinese psychology, including its xenophobic tendencies, 
For instance, a translated extract from a poster circulated 
by German agents in Wei-hai-Wei reads in part, "in France, 
you will have to associate with African negroes, . . . and 
such other remnants of 'dead' nations." See Ibid., Trans­
lation of Propaganda Posters, 1917.
121
P.R.O./W.O 106/35, Employment, Printed Memoran­
dum, February /?/, 1917.
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turing, "enrolling," the coolies, leaving to Robertson 
or Alston the task of refuting the German allegations. 
Robertson was equally disgusted, not at the nature of 
his work, but at the growing amount of time it began to 
consume, and the frequent trips to Wei-hai-Wei and Shan­
tung province that it soon entailed. Along with Alston, 
Robertson insisted that London do more to control the un­
censored minor leakages that had occurred in the English 
press concerning speculation on the use of Chinese labor. 
They jointly recommended a most stringent clamp down on 
all references to it.^^^
The New Statesman was the newspaper they most ob­
jected to, although a comment in the Manchester Guardian, 
perhaps the first in public regarding the possible ex­
tent of the Chinese labor scheme, had earlier stimulated 
Robertson's critical concern for the regulation of the 
British press. When the columns of The New Statesman 
suggested that soon colored labor was to be "lodged in 
compounds, and required to undertake unloading of ships, 
and any other work . . , under the authority of the pre­
sent 'governing c l a s s , '"1^4 the War Office needed little
122p.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C History, Alston, Pe­
king, to London, December 21, 1916.
l23Manchester Guardian, November 15, 1916, p. 4.
124"The Conduct of the War," The New Statesman, 
December 9, 1916, pp. 222-223.
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urging from Robertson to exert a tougher censorship. But 
in point of fact it could do little for fear of exagger­
ating the issue into one of major proportions that would 
involve questions of freedom of the press besides the 
use of colored labor. It was better to keep a close 
watch on the press and to discourage rather than block 
comment. That the War Office did maintain a keen inter­
est in all public references to the Wei-hai-Wei experi­
ment is apparent from clippings from relevant articles 
which are found sprinkled throughout the original sources, 
along with marginal comments on their significance.
In London too the Army Council, tired of the pro­
tracted nature of the negotiations and machinations in 
China, and frustrated by checks which had arisen at home, 
applied pressure to Bourne, hinting very strongly that it 
was still possible to raise the needed men in other spheres 
if he could not promise some very real progress within 
the shortest space of time. This was bluff. No nation, 
except perhaps India whose natives Britain was already 
using, could match the resources of China. Besides, the 
War Office and the Army Council had already learned that 
no where else in the world could men be got so cheaply as 
in China. West Indians, for example, expected grossly
inflated rates of pay by c o m p a r i s o n . 1^5
.0./W.C. 32/5145, Construction of Light Rail-
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Justifiably nettled at this goading, Bourne respond­
ed bluntly in a telegram which even the prosaic cypher 
could not disguise as evidently dictated under stress.
He promised unequivocally that the first battalion of
Chinese would leave Wei-hai-Wei for France on or very
126close to January 14, 1917. Waterproof canvass pocket
books had already been issued to each coolie for the in­
closure of his photograph, thumbprint, certification 
of physical fitness to serve, and copy of contract. Each 
man had also received a brass identity disc, which was 
permanently riveted by chain to his wrist in a blacksmith's 
shop at Wei-hai-Wei. This piece of ingenuity was of 
Bourne's own devising. Not surprisingly, a number of the 
more sophisticated laborers violently objected to this 
humiliation,128 but apparently Bourne actually thought
ways in France, Governor of Jamaica, to Colonial Secretary, 
London, October 4, 1916. (Natives from Jamaica demanded 
upwards of four shillings a day. The Governor of Barbados 
expected calls for higher rates yet if men from his island 
were recruited. See Ibid., Governor of Barbados to Colon­
ial Secretary, London, October 4, 1916.)
126p.R,o,/w.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, T. J. Bourne, 
Wei-hai-Wei, to "Milrail," London, December 19, 1916.
12?After the war it was revealed that Mr. Welch, a 
Scotland Yard expert, had remained in charge of this im­
portant plan to keep a record of the Chinese. See The 
Times (London), April 23, 1919, p. 5.
^^^P.R.O./W.O. 106/ 33, C.L.C. History, Robertson, 
Peking, to D.M.I., London, August 16, 1917.
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he was being solicitous for their welfare. Everybody 
knew all Chinamen looked alike, so if they got lost in 
France they could be promptly returned to the right units 
despite difficulties of recognition and language.
The identity disc was a needless humiliation, how­
ever, as each coolie had with him a photograph and other 
identity documents. The use of the disc implied that he 
would either lose these, or perhaps dispose of them de­
liberately in an attempt to "escape." Bourne considered 
himself progressive, not only in his thinking but in his 
politics, too. He must have been aware of that part of 
the Liberal ethos which repudiated the use of men as 
articles rather than as human beings. Perhaps his liber­
alism, tinged with long years of foreign service, recog­
nized with Herbert Samuel that there were two types of 
Chinese, and "the class of Chinamen who were accustomed 
to emigrate were in the main a degraded people . . . 
vicious, immoral, and u n c l e a n . "129 perhaps Bourne was 
too eager to please the War Office to care very much 
about the human value system that he claimed to represent 
Could he have believed that his attitude was "a flagrant 
denial on all points, of the principles of freedom and
l^^The words are Samuel's during a debate on the 
South African importation. See Parliamentary Debates 
(House of Commons), 4th ser., February 16, l904, col. 
1502.
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equity . . . which the Liberals believed had given Bri­
tain her position in the w o r l d ? " 1 3 0
As January, 1917, drew to a close Bourne realized 
with immense relief that he was on schedule as promised, 
and that the first contingent of one thousand and eighty- 
six men would leave for France via the Cape of Good Hope
1 O  -j
aboard the "Teucer," a converted passenger-cargo vessel.
Long and varied routes were deliberately taken in order
\
to confuse German intelligence and to avoid the submarine 
menace, so the first shipment did not reach France until 
April 19, 1917.132 gut at last the scheme was working, 
and Bourne could turn to issues of a more trifling but 
nonetheless important nature if the momentum he had pains­
takingly begun were to be successfully maintained. He 
had been in China for less than three months.
During this brief yet hectic period one of Bourne's 
continual worries had been the officer corps which "train­
ed" the coolies at Wei-hai-Wei, and later at Tsangkou, an 
additional camp near the port of Tsingtao some hundred
ISOgyam, Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office, 
p. 63. (The quotation refers to the similar South African 
scheme.)
121a full table of all shipments to Europe from Wei- 
hai-Wei and other ports will be found in Appendix 'B' at 
the end of this paper, pp. 264-66.
122xhree routes were employed; via the Cape, Suez, 
and overland via Canada. No coolie transports were ever 
lost.
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miles down the Shantung peninsula. These men, whose job 
it was to give the "raw importation" some semblance of 
order and discipline, were a polyglot command at best.
A glimpse of their psychology and methods reveals that 
the coolies were handed over to them to be "hammered and 
coaxed and cursed into a disciplined body . . . there is 
rivalry among the officers in regard to the number of 
canes broken on backs, legs, shins or heads."133
Among these so-called officers, who included an 
American adventurer, a stereotypically dour Scot, a fer­
vent missionary, and a renegade White Russian aristocrat 
of considerable military eminence, was onelieutenant in 
particular who was "well practised at drawing a coolie’s 
blood at the first s l a p . "134 No doubt this picture in­
volved some retrospective artistic license. It is only 
fair to mention that at the other end of the spectrum of 
opinions regarding the treatment of the coolies in Wei- 
hai-Wei, is found in the estimation of one who was pre­
sent, the belief that they were generally well treated 
and subject to no apparent brutality.135 But there seems
133Klein, With the 'Chinks' in the C.L.C. (London: 
Bodley Head, 1919), p. 72. (This is the only full-length 
published account of these days.)
134ibid.
135Reverend A. J. Gamier, Sevenoaks, Kent, England, 
letter to the writer, September 4, 1972. (Reverend Gamier, 
a Baptist, worked in Wei-hai-Wei for six months during 
1916-1917.)
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to be little doubt that the Chinese did receive a tough 
initiation, and some companies must certainly have been 
subject to harsher treatment than the rest. Bourne him­
self agreed that the type of man initially placed in 
charge of the laborers often failed to inspire the ne­
cessary trust and confidence.
In connection with the question of his officers, 
Bourne also had to deal with the local British colonials, 
led by a Major Nathan, who were contemptuous of the white 
establishment at Wei-hai-Wei felt that the whole Chinese 
Labour Corps should be "their show," and agitated for 
months to be allowed the premier role in receiving and 
training the c o o l i e s . ^he situation which developed 
as a result provoked Bourne to rely on Robertson's 
superior rank for support. For some months the climate of 
relations between the whites in Wei-hai-Wei remained 
acrimonious. The aspersions cast by Nathan and his fol­
lowers were particularly resented by Robertson because 
most of the officers found for the barracks in Wei-hai-Wei 
were appointed by Peking legation staff acting on his ad­
vice .
^^^P.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Memorandum on 
Supply of Officers in Tientsin, etc., Robertson, Wei-hai-Wei, 
to D.M.I., London, November 3, 1916. (Major Nathan appears 
to have been late Corps of Royal Engineers, and was civil­
ian manager of the Kailan Mining Company at the time of his 
opposition to Bourne, et al.)
137ibid., Jordan, Peking, to D.M.I., London, October 
28, 1916.
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Long before this trying tension was alleviated, 
Bourne had to face renewed pressures from London, this 
time in the form of the new Foreign Secretary, Arthur 
Balfour. One of Balfour's first acts in relation to the 
Chinese program, which he was most eager to expand, was 
to recommend negotiating with the Japanese for the open­
ing of their port facilities at Tsingtao, taken by them 
in November, 1914. This port was served by the Shantung 
railway, and would make an ideal shipping point for 
coolies raised in Shantung and enrolled at Wei-hai-Wei.^^® 
The port itself had advantages over Wei-hai-Wei, and 
Balfour was sure that Japanese efficiency could smooth 
the running of the scheme. Why not use Orientals to 
direct Orientals, he reasoned?
Bourne was not so sure. To him it meant an addi­
tional harassment to open a facility at Tsingtao. But 
under Balfour's prodding he did so, and the first ship­
load of coolies for France left there on April 4, 1917. 
Tsingtao actually became more important as a port of re­
entry for coolies returning to China after the war, and 
it was not until August, 1918, that the base of British 
operations was moved to there from Wei-hai-Wei. Bourne 
lamented that this latter move relinquished to the Japan-
1®®P.R.0./W.0. 32/11345, Recruitment, Foreign Office 
to Army Council, London, December 30, 1916.
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ese the auspices for the concluding of the Chinese labor 
scheme, a task he would have preferred Britain to handle 
exclusively.
III
During Bourne's physical implementation of the early 
stages for the creation of an army of Chinese labor, the 
War Office in London was building a climate of opinion 
among staff and officers that would provide for the re­
ception of the coolies. Because this involved so many 
intangible and psychological elements, it proved in many 
ways to be a more difficult task than Bourne's. Emotional 
and professional variables entered into the issue, too. 
Could two hundred thousand Orientals be absorbed into 
the British army establishment, and if so, how? Could 
professional standards of order and discipline be main­
tained? What units or branches of the service should be 
responsible for the coolies? Would they respond to their 
white officers and the non-commissioned personnel neces­
sary to run their companies? Would prejudice on the part
^^^P.R.O./C.O. 873/538, T. J. Bourne's Report to 
Commissioner of Wei-hai-Wei on Reasons for Moving Chinese 
Labour Corps to Tsingtao, August 9, l9l8. (Commissioner 
Lockhart used this issue to lobby Walter Long, the Colon­
ial Secretary in 1918, for improved status and facilities 
for Wei-hai-Wei. See Ibid., Commissioner, Wei-hai-Wei, 
to Colonial Secretary, London, August 21, 1918.)
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of white units serving in the field necessitate the rigid 
segregation of the "natives?" These and other questions 
had to be faced in Whitehall. The planners there had had 
experience in the use of colored troops and workers be­
fore, but on a limited scale and with purely colonial 
natives, often from India, who were used to the methods 
and discipline of the British R a j . Orientals were an 
unknown quantity.
During the latter part of 1916, while Bourne, Robert­
son, Jordan, and the other actors in the drama played 
their roles in far off China, the War Office maintained 
a fairly quiescent posture to avoid needlessly alarming 
its armies in the field with gratuitious chatter concern­
ing the establishment of a coolie force. But rumors 
quickly circulated throughout all echelons of command, 
and it was soon known that Whitehall was taking profes­
sional counsel on the treatment of a potentially vast 
labor force from the east. Even though the initial num­
ber of Chinese envisaged as a practicable proposition by 
the Army Council had at one time been a mere ten t h o u s a n d ,  
it became apparent to many high ranking officers that this 
number had long since been greatly enhanced. For one
Op.R.O./W.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, Minutes of a 
Conference to Consider Proposals that African Native La­
bour and Chinese Labour be Employed in France, August 25, 
1916.
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thing, it was known that Haig had been promised vast con­
tingents of laborers for use in trench digging and defence- 
work building, and no where in Europe were there enough 
available white men for the task.
Not surprisingly, then, some staff officers began 
to express open doubts about the status of this proposed 
army of alien labor, and about the role of the personnel 
who would be expected to govern and control it. The War 
Office had taken the plunge in mid-December, 1916, and be­
gun the formal construction of an officer establishment 
to take care of the anticipated influx of C h i n e s e .
Senior officers were gazetted, and the question of N.C.O.'s 
seriously considered. It was hoped by the War Office that 
a functioning framework would be on hand to receive the 
Chinese when they began to land, as Bourne had promised, 
in the spring of 1917.
Now wilder rumors began to circulate, and Major 
General Curtis, a senior staff officer, stepped forward 
as an important spokesman for a substantial body of pro­
fessional military opinion. He submitted a sharply worded 
memorandum to the War Office asserting that in his opin­
ion and in that of his brother officers it would be 
nothing short of disastrous if, as had been heard, thirty-
14lLieut.-Col. Faifax was to take command. See Army 
List for 1917, January, part iii, col 2023d.
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five thousand Corps of Royal Engineers' personnel were 
replaced by Chinese or coloreds. The only direction in 
which he personally saw any practicable reduction of 
white men was in substitution of natives for the most 
menial of mess room tasks, or perhaps in trench and tun­
nelling u n i t s . 142 Curtis and others knew that large 
numbers of Chinese might be incredibly difficult to ab­
sorb or utilize in a short space of time. In a substitu­
tion list of his own, Curtis presented his and other of­
ficers’ opinions, and recommended that great care be 
used in employing only a few hundred colored auxiliaries
in France.143
The War Office was sensible of the fears expressed. 
To some extent it shared t h e m . 144 For one thing, Mr. 
Lloyd George's continued and impatient insistence on the 
prompt production of two hundred thousand Chinese coolies 
in France was the kind of aggressive demand which the 
strategists there had not encountered before.145 in ad-
14^P.r .O./W.O. 32/5094, Substitution, Memorandum of 
Major-General Curtis to War Office, London, January 7,
1916.
145Ibid., "Appendix,"
144por example, Ibid. , Memorandum of Directorate 
General of Transport, January 22, 1917.
145ibid., Memoranda on Substitution of Coloured for 
White Personnel in France, January 20, 1917.
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dition, the War Office learned that Haig himself, despite 
the need for men and the promises made him, had indicated 
increasing concern over the nature and extent of proposed 
native labor schemes.
And so the War Office decided to take the unusually 
democratic step of circulating among staff officers a 
series of questionnaires regarding the use of colored 
troops and laborers. In a summation of the replies re­
ceived as a result of this action one finds an almost uni­
versal belief among high ranking officers that the pro­
posed number of colored substitutes or auxiliaries of any 
origin was far too high, and that caution should be ex­
ercised in pursuing existing policies for their use. 
Discipline, efficiency, and cohesion of units would cer­
tainly suffer, it was maintained. The Corps of Royal 
Engineers, itself numbering one hundred and two thousand 
effectives in 1916, urged most strenuously that they 
could absorb, or direct, at the most some twenty-three 
thousand of the hundred thousand native laborers it heard 
were "due" in France, and then only for employment in am­
munition columns, on menial tasks, or as diggers of com­
munications t r e n c h e s . 146 The Corps really felt adequate 
to take responsibility for seven thousand five hundred
146%bid., "A Summary of Replies Received," January 
nj, 1917.
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Chinese, and candidly fancied neither their use in out­
right substitution, nor their addition to overall 
strength.
In the course of the Summary it is the Chinese who 
rapidly materialize as the alleged major threat to pro­
fessional military procedures, for it was known or sus­
pected that they were to be imported in great numbers.
By the end of January, 1917, there were already in France 
one thousand "Cape Boys," ten thousand South African na­
tives, and en route or applied for, an additional fifty 
thousand South Africans, one thousand Portuguese coloni­
al natives, and one hundred F i j i a n s . ^48 addition,
there were at the same time native Indian contingents 
and some West Indians who had been employed by the Royal 
Artillery, the Army Service Corps, and some other branches 
of the service since 1915. But all of these natives were 
generally accepted as being a part of the total "Imperial 
Force" rather than as aliens per se.149 The major anxiety 
one gathers from the Summary is the fear of the Chinese as 
natives about whom few people in authority seemed to know 
very much. How would they react and respond to conditions
147 Ibid.
^^^P.R.O./W.O. 32/5097, Units Controlled by the Di­
rectorate General of Transportation.
149For some interesting sidelights on their condi­
tions, see P.R.O./W.O. 32/5110, The Lawrence Report.
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in France? Would a large contingent prove unmanageable?
It is clear from the views expressed that senior officers 
felt competent in relating to, and being placed in author­
ity over, natives of a colonial origin, but awkward and 
uneasy about the problems they might encounter in dealing 
with representatives of a subject race about which they 
knew comparatively little.
And yet in terms of pure physical and economic re­
turns the coolies offered more than the other natives em­
ployed by the army. Although undeniably devious, men­
dacious, and potentially troublesome, they were less in­
dolent than Blacks, and more amenable to harsh discipline 
and coercion, too. This was the dilemma which faced 
Whitehall, and which the Array Council squarely and real­
istically faced.150 The Chinese, it saw, offered the 
best prospects in what was contemptuously labelled "The 
Raw Importation." This was the state of mind in which a 
conference at the War Office in February, 1917, sat to 
consider just how the supply of Chinese should be appor­
tioned to units serving in F r a n c e . 151 necessary, firm
150p.R.O./W.O. 32/5094, Substitution, A Secret Memo­
randum from the Military Members of the Army Council on a 
Proposal that certain of the Personnel of Artillery Ammuni­
tion Columns, and of Royal Engineer, Army Service Corps, 
and Royal Army Medical Corps units might be replaced by 
Coloured Troops, February 6, 1917.
151lbid., Minutes of a Conference on the Supply of 
Labour, February 3, and 4, 1917, p. 3.
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measures would have to be taken to overcome the profes­
sional reservations of some staff officers and field com­
manders concerning the use of coolies. They were needed, 
were on their way, and must be adequately exploited when 
they arrived. Accordingly, the conferees agreed to re­
place with Chinese as many as possible of the ninety-six 
thousand white men currently listed as "unskilled labor­
ers" under the orders of the Directorate General of Trans­
portation. Taken into account yet again upon this occa­
sion was the tedious insistence of Lloyd George, now 
Prime Minister, that two hundred thousand Chinese be 
employed jointly by the Royal Artillery, the Corps of 
Royal Engineers, and the Army Service and Royal Army 
Medical C o r p s .1^2
Under the pressure of the circumstances brought 
about by professional doubts concerning the uses of na-
1
Ibid., War Office to Chief of the Imperial Gen­
eral StafTj TWir William Robertson7, and Military Members 
of the Æ r m y 7  Council, London, January 20, 1917. (It took 
until March, 1917, for the War Office planners to accom­
modate their thinking to the scope envisaged by the Prime 
Minister. By then they could suggest that the Royal Ar­
tillery manage 100,000 "natives," including Chinese, the 
Royal Engineers more than 35,000, the Army Service Corps, 
53,000, and the Royal Army Medical Corps, 35,000. Coolies 
figured heavily in all these estimates. In taking this 
view Whitehall remained a very long step ahead of com­
manders in the field. See Ibid., Minutes of a War Office 
Conference on the Substitution of Coloured for White Per­
sonnel in France, March 13, 1917.)
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tive labor, the War Office had deemed it advisable as 
early as December, 1916, to commission a reliable senior 
officer to carry out an inquiry into the whole question, 
not only of the use of Chinese and other native workers, 
but also into the "economy" of fighting men it was hoped 
to produce by the move to employ vast numbers of such 
personnel in France. General Lawson was chosen for the 
task of producing this rationale upon which the War Of­
fice hoped to rely in its distribution of colored labor.
Lawson's two Reports appeared simultaneously for 
top level distribution in January, 1917, just as opposi­
tion to the labor scheme within the ranks of the Army 
establishment began to reach its height. In his rather 
sketchy congeries of personal opinions, gathered together 
through the medium of short visits to units serving in 
France,153 Lawson outlined a tempting picture of how 
readily the use of Chinese and other aliens could re­
lease white personnel for combat duties. He particularly 
recommended the use of Chinese at railheads and their 
employment, "if nothing alarming r e s u l t e d , "154 port 
off-loading duties.
I53gut the visits were reported as quite searching. 
For example, see P.R.O./W.O. 95/3984, War Diary of Assist­
ant Director of Supplies, B.E.F., Boulogne, January 2, 1917
154Lawson, Reports on the Number and Physical Cate­
gories of Men Employed out of the Fighting Area in France, 
and on the Economy of Man Power in the Fighting Areas in 
France (London: For the War Office, January, 1917) , p"! TO.
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Lawson was the first person to offer a reasonably 
logical and defensible picture of how all forms of colored 
labor might be fitted into the existing military estab­
lishment in France both as outright substitutes for whites, 
or as auxiliaries for existing units to employ. Implicit
in his pages was the belief that the Army had the men and
the understanding necessary to exploit and govern the 
Chinese without serious untoward effects resulting. Con­
sequently, in terms of their psychological impact alone, 
his slim Reports are particularly notable in having gone 
a long way toward breaking down some of the resistance
to the use of the Chinese.
In early January, 1917, Field Marshall Haig could
reassure the War Office that he himself felt that the
principle of the employment of Chinese was at last on the 
verge of being accepted by his officers, but that a uni­
form system of classifying the coolies would have to be
designed and promulgated if more complete satisfaction 
were anticipated by London. His men needed a clear under­
standing of how their coolies could be utilized. Haig 
recommended the use of a simple ABC system, with "A" re­
presenting unskilled labor of the most fundamental coolie 
sort, "B," men capable of some semi-skilled tasks, and 
"C," those who might, under certain grave emergencies, 
be used in combat. Haig agreed that the Lawson Reports,
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whose production in draft form he was closely watching, 
formed the best guide, and would go far to eliminate re­
maining p r e j u d i c e s . 155
Elsewhere Haig, who had lost much of his earlier 
uncritical enthusiasm for the broad application of native 
labor, did still reaffirm that there was no reason why 
such men when used as substitutes or as auxiliaries 
should impair the efficiency of certain select echelons 
of his overall command. He even adverted to their pos­
sible use as organic additions to existing branches of 
the s e r v i c e . 156 This latter view, later abandoned by 
the Commander-in-Chief, was quite impossible to implement 
anyway, at least where the Chinese were concerned, for 
even attempts to attach them as cooks or servants to 
existing white units met with firm and concerted repudia­
tion from officers and men. In practice, the men of the 
Chinese Labour Corps were to lead lives as isolated as 
possible from all the groups they served or supported.
As one critic of the colonial era has suggested, such 
repudiation was to be expected, for the basic emphasis of
15^P.r  O./W.O. 30/6218, Correspondence, 1917, C.-in- 
C ., B.E.F., France, to War Office, London, January 4, 1917 
(A class system was eventually imposed upon the coolies. 
See Supra., pp. 224-26,
l56p.R.o./w.O. 32/5094, Substitution, Memorandum 
from the C.-in-C., B.E.F., France, to War Office, London, 
January /?7, 1917.
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the colonialist value system lay in the imposing of one 
form of culture upon another, lower form. This led to a 
defensive segregation of the colonial masters from the 
lesser breeds. Such defensiveness grew more paranoid as 
the two elements were forced into closer contact in any 
situation.
The truth of this assertion can be seen in the con­
ditions which obtained in France after the coolies ar­
rived. From a mere repudiation of desire for the slight­
est contact, there eventuated a real fear of any risk that 
the coolies should actually see the British common soldier 
at work or at play in case "unfavorable" comparisons were 
made, and the status of the "superior" culture diminished. 
The growth of this mentality gives the lie to those who 
maintained that the Chinese would gain "cultural exposure" 
by their stay in Europe; in fact, as will be seen, the 
coolies became progressively more isolated from every 
outside human contact as their stay in France grew longer.
In a General Conclusion, based upon Haig's and other 
responses, the military members of the Army Council even­
tually suggested that the major employment of Chinese be 
restricted to the performance of the most menial manual 
tasks; forestry, trench-digging, quarrying, loading, rail­
road track laying, burying the dead, and stacking ammuni-
Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, p. 11.
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tion. Extreme caution was advised in their use in skilled 
or semi-skilled posts, as "owing to the lower intellectual 
standard"158 involved, far greater training than was fea­
sible would be essential if unit commanders were to get 
value out of the men.
The views expressed in this General Conclusion, and 
carried into broad effect during the rest of 1917, set the 
pattern for the employment of the Chinese, and ensured 
that they functioned virtually within a vacuum upon their 
arrival in France. No branch of the service wanted to be 
too closely identified with their use. The skilled and 
semi-skilled Chinese who came with the Chinese Labour 
Corps, although recognized, were needlessly neglected 
until their value and potential later became more readily 
apparent and urgently needed. The Corps' respective com­
panies, shunted from army group to army group and from 
branch to branch, lay attached to units only so long as 
work remained to be done.
A vast, floating, pool was thus established, rather 
than a series of actual additions to established white 
commands. This phenomenon was to have important conse­
quences upon the management and efficiency of the coolies, 
as will be seen in the next chapter. It created in addi-
158p,R.o,/w.O. 32/5094, Substitution, Memoranda on 
Substitution of Coloured for White Personnel in France, 
January 20, 1917.
93
tion an entire caste of second-rate white staff officers 
and N.C.O.'s who were socially discriminated against by 
white officers and men in other units, and whose enforced 
quarantine with their charges proved irksome and damaging 
to morale long before the war's conclusion. In the early 
days of the Corps' existence a commission in it was "con­
sidered a good billet . . . with periodical home leave, 
reasonable /s~ic7 immunity from shells, bombs, e t c . "159 
The frustrations of a life apart soon vitiated this happy 
picture.
To make matters worse the Chinese arrived in France 
to meet officers and N.C.O.'s whom they had never seen be­
fore and for whom they could feel little initial respect 
or affection. In some important service quarters it was 
considered the height of stupidity to assume that the 
coolies should become the responsibility of their direc­
tors in France without having either the slightest idea 
of military fundamentals outside of their rough initiation 
in Wei-hai-Wei, or the elements of trust essential in 
those who must obey without question or h e s i t a t i o n . 160
No wonder, then, that the War Office later found it
159Klein, With the 'Chinks' in the C.L.C., p. 72. 
(Klein left his company before it saw France, and endured 
none of the frustrations to which Corps commanders became 
subject.)
IGOpor example P.R.O./W.O. 31/4953, Memorandum on the 
Training of Coloured Personnel, by General W. D. Bird, Di­
rector General of Staff Duties, March, 1917.
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necessary to concoct a morale booster in the form of a
general order distributed to all prospective officers in
the Chinese Labour Corps. "All ranks," it read,
should have briefly explained to them the 
object of the work, for what, and by whom, 
it will be used, what purpose it will serve, 
and especially, that all the work is being 
done for the prosecution of the war . . .161
The last injunction, as it was eventually recognized, 
meant little to the coolies. Later, when there arose em­
bittered comment on the calibre and effectiveness of the 
officers used to staff the Chinese Labour Corps estab­
lishment, the hasty or negligible training of the coolies 
in the basics of the military life, and their exposure to 
white personnel who were strange to them, were arguments 
to be used in cogent if fruitless defence by some of those 
accused of ineptitude.
At last, by the spring of 1917, the War Office had 
won the acceptance of the vast majority of its staff and 
field commanders of the initiation of the Chinese experi­
ment in France. An establishment of sorts had been pre­
pared to receive them. How would they be utilized in 
practice? How effectively were they to be exploited? An 
effort to answer these questions will be made in the next 
chapter.
IGlc.S.O. /Frank Fox7, G.H.Q. (Montreuil-sur-Mer) 
(London; Philip %llan & Co., 19%Ü), pT 16o.
CHAPTER III
DISCUSSION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF LABOR RESOURCES BY 
THE BRITISH ARMIES IN FRANCE AND THE IMPACT THEREON 
OF THE CHINESE LABOUR CORPS
In a leading article on Saturday, December 17, 1917, 
The Times summed up the eight months during which Chinese 
laborers had been active with the British armies in France 
as representing overall "an astonishing testimony to the 
efficiency of the organization which has gathered them 
from the ends of the e a r t h . "1^2
In the previous pages it has already been suggested 
that the gathering, while ultimately successful in terms 
of the production of nearly one hundred thousand coolies, 
was hardly the result of an efficient process. Valiant, 
perhaps, especially on the part of T. J. Bourne in Wei- 
hai-Wei, and carried on in the face of great difficulties, 
but hardly efficient. The situation into which the Chi­
nese stepped when they eventually reached Europe gives one 
genuine leave to doubt whether the preparations for their 
arrival and deployment were any more adequately handled.
lG2"Behind the Front," The Times (London), December 
29, 1917, p. 7.
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Lieutenant-Colonel Page-Croft, Conservative and 
Unionist Member for Christchurch, was closer to the 
truth than The Times' leader when, even before the arri­
val in France of the first Chinese contingent, he sug­
gested in the House that the army's use of labor forces 
in the theater of European operations showed grave lack 
of preparedness coupled with poor o r g a n i z a t i o n . 163  jjg 
expressed the hope that colored laborers would receive 
better treatment.
When the coolies began to disembark a month later 
they found the Lieutenant-Colonel's hopes quite unful­
filled. The pressing and continued need for additional 
labor which prompted their importation in the first place 
was not solely due to the manpower shortage which existed 
in the British forces throughout the war. It was also 
due to a poor disposition of available labor resources 
which served to convey to contemporary observers a sense 
of crisis which was serious, but in fact not so crucial 
as it appeared.
In truth there had been little or no coherent plan­
ning for the raising and distribution of manual labor 
units in the proposed war establishments considered be-
163pariiamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th 
ser., March 1, 1917, cols. 2205-2219, passim. And see 
The Times (London), March 2, 1917, p. 10. And see Par­
liamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser., March 1, 
19l7, cols. 2207-2219, for further references to dubious 
efficiency.
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fore 1914, and what planning there had been during the 
decade previous to the outbreak of hostilities was ren­
dered futile by the static nature of the campaigns which 
then ensued. In the Field Service Regulations on which 
the armies were mobilized in 1914 the relevant section 
on labor and auxiliary support was stinted and unreal­
istic. It was suggested, for example, that:
Freight trains should be loaded or unloaded 
by civilian labour provided by the depart­
ment or service concerned, unless military 
labour can be provided without interfering 
with the fighting efficiency of the t r o o p s . 164
Even this directive was unusually explicit, because it was 
recognized that railroad freight and its handling would 
form one of the major modern criteria of military success 
in the field. The belief that a few British labor com­
panies could easily and quickly be supplemented by a 
hasty recruitment of local inhabitants, as had been the 
case in the Boer War where colored labor was fortunately 
on h a n d , 165 proved quite inadequate to meet the eventual­
ities of the world war.
164yieid Service Regulations, part II: Organisation 
and Administration, Amendments, 1913-14 (London: H.M.S.O., 
1913), c h . 3, "Functions of the Forces in the Field," p. 33
165colonel E. Gibb, "The Organisation of Labour in 
the Great War: A Lecture Delivered at the School of Mili­
tary Administration, Chisledon," The Royal Army Service 
Corps Quarterly, Vol. XI (1923), p. 172.
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In one sense, the prolonged discussion of the lack 
of preparedness of the Army establishment for the use and 
exploitation of a large labor force is pointless. The 
vastness and unpredictability of the great war's opera­
tions were bound to have embarrassed even the most pre­
scient of military planners. The planning carried out 
at the War Office before the war had none of the drama 
or publicity appeal of the naval race carried out at the 
Admiralty by the First Sea Lord, J. A. Fisher, and others. 
R. B. Haldane, under whom much of the military prepara­
tion for possible war was carried out, was a serious and 
cautious individual who had three major emphases c o n ­
stantly thrust before him both by military men and poli­
ticians. Too large an establishment or provision for 
one, he was told, was bound to alarm the Germans unne­
cessarily. Money grudgingly granted the Army had better 
be spent only on top priority issues, of which the de­
signing of labor contingents was not one. Above all, 
the notion was impressed upon Haldane that any war with 
Germany and her allies was likely to be short and active, 
therefore, not requiring provision for vast corps of 
manual workers and supernumeraries. For those who wish 
to follow a revelation of the Army's unpreparedness in 
this respect ample evidence survives.^®®
166j>or example see P.R.O./W.O. 32/6805, Report of
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It is what was done to remedy this situation once 
hostilities were under way that provides a more bona 
fide grounds for inquiry into the general efficiency of 
the British Army's labor establishment, and of the Chi­
nese Labour Corps in particular. As The Times once re­
marked of the Chinese and their use, "modern war is 
modern industry, organized for a single definite pur­
p o s e . "167 Whether in the rhetoric of The Times that pur­
pose may be construed as victory, profit, or anything 
else is immaterial. It is clear, though, that to some of 
the men who were responsible for deploying the Chinese 
the idea of war as a modern industry offered an appealing 
model upon which to base their particular mode of labor 
management.
This was true to some degree of many of those who 
handled the entire labor establishment in France. One
the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Organisation 
of the Corps of Royal Engineers (The "Wood Committee"), 
l906. (Here it was optimistically suggested that one and 
a quarter miles of new railroad track a day could be laid 
in a future war with only the aid of the unskilled labor 
of the country in which the Corps found itself.) See also 
P.R.O./W.O. 32/5151, Report of Major-General Hickman's 
Siege Committee^ 1914; P.R.O./W.O. S2/S303, Organisation 
of Colonial Troops for Imperial Service; P.R.O./W.O 32/ 
7109, Conference on Deficiencies in the B.E.F., l9l2; 
P.R.O./W.O. 52/7108, The Mobilisation of the Expeditionary 
Force, 1912/13.
^®^"An Army of Labour in France," The Times (London), 
December 26, 1917, p. 8.
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who knew that establishment well notes that it was di­
vided about equally between "big business men and typical 
Oxford m e n . "168 This is an oversimplification. But the 
two types did exist side by side in broadly recognizable 
outlines.
The "big business" labor handlers saw their work­
ers solely in terms of physical production; jobs done, 
goals achieved, military staffs satisfied. To them, war 
was an industry in the prosaic sense of the word, only 
designed in this instance with the very special goal in 
mind of total victory over the enemy.
The "Oxford" men were characterized by university 
and college educated individuals who regarded themselves 
as aware of the latest "progressive" management tech­
niques like centralized employment, a very popular inno­
vation of the day, "the natural successor in the evolu­
tion of business from the methods which have been common 
. . . since the industry first began to assume its large 
importance in the world’s a f f a i r s . T h e y  relished
^®®G.S.O., G.H.Q. (Montreuil-sur-Mer), p. 168.
^®^Gibb, "The Organisation of Labour in the Great 
War," p. 180.
170
E. M. Hopkins, "Advantages of Centralized Employ­
ment ," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Vol. LXXI, (May, 1917), p. 1.
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their graphs, comparative performance charts, and "sci­
entific" estimates of capacity and output. They were the 
first technocrats. To them war was an opportunity to 
prove their scientific concepts of labor management.
They were even accused of maintaining the Chinese coolies 
at work in Europe after the conclusion of the Armistice
merely in order to gratify the demands of their experi- 
1 71mental designs.
It is against these two types of mentality that the 
use and function of the Chinese must be discussed. At 
the time there was no history of labor management in war. 
It was a new experience to handle so many white workers 
in the field, let alone c o o l i e s . N o  wonder that haste 
and a lack of clear cut techniques or priorities should 
have dogged their use from the minute that war stale­
mated, and it was realized that the need for manual work­
ers to sustain the armies in the artificially contrived 
"combat" zones was likely to be of long d u r a t i o n . D e ­
spite all their best intentions, the officers of all 
shades of politics, opinions, and degrees of expertise 
who found themselves in charge of the disposition of la-
ITlttThe Art of Wangling," The New Statesman, Septem­
ber 13, 1919, p. 586.
IT^Gibb, "The Organisation of Labour in the Great 
War," p. 171.
l73p.RO./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, "A History of 
War Committee Report," June 5, 1919.
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bor resources occasionally threw up their hands and ad­
mitted that "the economical use of men . . , was often 
a matter of local /s~ic7 adjustment. On the spot
decisions often negated the best laid plans for use and 
exploitation of workers.
When war commenced, the disbursement of existing 
non-skilled labor resources rested largely with the Di­
rectorate of Fortifications and Works, which had itself 
been the subject of revision and appraisal in the immedi­
ate pre-war period. Indeed, at the very time the Direc­
torate was being mobilized in August, 1914, a plan was 
put before the Army Council for bringing all works and 
their direction under its control. This plan, the imple­
mentation of which might have saved an infinite amount of 
squabbling, jealously, and mismanagement later on, was 
typically "never definitely rejected, but not proceeded 
with."175
Haldane, who stood in for Asquith at the War Office 
in these early days of war, and the military members of 
the Army Council, were, it is true, generally in favor of 
"putting all works under one responsible d i r e c t o r a t e ,"176
174P.R.O./W.O. 107/37, Labour Report, p. 156.
175P.R.O./W.O. 32/4810, Change of Title and Duties 
of Director of Fortifications and Works, Memorandum on the 
Attitude of the Army Council.
176ibid.
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for the pressures of war, even at that stage, made plain 
the need for coordination of all tasks with the labor 
resources available to carry them out. When the Director­
ate of Fortifications and Works later pleaded for its own 
upgrading, and the inclusion of its director on the Army 
Council as a step in this direction, the request was 
refused.
There is no doubt that other branches of the ser­
vice which disposed of labor contingents, for example, the 
Corps of Royal Engineers and the Directorate of Transport, 
viewed with hostility any attempt to give another branch 
precedence in the organization or disposition of workers. 
The Corps of Royal Engineers, too, always tried to insist 
that it alone knew how to dispose of its labor auxiliar­
ies, and possessed the sole technical knowledge requisite 
in order to place them correctly.I??
In part as a result of the envy and opposition of 
fellow soldiers, the Directorate of Fortifications and 
Works failed to win the status of a labor coordinating 
establishment. Expediency with Belgian labor, and with 
artisan companies raised in France to supplement British 
labor companies, although in strict pursuit of the policy 
laid down in the Field Service Regulations, were not at
17?The Corps of Royal Engineers in the Great War 
(London: n . pTj 1919), p. 161.
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all successful.178 By mid-1916 it became imperative that 
some coordinating body with greater administrative and 
executive powers be constituted to plan, control, and 
predict the course of labor personnel utilization.
The establishment provided to take care of this 
need was the Directorate of Labour, which actually took 
over its function on January 5, 1917. The Directorate of 
Fortifications and Works remained, although with dimin­
ished importance, and other branches of the service, like 
the Directorate of Transportation, were still to retain 
autonomous control of certain skilled and semi-skilled 
workers.
The Directorate of Labour was to concern itself 
mainly with the dispositions of unskilled men, and was in 
large part inspired by the need to cater to the coming 
influx of Chinese. Colonel Fairfax, Commander of the 
Chinese Labour Corps, became Senior Advisor on Chinese 
Labour to the new Directorate, which was presided over 
by Colonel, later Brigadier-General, E. G. Wace. In the 
coming deployments of Chinese labor, Fairfax was to re­
present the more conservative "business" mentality, while 
Wace, an Oxfordian, considered himself progressive and
178p.R.O./W.O. 161/2, The Historical Narrative of 
the Works Directorate^ p. 6. ("no serious steps appear 
to have been taken to fulfill the needs of unskilled 
labor.")
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ultra-scientific in his management of native labor.
At its peak in late 1917, the Directorate, which 
owed its loyalty in the army structure to the Quarter­
master-General, disposed of a force of approximately
three hundred and eighty-seven thousand unskilled work- 
179er s , of whom over ninety thousand were by then Chi­
nese. In the field, a Labour Group Headquarters was 
established in each sector to deal with the disposal of 
from five to six individual companies of perhaps five 
hundred men each. A lieutenant-colonel and nineteen 
junior officers staffed each group h e a d q u a r t e r s . ^s 
a part of its records, a Chinese Labour Corps record 
office was established in Whitehall. No trace now re­
mains of this depository except for some statistical and 
narrative sources in duplicate at the Public Record Of- 
fice.
And so the new Directorate at the start nominally 
disposed of quite a substantial f o r c e . 182 %n February,
179g .S.O., G.H.Q. (Montreuil-sur-Mer), p. 168.
180Gibb, "The Organisation of Labour in the Great 
War," p. 177.
181it was officially predicted at the time that 
these records would disappear, as "no provision has been 
made for them in the 'after war' establishment." See P. 
R.G./W.G. 106/33, C.L.C. History. (Some material that 
did survive was probably lost in the bombing of the second 
war, )
. 32 Infantry Labour Battalions, 119 Infantry 
Labour Companies, 7 Works Battalions, and 101 Infantry 
Works Companies.
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1917, still before the arrival of the first coolies, sup­
plementary unskilled personnel from other branches were 
admitted to its jurisdiction, while in May, the Corps of 
Royal Engineers and the Army Service Corps finally allow­
ed some of their men to fall under the auspices of the 
Directorate of Labour.183
However, as Colonel Wace remarked upon assuming re­
sponsibility, "when the Labour Directorate came into 
being . . .  it proved extremely difficult to discover 
where all the labour was, under whom it was working, and 
how it was e m p l o y e d . "184 it proved even more difficult 
to overcome these challenges.
Right at the outset of the use of the Chinese in 
France Colonel Wace claimed that he saw that their func­
tions were going to be inhibited by confusion of direc­
tion and lack of proper management. He was not surprised 
when Sir Eric Geddes, as head of the Directorate General 
of Military Railways, felt that he should have pre-emin­
ent claim to the Chinese secured in Wei-hai-Wei. Geddes 
was finally prevailed upon to accept only the first seven 
thousand merely because, as it was admitted, the raising 
of the coolies was technically the responsibility of his
183p.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Minute Sheet,
1917.
1 A4
^°^P.R.O./W.O. 107/37, Labour Report, p. 132.
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d e p a r t m e n t ,185 ^nd also because as early as September 
26, 1916, he had written an urgent memorandum on the need 
for the employment of twelve thousand coolies on a narrow 
gauge railroad project in which he was involved in F r a n c e .  186 
From the very beginning, noted Wace with ex post 
facto sanctimony, "this special earmarking was vicious in 
principle, and should never have been allowed."18? It 
resulted all too frequently in "the consequent waste of 
power due to the employing Officers making /sic7 work 
for the Chinese when the legitimate work was s l a c k , " 1 8 8  
merely in order to hold on to them for possible future 
disposition.
Entries in the war diaries of units employing the 
Chinese tend to confirm the general tenor of Wace's re-
18^Ibid., p. 47. (Geddes was Bourne's direct super­
ior in London.)
186p,R,o,/w.O. 32/5145, Construction of Light Rail­
ways for the B.E.F. in France, "Provision of Material and 
Personnel, 1916," Memorandumof Director General of Mili­
tary Railways to Quartermaster-General, War Office, London, 
September 26, 1916. (Geddes, who became First Lord of the 
Admiralty in 1917, had a habit of prodigality with the 
laborers at his disposal and was apt to make promises on 
their behalf which could not be carried through. See P. 
R.G./W.G. 158/45, War Cabinet File no. 1, March, 1917 to 
January, 1918, Minutes of Anglo-French Conference, ÏÔ1 
Downing St., March 12 and 13, 1917.)
1 87
^°'P.R.G./W.G. 107/37, Labour Report, p. 47.
188ibid.
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marks. For example, the official diary of the Assistant 
director of Supplies in Boulogne, Lieutenant T. A. Mor­
gan, records that so poor was the distribution of labor 
resources at his disposal that on one day too few men 
were available for a specific task, and on another, too 
many.189 By September, 1917, when he was employing ad­
ditional Chinese, the same problem existed more acutely.
On occasion, Morgan had to requisition Army Service Corps' 
personnel, even though Chinese theoretically assigned to 
him by the Labour Directorate had not been officially de­
t a c h e d . 190 Some of the labor which did finally arrive 
from the Directorate's pool was unequal to the heavy 
tasks presented it,1^1 although this was admittedly an 
unusual occurrence.
Morgan's frustrations were by no means unique. Ex­
amples of similar situations may be found scattered through­
out the war diaries which still exist. So difficult did 
the question of dispositions become that some units were 
even forced to recruit local labor, although as already 
suggested, this was a very poor expedient. This embar­
rassing state of affairs existed at a time when an ade-
189p R.o./w.O. 95/3984, War Diary of Assistant Di­
rector of Supplies, B.E.F., Boulogne, May 25, 1917.
^^^Ibid., September 7, 1917.
l^ljbid., October 2, 1917.
109
quate supply of Chinese and other native labor companies 
existed in base camp concentrations, waiting to be called 
upon or requisitioned.
Naturally Wace and his direct subordinates began
to experience the annoyance of commanders who failed to
receive adequately distributed aid from his Directorate's
pool. Wace admitted, although without accepting direct
personal responsibility, that,
The intelligent distribution of labour . . .
is especially necessary for the Chinese. Every­
where in France instances of the reverse are 
apparent. . . . The Chinese are not ignorant. 
They have brains. Orders and counter orders 
and unintelligent distribution of labour . . . 
have a demoralising effect . . . and induce 
them to regard our brains as inferior to their 
own.193
For Wace, the issue of poor deployment was redolent with 
racial significance as well as suggestions of personal 
inadequacy; how could the master race be seen in the act 
of fumbling for a coherent policy? Besides, poor utili­
zation of the Chinese damaged their morale and efficiency 
as well as their respect for the British.
192p.R.O./W.O. 95/3985, War Diary of Assistant Di­
rector of Supplies, B.E.F., Abbeville, April 8, 1918. TThe 
Abbeville sector was one of the first in which coolies 
operated. Their great base camp at Noyelles was a few 
kilometers from the town. For details, see P.R.O./W.O.
95/3976, War Diary of 'Q’ Branch, Abbeville H.Q., 1916- 
1917, passim.)
193p.R.O./W.O. 107/37, Labour Report, "Notes on 
Chinese Labour," para. 8, n.d.
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Was all of this just the result of so many bureau­
cratic blunders, the type that are common in any great 
war? Did confusion occur because such vast numbers of 
labor had never been employed before? Or was it the 
erratic nature of the w ar’s operations, first mobile and 
then static, that forced its pattern of inconsistency 
upon the attempts of the Labour Directorate to marshal 
its resources effectively? All of these elements un­
doubtedly were present. But present also was the con­
flict between the two types of mentality referred to 
earlier; those that were divided between a primitive 
production determined organization, and those who felt 
that the disposition of the Chinese and other natives 
should be the result of either technologically deter­
mined or rationally predicted estimates or performance, 
usefulness, or effectiveness. All the time the emer­
gencies of war played into the hands of the former, who 
tended to be junior officers in charge of labor battal­
ions or companies. They could not resist the temptation 
to depart from outlined management structures and pro­
cedures to place their coolies at work coping with an 
unforseen or unassigned task. In this, the commanders 
of units "employing" Chinese and native labor were as 
much to blame, for they knew only the exigencies of the 
moment, and welcomed the addition of temporary or unasked-
Ill
for labor. Under such conditions it was hard for Wace 
and his "efficients" to run a rational labor distribu­
tion machine.
To re-emphasize; the Labour Directorate, with Colo­
nel Wace at its head, had been designed to remedy this 
eventuality. It was to be the coordinating body of un­
skilled labor, governing the dispositions of most other 
Directorates in this sphere, and parcelling out its con­
tingents with thoughtful care.
Wace determined to see this task in a pluralistic 
way. Each major branch of the service which he served, 
like the Army Service Corps, was to retain a nucleus of 
semi-skilled laborers and artisans with the Chinese and 
other natives cast as part of a floating resource, cap­
able of temporary junction with any such nucleus as 
specialized demands and needs arose. In adopting such 
an approach, Wace neglected the problems of integration 
which were bound to arise. He hoped his floating pool 
of men would form the basic integrative resource, with 
each assignment of labor temporarily departing the pool 
to do a specific task for units who had made plain their 
requirements through clear requisitions for aid. This 
was his concept, almost his ideology. Through it he 
hoped to modify, streamline, and coordinate to some de­
gree the energies of the vast and potentially unmanage-
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able pool over which he was given command. This, to Wace, 
was "scientific" and modern management. His ideas were 
advanced, of that there can be little doubt.1^4 He hoped 
to act as a contractor rather than as a mere labor ex­
change.
But the real distinctions to be applied in utiliza­
tion and distribution of labor resources never became so 
clear cut. For one thing, his pool was not homogeneous 
enough to permit objective parceling out. Wace was sup­
posed only to deal in unskilled labor, but as he himself 
finally recognized.
There is no such thing as really unskilled 
labour. The Real distinction is that be­
tween permanently allotted and interchange­
able labour, selected for its aptitude . . .
And yet as the needs vary, it is more econ­
omical for the Force as a whole that Labour 
should be pooled and transferred from one 
unit to another as required.195
The centrally directed allotment of contingents from one 
pool remained Wace's ideal, but he could never attain it 
because the quality, capacity, and skill of his contin­
gents varied as much as the variety of tasks which faced 
them. "Economy" and "efficiency," his two watchwords.
194For example, see S. H. Udy, Work in Traditional 
and Modern Society (Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, 1970) 
(Many of Wace's ideas are remarkably akin to those discus­
sed in Udy's chapter "The Development of Pluralistic Or­
ganization," pp. 97-115, passim.)
195p.R.o./w.O. 107/37, Labour Report, p. 5.
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paled beside these imperatives.^®®
It is the war diaries of commanders requiring labor 
which amply convey the frustrations which resulted when 
the pool, Wace's "floating resource," was called upon as 
demands arose. Often, for example, the pressing urgency 
of a task was past by the time, say, a train unloading a 
company of coolies had been marched from the nearest pool 
base camp to supplement a "nucleus" task force already 
engaged on the work.^®? Later, when it was conclusively 
proven that selected Chinese could constitute a more per­
manent force with a management rationale of its own, be 
entirely responsible for laying sections of railroad 
track, salvaging war material, and show qualities of sus­
tained effort, the cherished image of Wace's in regard 
to a modified floating labor pool was abandoned. But by 
that time the active war was over. Not until too late 
did Wace really appreciate that the coolies could form 
skilled and semi-skilled companies, leave the pool, and 
make valid contributions to the war effort apart from the
^®®After the war the columns of the New Statesman 
ridiculed Wace's aspirations; "The higher labour author­
ities were like children with a new toy , . . forms and 
returns multiplied as they played with their vast resources." 
See "The Art of Wangling," The New Statesman, p. 585.
IBTpor an instance, see P.R.O./W.O. 95/3985, War 
Diary of Col. A. K. Seccombe, Director of Supplies, Lines 
of Communication, B.E.F., France, August 25, 1&17.
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unified group he was endeavoring to control.
Wace might have appreciated this earlier had his 
relations with Colonel Fairfax, the Chinese Labour Corps 
commander, not blinded him to certain realities concern­
ing the coolies; Wace, with an insistent and arbitrary 
manner, clashed with his outspoken subordinate, Fairfax, 
and thus lost the confidence and support of his most 
important subordinate. But their points of view on the 
handling of Chinese labor were really too disparate to 
have been compatible in any case.
Symbolic of the animus which grew up between the 
two men over the question of the coolies is a pressing 
memorandum to the War Office, drawn up independently by 
Fairfax, in which he begs for the creation of an inspec­
torate to look into the question of poor communication 
between his Chinese Labour Corps company commanders and 
their superiors at the Labour Directorate. Poor deploy­
ment of coolies, the grave lack of training and selection 
which had allowed "a proportion of professional criminal 
riff-raff, agitators, and undesirables"^®® to join the 
Corps, and the sometimes inexplicable directions of 
Wace’s directives all provided ammunition for Fairfax’s
!®®P.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Memorandum 
from Col. Fairfax, H.Q., C.L.C., France, to Col. Weather- 
all, War Office, London, December 28, 1917.
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charges. He was production oriented himself, and found 
the complicated directions of the Labour Directorate 
i r k s o m e . 199 y/ace's fondness for graphs and performance 
estimates annoyed and confused Labour Corps' personnel, 
urged Fairfax. The war was not an exercise in scientific 
labor management, but a life and death struggle in which 
the coolies must be exploited regardless of such methods.
What Fairfax wanted was the autonomy from which to 
direct his coolies as he thought fit. Being considered 
an adjunct of a vast and, to him, promiscuously available 
labor pool, was not conducive to his sense of profession­
al entitlement. The acrimony between Wace and Fairfax 
undoubtedly prevented the former from paying enough at­
tention to the skilled and semi-skilled roles the coolies 
might play. His defensiveness about abandoning some of 
his pool concepts might well have been lessened save for 
the mutual jealousy between the two.
This situation was particularly unfortunate for 
the status of the coolies, for while the two men most 
concerned with their deployment fought over methods of 
management and policy, many of their potentials remained 
untapped. The Chinese Labour Corps contained men whose 
skills were crucially necessary to the Allied war effort, 




Fortunately for Britain, Chinese originally imported 
as part of the "Raw" product could be found before the war 
ended in foundry shops, building, driving, and repairing 
tanks and motor cars behind the lines, and engaged on a 
multitude of other semi-skilled, skilled, or even quasi­
professional tasks. Racial prejudice and professional 
jealousy between military men had almost prevented this 
important contribution from taking effect.200 When their 
full value was belatedly realized, there arose a constant 
combing out effort in the Chinese companies to determine 
which of the coolies could be considered proficient 
enough for transfer to a specialized unit.201
In January of 1918 the first really serious use of 
skilled and semi-skilled members of the Chinese Labour 
Corps began. In June of that year a monthly return was 
instituted by the Labour Directorate for the purpose of 
seeing that such men were at last properly employed where 
they could do most good, and not wasted on purely menial 
or manual jobs. At one time in 1918 there were twenty-one
200nowever, some attempts were made to categorize 
some shipments of coolies upon arrival in France. These 
attempts did not prove successful and were superficial.
2Qlp.R 0 /W.O. 32/5091, Maintenance of Battalions 
in France, 1&1Ô-1917, Memorandum from Office of Adjutant 
General, G.H.Q., B.E.F., France, to Chief of Imperial 
General Staff, London, October 29, 1917. (Note is made 
of the danger of reducing Corps strength under such cir­
cumstances . )
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recognized skilled or semi-skilled coolie companies, over 
ten thousand men, and above and beyond this figure "nu­
merous other Companies have at sometime or other been
0f)0
employed on essentially skilled work." The notion of 
the utter predomination of ignorance in the Corps' Chi­
nese personnel must under these circumstances be abandoned.
A few specific examples will emphasize this conten­
tion. At number five Area Motor Transport Central Work­
shops Chinese taken from manual labor companies were by 
early 1918 running their own truck repair shop, smith's 
shop, molding bay, paint shop and motorcycle repair works. 
In November of the same year Company 147 might have been 
found in the great siege park at Douai working in the 
highly skilled artillery maintenance facility. Many 
"coolie" fitters had their own shops, and Chinese Labour 
Corps' Companies 51, 69, 90, and 173 exclusively ser­
viced the tanks at the big Tank Corps Depot at Auby-les- 
Hesdin.
For a few British officers there was even the sight, 
which they found greatly humiliating, of Chinese almost 
entirely maintaining the important railroad lines between 
Calais, Zeneghem, Dieppe, Boulogne, Audriecq, Dannes, Ab­
beville, Saignevillem Abbancourt, and Sequence, leaving
202p.R.O./W.O. 107/37, Labour Report, p. 47. (No. 
8 Co., C.L.C. was employed in the Light Railway Workshop 
near Abbeville as early as January 8, 1918.)
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all "but a minimum of skilled British personnel" in the 
vicinity.203
These and other specialist companies, made up of 
the metamorphosed "Raw Importation," generally remained 
within the Chinese Labour Corps itself, but some were 
contracted out to branches of the service desiring par­
ticular help. Under such circumstances the companies 
endured a rather ambiguous identity. Should they adhere 
to the nuclei of skilled white workers retained by most 
independent directorates, like the Directorate of Trans­
portation? Or should they still be regarded as compon­
ents, albeit anomalous, of the Labour Directorate's vast 
pool of "unskilled" labor?
Sharp rivalry grew up between Wace's organization 
and some of the commands who claimed exclusive use of 
skilled and semi-skilled Chinese. Wace particularly re­
sented this competitive angle. It frustrated his basic 
rationale of imposing standard procedures on the distri­
bution of all Chinese workers. Even when he came to ad­
mit the necessity of using such men where they could be 
most effective, and pulling them from his pool, he still 
expressed reservations. One of his reservations was 
based on a very practical foundation. Chinese Labour 
Corps commanders, as he found out, resented the manpower
203lbid.
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strengths that they lost as a result of the search for 
technical and other skills among their men. They were 
further disaffected when the coolies they did retain act­
ed in an unskilled or supportive capacity for specialist 
units to which former colleagues and Chinese personnel 
had recently been seconded. Their already tenuous profes­
sional prestige was at stake.
But the greatest damage done by the competitive 
angle noted above was the impact it had upon the sensible 
employment of the skilled and semi-skilled Chinese once 
their talents were put to use. If there had long been 
a refusal on the parts of influential staff officers and 
senior unit commanders to recognize the full extent and 
potential of this material, the initial mistake could at 
least have been partially rectified by a greater willing­
ness to work together with all interested branches of the 
service to procure a fair share of the energies and po­
tentials released. This did not happen. In the official 
sources which remain, a number of instances may be found 
of the poor organization and utilization to which such a 
situation inevitably led. For instance, in early 1918 
the deputy director of transport in one important sector 
in France remarked in his war diary that,
A difficulty has arisen as regards the rela­
tionship of the 114th Chinese Labour Company 
to the 5th Heavy Repair Shop. According to 
the Director of Transport's arrangement with
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the Director of Labour ^Wace7, this com­
pany is a technical company . . . but the 
Base Commandant Dunkirk does not take this 
view; he considers that the company can be 
employed anywhere in the Area at his dis­
cretion.204
As a matter of fact, this particular company was desig­
nated "semi-skilled," and the upshot of the quarrel con­
cerning its designation was the waste of much valuable 
time and effort which resulted in the unit being split 
so that a mere fifteen men could be employed in the re­
pair shop, while the remainder returned to the labor
pool.^05
This example shows how potentially disruptive of or­
ganization was the personal attitude of a commander to 
whose command a Chinese labor company might be temporarily 
attached. If he so chose he could ignore the recommenda­
tions of the coolies' own commander, or the advice of the 
Labour Directorate. He could even change the reasons for 
his original requisition of labor from the pool, and some­
times for frivolous reasons, rather than to cope with the 
demands of war.^OG This anomaly affected manual workers
204p.R.O./W.O. 95/3992, War Diary of Deputy Director 
of Transport, Northern Sector, B.E.F., France, February 15, 
iôlâ.
205ibid., February 18, 1918.
206The columns of The New Statesman suggested that 
it had not been unusual "to hear of an instance where 150 
coolies were kept in camp for a fortnight, levelling out 
ground for a tennis court . . .' See "The Art of Wangling," 
The New Statesman, p. 586. (The paper was not alone in re- 
cording these instances.)
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and those Chinese accomplishing more demanding tasks.
According to Colonel Wace, who found this state of 
affairs the ultimate evidence of stupidity and unscien­
tific labor management, the situation was due entirely 
to the ambiguous phrasing of the Quartermaster-General's 
memorandum of January 5, 1917, under which the Labour 
Directorate had been formally constituted. This direc­
tive placed the burden of distribution and control dur­
ing working hours on the "Employer" or unit for which 
labor was w o r k i n g . 207 With each employing commander 
disposing of his labor resources as he thought fit during 
the eight or, as in the case of the Chinese, ten hours 
during which they were within his compass, the poor utili­
zation of the overall pool could only be worsened con­
siderably . 208
It has been suggested how Wace aimed at moving from 
the invidious position of labor exchange to that of pro­
fessional contractor. But it would be too simplistic to 
agree with him that the root of his inability to accomp­
lish this lay in ambiguities perpetrated by the Quarter­
master-General. Certainly Wace's duties and obligations 
could and should have been spelled out more clearly, but 
such a move would by no means have eliminated the rival-
207p.R.O./W.O. 107/37, Labour Report, p. 7. 
208#ine hours was the working day for Blacks.
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ries, jealousies, and insubordinations which frustrated 
his policies of labor control. In vain he reprimanded 
officers in branches of the service which he served, 
ordering them to refrain from questioning the Director­
ate's allotment, administration, and treatment of its 
labor p o o l . 209 In vain, too, did Wace attempt to ex­
plain clearly the obligations he felt each commander 
using the pool should abide by. "No movements of labour," 
he wrote in one of his toughest directives, "will be 
made by 'Employers' without reference to the Labour 
Group Headquarters of the Area c o n c e r n e d . " 2 1 0
Finally, in what amounted to self-preservative re­
taliation, the Labour Directorate tried to select only 
loyal commanders for its labor companies, insisting that 
they adhere as closely as possible to the orders and 
ideology of the Directorate while trying not to clash 
too seriously with the officers of commands that they 
were assigned to assist. This call for allegiance re­
sulted in an untenable situation being made even worse 
for the Chinese, because the calibre of officer in charge 
of them was such as to be unequal in most instances to 
the performance of so delicate a feat. Such officers
209por an example, see P.R.O./W.O. 95/3985, War Diary 
of Assistant Director of Supplies, B.E.F., Abbeville, June 
18, 1917.
210p.R.O./W.O. 107/37, Labour Report, p. 10.
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tended to follow Fairfax's production oriented mentality, 
fall in with the demands of many of the commanders whom 
they served, and ignore Wace's "scientific" methods for 
deployment and distribution of labor.
Colonel Wace had optimistically laid it down as
essential to his concept of labor management that all
company commanders,
be selected and trained in the principles 
/sic7 of labour administration and in the 
economical employment of labour. They must 
know the capacity of the labour at their 
disposal and the practical application of 
labour to work /sic/2^i
This was too sophisticated a goal so far as most of the 
Chinese Labour Corps' commanders at company level were 
concerned. Many of the subalterns in charge of coolies 
had never seen a Chinese before, and had not the slight­
est understanding of his m a k e - u p . ^12 Neither had they 
any appreciation of Wace's intellectual estimation of 
correct labor management. Not surprisingly under this 
dual disability they were easily intimidated by senior 
officers to whose commands they found their coolie com­
panies temporarily attached.
This sustained atmosphere of crisis, in which it 
has been demonstrated that the Chinese played a large
211Ibid., p. 196.
212h . Boswell-Lancaster, "Our Chinese Allies of 
1914-1918," Our Empire, Vol. XV (August, 1939), p. 40,
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part, helped to bring about the creation of an entirely 
new establishment in February, 1918. It was dubbed La­
bour Control. Colonel Wace remained to head it. It had 
broader reaching powers than the Labour Directorate 
which it replaced, and was designed to coordinate the 
efforts of all activities of labor employers in the armies 
in France. The foundation of Labour Control was brought 
about not so much as a result of criticisms regarding the 
efficient employment of labor resources in the pool, al­
though these figured very prominently in the decision, 
but rather as a result of serious concerns about weak­
nesses in discipline and executive material in the body 
of the old Labour Directorate, its Area Headquarters, 
and units under its control.
Here the Chinese Labour Corps played a major role 
in bringing about the reorganization. The men who of­
ficered its companies, although often personally above 
reproach, failed to make good military material because 
too often they had been chosen on account of their civil 
background in China, or because of some other civilian 
capacity which it was thought by the War Office might be 
helpful in the direction of the c o o l i e s . T h e s e  men
213The War Office admitted that Chinese companies 
were "too newly organised and many of their Officers had 
had very little military experience." See P.R.O./W.O. 
107/37, Labour Report, p. 13.
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pleased neither Wace nor the professional officers to 
whom their coolie companies were seconded. And so, just 
as the pending arrival of the Chinese in France in the 
first place had prompted the setting up of the Labour 
Directorate in January, 1917, so their continued pre­
sence in Europe now helped to force a major re-assessment 
of labor management and direction resulting in the ap­
pearance of Labour Control.
The general ineffectiveness of the Chinese Labour 
Corps' officers was heightened by the very existence of 
their unhappy role as middlemen between "employers" and 
the Labour Directorate. They were now to be helped to 
overcome this invidious position. The new Labour Control 
was to provide company commanders of coolies and other 
natives with a genuine and substantial support in the 
form of ranking colonels. Commandants of Labour, as they 
were to be known, instead of the former assistant direc­
tors of labor and their deputy assistant directors.
This reform was important, for it considerably 
raised the morale of the Chinese Labour Corps' company 
commanders, who now felt that at least there were officers 
at Labour Control who would not only listen to them, but 
also had the power of rank to exert should it become ne­
cessary to rebuke or caution officers by whom the Chinese 
were utilized. But this reform also emphasized what had
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probably been the major weakness of the old Labour Di­
rectorate; namely, its tentative command structure. The 
assistant directors of labor and their deputies had been 
engaged in January of 1917 merely to "advise and assist,"214 
rather than actually to direct the allotment and deploy­
ment of labor resources. This ephemeral brief had proven 
fatal when it came to dealings with sometimes obstreper­
ous commanders of units using labor from the Labour Di­
rectorate's pool. It had been generally recognized by 
staff officers of other branches that the directors of 
labor in the field had no serious executive role, and 
consequently need not be listened to with much seriousness. 
This state of affairs alone would have prevented many of 
Wace's policies from being implemented.
Another notable limitation on the effectiveness of 
the Labour Directorate which also adversely affected the 
Chinese had been the assumption that it would carry out 
work ordinarily done by the Adjutant-General's office. 
Questions of discipline and organization which had nothing 
to do with the disposition of labor had to be dealt with 
by Wace and his subordinates. Time was wasted here which 
might otherwise have been occupied in improving the dis­
tribution of labor personnel. As the Labour Directorate
214p,R,o,/w,o, 32/1856, Position of Proposed Labour 
Directorate, Memorandum of September 9, 1916.
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had been formed under the auspices of the Quartermaster- 
General it had no business doing the work of the Adjutant- 
General 's office, too. The reorganization of early 1918 
acknowledged this. Administrative tasks of the funda­
mental sort were placed under the Adjutant-General, while 
Wace and his men now won greater latitude for the imple­
mentation of their own policies, although still nominally 
under the Quartermaster-General. At the same time, how­
ever, liaison machinery was constructed to enable Labour 
Control to maintain close contact with the Adjutant-Gen­
eral 's staff.
Once the Labour Control began to function in the 
spring of 1918 a choice lay more clearly between a greater 
move toward coherent centralized control of all labor re­
sources, both skilled and unskilled, and the continued 
assertions of independence by local commanders in the 
field which had proved so damaging to the Labour Direc­
torate and the Chinese throughout 1917. It was inevitable 
that much of the old parochialism should remain, especial­
ly as the Corps of Royal Engineers and other Branches of 
the service still managed under various evasions to retain 
some vestiges of their old independence in the distribu­
tion of l a b o r . 215 But elements of Wace's vision lay 
within his reach for the first time. In order to adver-
215The Corps of Royal Engineers in the Great War 
(London; n.p., 1919), p. 39.
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tise its resolve that centralized direction should be
the norm, the Labour Control command, personified by
Wace, declared.
Formations to which earmarked Labour is allot­
ted are responsible for its inspection and for 
reporting any readjustment that may become ne­
cessary . . .  or any wastage of this Labour, 
and /they/ will make suggestions for its more 
economical use.216
That the creation of the Labour Control did much to 
improve the utilization of the Chinese is indisputable. 
Questions of priority in their use seem for the first 
time to have been dealt with rationally and expeditiously, 
and although their company commanders were subjected to 
greater pressures in regard to efficient management and 
discipline, they in turn now had more substantial backing 
from the new Labour Commandants. The war diaries reflect 
the impact this arrangement had upon the efficient de­
ployment of native labor.
The only fresh phenomenon which seriously jeopar­
dized the Corps' improved status was the eventual return 
of the war to a mobile pattern with the consequent even­
tual abandonment of fixed defensive positions to which 
this led. And yet the department of the service which 
gave Labour Control most trouble in relation to the Chi­
nese at this juncture was not one of the branches involved
107/37, Labour Report, Charter of the 
New Labour Control, para. 16, "Distribution of Labour."
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in the physical forward movement of the armies but, as 
the appropriate documents testify, the Docks Director­
ate, which controlled the Channel ports. Even here, ac­
cording to their own officers, the Chinese performed 
quite well. The damage was done not so much by their 
incapacity as by the continued inept assignment of their 
tasks.217 For this the requisitions of the Docks Di­
rectorate and its commanders must assume responsibility.
The source of this incompetence appears to have 
lain in lack of desire for any genuine communication with 
Labour Control or its commandants. The outcome of a 
series of crises which dogged the pattern of Chinese em­
ployment in the docks was a committee of inquiry, chaired 
by Major-General R. Ford, Deputy Quartermaster-General 
at B.E.F. Headquarters in France. The committee's re­
port urged greater cooperation between the Docks Direc­
torate and Labour Control, and insisted that the former 
observe the conditions under which Wace operated. The 
committee also referred to the animosity which existed 
between Wace and Brigadier-General R. L. Wedgwood, Di­
rector of Docks, which had contributed to the exacerba­
tion of the whole situation. But the committee's conclu-
217ibid., Memorandum of Assistant Commandant of La­
bour, G.H.Q., B.E.F., France, July /?/, 1918. (An example 
reads in part: "Docks Directorate assigned six Chinese to 
each of 14 railway trucks at 11:00 a.m. Chinese still 
ready by mid-day. Had not received direction an hour la­
ter," etc.)
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in the physical forward movement of the armies but, as 
the appropriate documents testify, the Docks Director­
ate, which controlled the Channel ports. Even here, ac­
cording to their own officers, the Chinese performed 
quite well. The damage was done not so much by their 
incapacity as by the continued inept assignment of their 
tasks.217 For this the requisitions of the Docks Di­
rectorate and its commanders must assume responsibility.
The source of this incompetence appears to have 
lain in lack of desire for any genuine communication with 
Labour Control or its commandants. The outcome of a 
series of crises which dogged the pattern of Chinese em­
ployment in the docks was a committee of inquiry, chaired 
by Major-General R. Ford, Deputy Quartermaster-General 
at B.E.F. Headquarters in France. The committee's re­
port urged greater cooperation between the Docks Direc­
torate and Labour Control, and insisted that the former 
observe the conditions under which Wace operated. The 
committee also referred to the animosity which existed 
between Wace and Brigadier-General R. L. Wedgwood, Di­
rector of Docks, which had contributed to the exacerba­
tion of the whole situation. But the committee's conclu-
217lbid., Memorandum of Assistant Commandant of La­
bour, G.H.Q., B.E.F., France, July /?7, 1918. (An example 
reads in part: "Docks Directorate assigned six Chinese to 
each of 14 railway trucks at 11:00 a.m. Chinese still 
ready by mid-day. Had not received direction an hour la­
ter," etc.)
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sions were virtually redundant when issued in October, 
1918, and had little impact upon the subsequent employ­
ment of the diminishing number of coolies in the Channel 
ports.218
The fact is that Labour Control, although greatly 
superior to the Directorate of Labour as a vehicle for 
Wace's "scientific” methods of deployment, and able to 
achieve much higher levels of efficiency in its alloca­
tion of resources, failed to win the status it needed 
and deserved as a result of the changes of February, 1918, 
which brought it into existence. It is one thing to re­
design and modify an establishment, quite another to have 
it instantly accepted as genuinely authoritative. The 
Control came to be seen largely as the Labour Directorate 
had been regarded; namely as an exchange rather than as 
a professional contractor. Colonel Wace regarded this 
as almost analogous to the worst side of the civil labor 
sphere, where "industry works with a reserve of Labour.
As men are not wanted . . . they are thrown back on the 
Labour market, and it is not the business of the employer 
what becomes of them."^^®
Wace spent much of his energy in the continuing ef­
fort to prevent this careless exploitation of his pool,
^^^Ibid., Appendix 'Z.' 
219lbid., p. 170.
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and of the Chinese who formed such a large element of it, 
but without the success for which he personally always 
hoped. He wanted to train a staff that would recognize 
the importance of the methods and policy he used, and 
thus create for the first time a recognized rationale 
for the use of labor in the actual battlefield conditions 
of war. Intensity of an army's demands for labor, he al­
ways told his subordinates, was ideally determined not by 
the fluctuations to which civil labor is subject, but by 
two controlling variables which the clever military labor 
director appreciates and is able to manipulate; the as­
sessment of priorities, to be determined in this case by 
his own office as a result of long term prognoses, and 
the existing military situation. For Wace, this amounted 
to finding a happy medium between what he regarded as the 
officially sanctioned mandate of the professional Labour 
Control establishment, and pure expediency. But when the 
war became dramatically mobile again in mid-1918, these 
two variables, which had assumed dogmatic proportions in 
Wace's thinking, were proven mutually irreconcilable, and 
the demands of war assumed paramount importance.
If Wace failed in his attempt to create a school of 
thinking in regard to the management of labor in war, it 
is still important to remember that his carefully laid 
down rules for the procedures of labor employment still
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applied to an extent, and provided an important framework 
in which the Chinese continued to function instead of 
being grossly exploited as might well have been the case 
had not "employers” had to account in writing for the 
use made of their coolies. Wace’s organization repre­
sented a form of legality against which the exigencies 
of war washed, but which they could not submerge.
Colonel Wace's professional interest in the Chinese 
was reflected in the care he took to estimate their per­
formance and lay down norms for their use. After study, 
he and his junior officers introduced a broader task work 
schedule for the Chinese to pursue rather than the lengthy 
timework system^^O which kept them in the field for ten 
hours a day, and which he rightly regarded as unsuited to 
those who had no practical interest in victory. Taskwork 
recognized that a basic incentive system could be appreci­
ated by the coolies. If they finished a given task be­
fore the conclusion of their ten hours, a long break was 
to ensue before the resumption of their next task, or 
perhaps the remainder of their day’s labor might be re­
mitted altogether.
Sometimes the Chinese seem to have accomplished more 
by way of specific tasks in, say, seven hours than they 
had formerly done when working to the limits of the al-
220piecework was never given to labor units on ac­
tive duty.
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lotted ten hour span. This looked like a triumph for the 
psychology of Wace's method. The application of his posi­
tive reward system was popularly employed at railheads in 
an attempt to eliminate the kind of wanton wastage of 
effort that had become commonplace in the use of the 
Chinese at that particular point. But here again the more 
progressive and modern-sounding notions of Labour Control 
were frustrated. Senior officers could be heard com­
plaining that unpleasant comparisons had emerged between 
the amount of work accomplished by coolies under the task 
work regime, and the work accomplished by white labor 
companies under similar conditions.^21
Combined with this anxiety for the preservation of 
racial superiority one finds also that commanders of 
Chinese Labour Corps companies functioning exclusively 
on the task work schedule tended to ignore promised re­
wards in the form of rest periods or a shortened day, and 
merely stepped up the overall effort demanded of their 
men. Production oriented as they were, they saw no ne­
cessity for the psychological and physical rewards es­
sential if the system were to work. Without that essen­
tial knowledge of their charges which Wace deemed essen­
tial, some Chinese Labour Corps officers believed the
221see Appendix ' C  at the end of this paper for 
some comparisons. Supra.*, p. 267.
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exaggerated reports that they had heard retailed at 
second hand concerning the coolies' legendary capacity 
for work. Consequently, the temptation existed to keep 
up the pressure, and to give the Chinese an increasing 
number of tasks to perform, some of them far too far 
forward of the positions supposedly guaranteed them in 
their contracts.222 The commanders involved defended 
these actions by reminding Labour Control of its own 
fiats in relation to efficiency. On one or two occa­
sions abuse of the taskwork system actually led to mu­
t i n i e s ,  223 and the whole idea as Wace envisioned i t  
finally had to be drastically modified or abandoned al­
together .
The pending arrival of the Chinese Labour Corps had 
helped provide for the formation of the Labour Director­
ate, its use and abuse in France had had an impact upon 
the materialization of Labour Control, and its existence 
had provided a paradigm over which the two basic types of 
labor management mentality fought. As such the Corps had 
a profound and continued impact upon the deployment of 
all labor resources by the British armies during the
222j'or an example, see P.R.O./W.O. 95/1641, War Diary 
of Commander, Corps of Royal Engineers, 7th Div. H.Q., B. 
E.F., France, October 26, 1917.
223por an example, see P.R.O./W.O. 95/3984, War Diary 
of Assistant Director of Supplies, B.E.F., Boulogne, March 
ll, 1Ô1Ô.
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years 1917 and 1918. Neither Wace with his scientific 
methods, nor Fairfax with his production oriented out­
look, won a clear victory by w a r ’s end. Neither was the 
experiment ever to be repeated. Although in 1923 Colo­
nel Gibb could tell his students at the staff college 
most emphatically that it still lay in the future for 
someone to take the essential step of recognizing a 
"Central Labour authority responsible for arranging the 
supply, the terms of engagement, and the distribution or 
allotment of men to work,"^^^ he himself could not know 
how radically the whole concept of war would change be­
fore the next great conflict. Certainly contingents of 
manual laborers were needed during the second world war, 
but advances in strategies and weapons design, and the 
advent on a huge scale of motorized transport, did away 
with armies of labor in the field, and placed the em­
phasis instead on the exploitation and management of 
domestic labor. There never was, and there probably never 
will be, a need for another Chinese Labour Corps; its role 
was unique and now belongs to history. In the final esti­
mate, many of Wace’s methods proved correct, and have be­
come a part of the history of civil labor management 
since 1918. The ideas and prejudices of his opponents be­
gan to pass from the scene just as inevitably as did the 
Corps itself.
BB^Gibb, "The Organisation of Labour in the Great 
War," p. 173.
CHAPTER IV
THE RESPONSE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN BRITAIN
TO THE RAISING OF THE CHINESE LABOUR CORPS
By late 1916, British labor, through the medium of
its unions, had learned to live uneasily with various 
plans for dilution and substition. Shop stewards and 
individual workers might and did feel the acute pressures 
of these problems, along with the attendant fear of mili­
tary conscription to which they led,225 but they had lit­
tle opportunity for clear or vocal dissent. Toward the 
end of 1916, however, the complacency of the unions and 
their leaders was challenged by the specter of massive 
substitution through the use of Chinese and native labor.
It had leaked via the press, and been rumored con­
sistently, that the government was embarking upon the 
concrete realization of plans to import coolies to Europe. 
Were these Orientals destined for France, as official in­
dications seemed to suggest? If so, what part would they 
play there? Or were the Chinese to take a more sinister
role in some scheme of direct substitution in Britain
225Q D H  Cole and R. Postgate, The British People: 
1746-1946 (New York: A. Knopf, 1961), p. 524.
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itself? Under the threat of these anxieties and unre­
solved questions it is not surprising that for a few 
months the leaders of organized labor in Britain threw 
off their lethargy in an attempt to gauge the extent of 
the threat to their rank and file, and prepared once more 
to do battle for the rights of the working man.
Genuine fears would have been aroused much earlier 
had labor leaders divined more clearly the intentions of 
some military men in relation to the use of Chinese. As 
early as August, 1916, when the scheme for raising coolies 
was still in its infancy, a conference was held in White­
hall for the specific purpose of considering what part 
the projected raising of these men and other natives 
might play in releasing able-bodied British workers for 
participation in c o m b a t . T h e  War Office and the Army 
Council acknowledged a desperate need for Chinese labor 
in France, but they also toyed very seriously with the 
idea of using additional coolies for purposes of direct 
substitution in Britain.
However, it was also realized in Whitehall that such 
a direct introduction of native labor would cause acute 
problems among British workers, although manpower needs 
had become so pressing that the confrontation of this is-
226p R 0 /w 0 32/11345, Recruitment, Minutes of a
Conference to Consider the Proposal that African Native La­
bour and Chinese Labour be Employed in France, August 25, 
1916.
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sue seemed almost preferable to the existence of military 
insecurity in France. One way of avoiding such a confron­
tation was the use of coolies in France in such a manner 
as to release older men currently active in white labor 
corps so that they could return to the domestic factor­
ies, and in turn release younger men who could be used 
solely for combat duties. A number of those involved in 
the direction of workers in France, among them Major- 
General Woodward, Director of Military Organisation, were 
willing to embrace this approach, as it provided an al­
ternative to a direct showdown with British labor, or so 
they believed. "The Labour Party," noted Woodward, "won’t 
part with more men unless they are replaced so m eh o w ."227 
Apparently he felt satisfied that the party would agree 
to seeing men sent to the front in exchange for others 
returned to the hearth. But Woodward’s interest was 
really the cabinet. "The Cabinet," he remarked, "will 
do nothing to raise more /fighting men7 unless we can 
show them that we at the War Office are doing our utmost 
regardless /s’ic7 to get back able men to replace younger 
men required for the front."228
Woodward and some of his colleagues saw the Chinese 




hand of the cabinet into complying with the General 
Staff's urgent requests for broader conscription of do­
mestic manpower. Mr. Asquith had remained dubious about 
this extension of military power, and had resisted it 
for so long as he as Premier was able. Now the cabinet 
over which he presided was less attentive to his leader­
ship than in past years. Consequently, as Woodward knew, 
it was more amenable to pressures from professional mili­
tary men. He cared little for the opposition of the 
Labour party, and not much for the concerted opposition 
of the workers in Britain. He believed that the cabinet 
could be pressured into providing for added manpower 
strengths once the War Office took the initiative in pro­
viding some means of releasing white labor in Britain 
for action in France. Woodward and his colleagues had 
every reason to believe that Mr. Lloyd George, as Secre­
tary for War, approved of and supported their p l a n s . ^^9 
In practice these plans failed to materialize.
This was in part because of the delays and adversities in 
the production of the Chinese Labour Corps, the important 
role women began to play in keeping up levels of factory 
production, and the extension of conscription. But per­
haps the most important factor which militated against 
the introduction of Chinese labor into Britain, and which
229lbid.
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limited their use as substitutes in France, was the un­
expectedly strong, though brief, resistance of labor in 
Britain.
It must be recalled that throughout the early war 
years, and once the decision had been made to support 
the war effort, British labor adopted a narrow, not to 
say introverted, state of mind. Tamed and conditioned 
by the illusions of Imperial grandeur,230 it rallied to 
the flag just like its brother socialists: Germany.
When it spared time to consider broader issues than those 
affecting the immediate domestic situation, it was us­
ually to speculate vaguely on what direction labor re­
lations might take after the conclusion of hostilities, 
or whether any future might exist for international so­
cialism after the holocaust.231
The voice of labor was slow to grasp the danger of 
the Chinese threat. Ripples of concern are evident to­
ward the close of 1918, but do not emerge into promin­
ence until early 1917. In November, 1916, the intel­
lectually, Fabian oriented voice of The New Statesman,
230s. Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform: Eng­
lish Social-Imperial Thought, l865-l6l4 (Garden City: 
Doubleday, 1968), p. 226.
231por typical examples, see "The Coming Slavery," 
The Socialist Standard, June 1, 1916, pp. 76-77, and Rosa 
Luxembourg, "Rebuilding the International," The Socialist 
Standard, September 1, 1915, p. 1.
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although a defender of the socialist and labor ethos, 
could magisterially castigate the War Office for "a 
timid start" in the use of native labor in France.232 
A month or two later, with its complacency shaken, the 
same newspaper remarked bitterly that British labor's 
subscription to the war effort would undeniably falter 
in the face of the use or importation into Europe of 
colored workers, especially if that force were used in 
schemes of dilution or direct s u b s t i t u t i o n . 2 3 3
These inconsistencies need not cause surprise.
In the individualistic world of the British left shades 
of opinion from vehement opposition to the introduction 
of the Chinese into any theater of war, to mild approval 
of their use on a modest scale both in Britain and in 
continental Europe, may be found. Basically, the left 
saw three possible uses for the Chinese, each affecting 
its own interests; dilution of workers in factories at 
home by the introduction of coolies, direct substitution 
of Chinese for workers either at home or in white labor 
corps abroad in order to release these men to play a 
part in combat strength plans, or direct competition
232"i^au Power and Soldier Power," The New Statesman, 
November 1 1 ,  1 9 1 6 ,  p. 1 2 5 .  (The writer seems to have be­
lieved that the "constructive" use of Chinese might actual­
ly have stayed the process of dilution or substitution.)
233"Labour and its Voice," The New Statesman, Janu­
ary 2 7 ,  1 9 1 7 ,  pp. 3 8 9 - 3 9 1 ,  passim.
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from the Chinese in British factories given over to them 
specifically.
This latter state of affairs, it was finally real­
ized, could continue after the war’s end. It was The 
New Statesman that blamed Lloyd George, the Morning Post, 
and the whole Northcliffe press for encouraging the possi­
bility of this e v e n t u a l i t y ,23 4  and the paper went on to 
hint that these same elements saw the Chinese as consti­
tuting a virtually illimitable pool upon which capital­
ists in Britain could draw once an armistice was conclud­
ed with the enemy. This pool, soon to be "lodged in 
compounds, and required to undertake the unloading of 
ships, and any other work . . . under the authority of 
the present ’governing class,'" was bound to present a 
huge threat to the interests of organized labor in Bri­
tain, reasoned the w r i t e r . ^35 And, noted the same paper 
later on, might not the management and direction of such 
indentured labor furnish the capitalist managers in Bri­
tain with the secrets of collective manipulation of labor 
resources which they could apply in their dealings with 
workers at home?236
234"xhe Conduct of the War," The New Statesman, De­
cember 9 ,  1 9 1 6 ,  p. 2 2 2 .
235ibid.
236”Capitalism after the War," The New Statesman, 
February 3 ,  1 9 1 7 ,  p. 4 1 3 .
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But, after all, these were speculative, even eso­
teric, conclusions. To see war as a sophisticated capi­
talist enterprise in which money is made through the 
exploitation not only of labor, but also of human emo­
tional traits, is a view with which people today have be­
come more familiar. In 1916 or 1917 it could appear to 
prominent and intelligent trades union men like Ben 
Tillett just so much needlessly arrogant chatter to 
discuss the potential role to be performed by Chinese 
as cogs in the workings of the post-war capitalist ma­
chine. The same was true of the paradox that pre-war 
increases in productivity had lessened the need for man­
ual labor, while the war had brought a greater demand 
for manual workers than ever before. Ironically the 
Chinese were forced to work under the most primitive 
conditions long since transcended by the workers of 
Britain.
To men like Tillett it was essential to discover 
what power he and his fellow proletarians could exert 
to keep the immediate practical use of the Chinese with­
in bounds acceptable to the status quo they now enjoyed 
and were prepared to defend. Under the circumstances of 
the entry of Black labor into France already, there ap­
peared to Tillett to be every reason to act with some 
haste and resolve. He showed himself one of the most
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resolute of labor's spokesman on the issue. Colored
labor, he remarked in late 1916, arrived in Europe
"even before the question was mooted in this c o u n t r y , "237
There seemed every reason to suspect that the coolies
would arrive and be assigned with similar s u d d e n n e s s .238
With the help and support of his fellow unionists,
Tillett moved a resolution before the Council of the
General Federation of Trade Unions, in which he noted
that that body viewed,
with grave anxiety the proposal to import and 
substitute coloured labour for white labour.
It will regard such an importation . . .  as a 
contemptuous repudiation, and fears that the 
proposal to introduce coloured labour is but 
a preparatory step on the part of capital to­
wards the exploitation of labour after the 
war.239
Tillett acted partly in ignorance when he delivered this 
resolution. In the secrecy of war, and with the censor­
ship of Whitehall prevalent, a great deal of speculation
237Report of Special General Council Meeting, Gener­
al Federation of Trade Unions, Holborn Hall, London, Wed­
nesday, December 6, 1916 (London: Co-operative Printing
Society, 1916), p. 37.
238colonel Lawson, in his Reports, had urged that 
all substitution be gradual,_"and spread out over a large 
number of units at a time, _/fo£7 in this way, if well or­
ganized and arranged, the replacement would take place 
almost unnoticed." See Lawson, Reports, p. 11.
239Report of Special General Council Meeting, Gen­
eral Federation of Trade Unions, Holborn Hall, London, 
Wednesday, December 6, 1^16 (London: Co-operative Print­
ing Society, 1916), p. 37.
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and rumor abounded concerning the use of native person­
nel by the War Office, But by December of 1916 it was 
becoming generally accepted in certain circles of labor 
and trade union leadership that Chinese were about to 
be collected on a larger scale than ever before envis­
aged, although it still was not apparent to what use 
the War Office contemplated putting them. Neither was 
it known for certain how many Black laborers or troops 
actually were in France, or what plans existed for their 
increase and future allotment. Under these conditions 
of uncertainty it was hard to formulate any clear policy 
of opposition, or to overcome the comparative indiffer­
ence of those on the left who doubted that any real 
threat to British labor really existed.
In mid-November, members of the Parliamentary Com­
mittee of the Trades Union Congress, responding to the 
pressures of some anxious rank and file members, visit­
ed the War Office in an attempt to clarify policy re­
garding the introduction or importation of colored la­
bor into Europe. The meeting did little to clarify the 
situation. The very delicate negotiations for the 
raising of the Chinese were in a critical stage, the 
extent of Lloyd George's proposed native labor estab­
lishment was still quite secret, and the War Office had 
no intention of arousing premature excitement over the
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appearance of the Chinese. Consequently the innocuous 
Earl of Derby, soon to succeed Lloyd George as minister 
for war, soothingly assured members of the visiting 
delegation that any substitution schemes involving na­
tives of whatever origin were designed merely to re­
lease ailing men from the army for work at home in Eng­
land. It was, he said, "a mere exchange of men" that the 
government contemplated by the use of a few colored la­
borers .240
The realities were very different. But under the 
circumstances of this bland assurance the so-called Tri­
ple Alliance of railwaymen, miners, and transport opera­
tives, which was to look so formidable at other times, 
could only refer impotently to "sinister movements"^^^ 
to import Chinese labor. Nonetheless, the concern of 
the labor movement was growing day by day.
Arthur Henderson, still in his somewhat equivocal 
position as industrial conciliator and labor advisor to 
the cabinet, certainly knew more about the scheme to use 
the Chinese than he was prepared to admit to his col-
240tijjinutes of an Interview with Lord Derby and 
General Geddes, by Members of the T.U.C. Parliamentary 
Committee, November 15, 1916," (London, T.U.C. Archives).
241"Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, Miners' 
Federation of Great Britain, Imperial Hotel, Russell 
Square, London, Wednesday, December 20, 1916," (London, 
T.U.C. Archives) Resolution 4, "Coloured Labour."
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leagues in labor politics. He could have told them, 
for instance, of the Wei-hai-Wei compromise. He chose 
to remain silent. Neither did he pay any attention 
when in late November the Parliamentary Labour Party 
resolved to condemn plans to introduce any native labor 
into Great B r i t a i n . ^42 The party, he observed, was 
acting on h e a r s a y .243
Henderson was thoroughly aware of the delicacy of 
the situation, and closely observed the mounting con­
cern of labor as 1916 drew to a close. When really 
serious fears of Chinese and native workers were voiced 
at the annual Labour Party conference in Manchester in 
January, 1917, he could no longer remain silent. But 
he still refrained from revealing any of his intimate 
knowledge of the coolie scheme. He could not under­
stand, he defensively observed, why such rage was being
generated by the question. It behoved the conference 
"to be a little careful about putting an irreversible 
veto upon a man being employed under certain conditions
merely because of the colour of his s k i n . "^44 The red
242^ week later the Parliamentary Committee of the 
T.U.C. supported this condemnation and conveyed its de­
cision direct to the Colonial Secretary. See "Minutes 
of a Meeting of the T.U.C. Parliamentary Committee, De­
cember 6, 1916" (London, T.U.C. Archives).
243ibid.
^44Report of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the 
Labour Party, Albert Hall, Manchester, January, 1917 (Lon­
don! Co-operative Printing Society, 1917), p. 142.
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herring did not work. The Conference knew very well that 
a real fear of alien labor was abroad, and that no re­
ferences to racial prejudice could stem its tide. Ernest 
Bevin, at that time leader of the Dockers' union, sup­
plied the suitable retort to Henderson, and assured him 
that even if fears of the use of coolies or colored la­
borers had been somewhat exaggerated, there still re­
mained the legitimate anxiety that the Army and the whole 
Whitehall establishment were seriously playing with the 
notion of natives as a direct challenge to the hard won 
status of the British working c l a s s e s . ^45 How much of 
this was rhetoric, how much insight on Bevin's part, 
can only be guessed. Certainly had he known of the po­
tential significance of the enrollment scheme in far 
off Wei-hai-Wei he would have made even greater capital 
out of Henderson's cautions. The latter offered no re­
buttal .
The pace appeared to quicken as the labor press 
took up the issue. The Daily Herald observed that if 
the reports of an Oriental labor policy were correct, it 
should be remembered that in the East there lay at the 
feet of British capitalists an inexhaustible pool of 
"yellow skinned labour," waiting for e x p l o i t a t i o n . 246
245ibid.
246"The Human Comedy: 'Uplifting the Native," The
Herald, January 20, 1917, p. 8.
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Justice, the organ of Hyndman's Marxist Social Democrats, 
had voiced a semi— though more general caution in the 
space of a few lines a month or two earlier. What, it 
wondered, would the effect be on the post war wage 
structure if a vast new pool of wage slaves were to be 
opened up for exploitation during the war?^47 But, 
disappointingly, comments in the left wing press remain 
oblique or muted. There exists no outright denunciation 
of plans to raise Chinese labor. This was because the 
details of the Wei-hai-Wei scheme were never allowed to 
leak out. Security was at a maximum. No paper dared 
print more than vague innuendo based on supposition. To 
have done more would have been to invite a censor's 
clampdown. And so the potentially vital weight of the 
labor press was never employed. It served only to keep 
the issue before the eyes of its readers in the most 
general and tantalizing sense.
Where, then, was the real focus of labor's oppo­
sition to the Chinese labor scheme? It lay behind the 
scenes in the committee and conference rooms at the T. 
U.C. and Labour Party headquarters. It too flourished 
on innuendo and rumor, but it was prepared to act none­
theless. In true British tradition the leaders of or­
ganized labor resolved to work out a compromise on an
247justice, November 9, 1916, p. 6
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issue about which they still knew little, but which 
they rightly regarded as a serious threat.
It was J. S. Middleton who led the vanguard of 
this compromise position that was to allow the War Of­
fice to proceed with its planned importation of Chinese 
in exchange for assurances that such labor would not be 
used in Britain itself. Middleton was secretary of the 
War Emergency Workers' National Committee, a joint la­
bor organization which included representatives of the 
Parliamentary Committee of the T.U.C. and the Parlia­
mentary Labour Party. Significantly enough, its chair­
man was Arthur Henderson. As a result of a series of 
meetings and conferences, of which unfortunately no re­
cord survives, Middleton wrote a strongly worded letter 
to Asquith before the Prime Minister quit as head of the 
shaky war coalition. In it Middleton spoke of his Com­
mittee's absolute resolve to uphold its mandate of pro­
tecting British workers' employment and conditions of 
service throughout the war, and of its decision always 
to resist the introduction of any native labor into the
country.248
248j g Middleton, Secretary, W.E.W.N.C., letter 
to Prime Minister, London, December 2, 1916 (London, La­
bour Party Archivés). The W.E.W.N.C. had taken a strong 
line on Chinese before when on August 12, 1916, it adopt­
ed a stern resolution deploring the use of Chinese labor 
on British ships.
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The Prime Minister's reply was second hand and 
coldly formal. But Asquith understood from Middleton's 
tone the significant opposition that organized labor 
might mount where plans to employ the Chinese extended 
to Britain, or used in substitution plans in France.
He must have passed this understanding on to his suc­
cessor, Lloyd George. It was clear to both of them 
that labor now had a concrete point around which to cen­
ter its opposition to the uses of colored labor. Lloyd 
George was quick to snap up the willingness of Middleton 
and his colleagues to compromise. As soon as the former 
assumed control of the government, the War Office and 
the military planners in Whitehall reluctantly abandoned 
all considerations of using large numbers of Chinese and 
other natives in Britain, professed themselves satisfied 
with the compromise, and resolved to proceed cautiously 
even with their continued plans for disposition of na­
tive labor in F r a n c e . ^49
All of this was in defiance, it seemed, of Lloyd 
George's own plans for use of the Chinese. But the Prime 
Minister was never one to force an untenable issue when 
a workable compromise existed as an alternative. He 
knew that the future exigencies of the war might change
249p R  o /w.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, Memorandum 
of Army Council, January /?/, 19l7.
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matters. Besides, he could make capital for himself 
out of publicly admitting the existence of the agree­
ment not to use colored workers in Britain, and thus 
dissociate himself in the public mind with all the un­
savory talk about coolies and slave labor s c h e m e s .250 
Asquith had not been so shrewd, or perhaps he lacked the 
time and energy to pull off a similar coup. His name, 
therefore, remains closely associated with the raising 
and importing of the Chinese Labour Corps.
Now organized labor could rest content. If the 
coolies were exploited in France, no matter; it had the 
word of the new government that they would not be used 
in Britain251 or in plans of substitution in France. The 
sinister threat of colored labor which had hung in the 
background for so l o n g 2 5 2  was at last lifted.
The Germans made propaganda capital out of this 
supposed capitulation by the British government.253 They 
had no doubt that it was labor union leadership, speci­
fically that of the triple alliance, that had caused the
250The London and China Telegraph, February 5, 1917, 
p. 99. (An advocate on behalf of the War Office of the 
broadest possible uses of China's manpower resources, the 
paper lamented the Prime Minister's decision.)
25lNo document can be found to substantiate this 
promise,
2528 Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell 
1914-1944 (New York: Bantam Books, 1962), Vol. ÏT^ pi 4 04.
253Korrespondenzblatt, no. 8, January 22, 1917.
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backdown, and they hoped in addition that organized Bri­
tish labor would continue to oppose the distribution of 
the Chinese in France. The Germans were frankly shocked 
that the Wei-hai-Wei scheme had gone ahead at all de­
spite domestic opposition in B r i t a i n , ^54 They do not 
seem to have realized that once assured of avoiding the 
presence of coolies in Britain, or as substitutes abroad, 
the labor leaders had no practical, emotional, or senti­
mental interest to spare on the Chinese and their ex­
ploitation ,
The appearance of British propaganda added weight 
to the verbal reassurances given Middleton and his col­
leagues. The Chinese, it was noted in these publications, 
would be used only as replacements for white personnel 
in France who were unfit for protracted laboring tasks 
anyway, and who could return to Britain, either for de­
mobilization, or to help with the overall war effort in 
some less demanding c a p a c i t y . ^55 There was no hint that 
the use of coolies in Britain had been contemplated, or 
that they might have freed young working men to join the 
colors.
254ibid.
255Typicai is The Men Who Tidy Up: By One Who has
Served in a British Labour Battalion (London: T. Fisher
& Unwin, 1017), pT (This work was published simultane­
ously in America by G . H. Doren, New York.)
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Had labor won a victory? Of sorts, no doubt.
Sydney and Beatrice Webb, in their monumental history
of trades unionism, had no doubt that the victory was
sound and substantial:
It was . . . only the determined private 
^riter*s emphasis? resistance of the Trade 
Unionist leaders of the Labour Party that 
compelled the Government to abandon its pro­
ject of introducing several hundred thousand 
Chinese labourers into Great B r i t a i n .
They exaggerated. But there is a strong element of truth 
in their contention, as has been suggested above.
There were some spheres on the left which did not 
react well to the compromise. The Independent Labour 
Party, as in many other instances, objected to the con­
ciliatory stand adopted and defended by the Parliamentary 
Labour Party and the union leaders. In its organ, the 
Labour Leader, the I.L.P. denounced action which would 
lead to the use of coolies even in France, and wondered 
how much latitude was thus being given "capitalist 
jingoes"257 to continue their exploitation of the work­
ing classes.
The moderate left, however, expressed general hap­
piness with the situation, and resolved that it would
56gydney Webb and Beatrice Webb, The History of 
Trade Unionism (London: private printing"^ 1Ô1Ô) , p. 691.
(The Webbs seem to have had in mind the activities of 
Middleton and the W.E.W.N.C. as a basis for their conten­
tion.)
257Labour Leader, January 18, 1917, p. 7.
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quietly continue to watch for any violation of the 
status quo once the Chinese arrived in force in France. 
The left wing press could be relied upon, it was felt, 
to report any serious avoidance of the agreement to con­
fine coolies to the continent. Given the difficulties 
it had experienced in getting material into print on 
the plans to raise the Chinese in the first place, it 
must remain doubtful whether the activities of the mini­
scule labor press would have been any more effective in 
a future crisis. In any case, the War Office agreed 
among its senior staff members in Whitehall that it 
would not arouse the passions of the left wing press on 
the Chinese issue, and resolved to keep as low a profile 
as possible where the topic was c o n c e r n e d . ^58
A sort of official imprimatur was given the de­
cision to restrict the Chinese to the continent when, 
in July of 1917, the Commission of Inquiry into Industri-
9  c q
al Unrest made public its f i n d i n g s . L o r d  Derby, and 
the Director of National Service, Sir A. Geddes, lost no 
opportunities to soothe organized labor whenever the
R 0 /w.o. 32/5091, Recruitment, Army Council 
to Director of National Service /Sir A. Geddes?, London, 
November 6, 1917. And see Ibid., War Office, London, to 
C.-in-C., B.E.F., France, February 15, 1917.
259The Times (London), July 23, 1917, p. 7. And see 
G. N. Barnes, Synopsis of Conclusions of the Commission of 
Inquiry into Industrial Unrest, Appointed June 12, 1917 
(London; n.p., 1917), passim.
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coolie or substitution questions looked likely to re­
appear or to compromise the Commission's findings.
Thus, when they contemplated the importation into Europe 
of an accelerated number of coolies, both men eagerly 
sought to assure the T.U.C. that this proposal could 
have no possible impact, either upon the arrangement 
reached at the beginning of 1917, or on the conclusions 
of the Commission i t s e l f . ^60
Did the Establishment and the army keep faith with 
working men? Evidences seem to suggest not. The Min­
istry of Munitions used Chinese workers in Britain in 
direct contravention of the agreement to confine their 
use to the continent. These workers were engaged by 
factories manufacturing munitions and related products, 
and it is clear the the Ministry approved, even forward­
ed, this procedure, although it personally kept aloof. 
Where these Chinese were raised is not clear, although 
some may have been taken from the ranks of the Chinese 
Labour Corps, or marked for such purposes even before 
they left Wei-hai-Wei. Some references to their use may 
be found in the Ministry of Munitions' files in the Pub­
lic Record Office in London. One of the most interesting 
of these notes :
260Report of the Forty-ninth Annual T.U.C. Gather­
ing, Palace Hotel, Blackpool, Monday, September 3, l9l7 
(London; Co-operative Printing Society, 1917), p. 391.
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Investigations have been made by one of the 
secretaries of the Chinese Embassy on the em­
ployment of Chinese in Birmingham. He found 
that there were about 600 Chinese, of whom 
about 440 were employed in factories. The 
chief investigation officer says that there is 
very little trade union opposition to their 
employment, so long as they are engaged on a 
similar footing to that of British labour.
There is . . . strong opposition to their em­
ployment on other work such as in gas w o r k s . 261
Apparently, the local trades union men had no objection 
to the use of coolies so long as their presence was con­
fined to certain industries, and so long as they received 
the benefits to which the British working man had become 
accustomed. If this is true, it would seem to be an in­
teresting departure from the kind of aggressive and 
chauvinistic response usually looked for under such cir­
cumstances. Perhaps labor leaders exaggerated the oppo­
sition of the rank and file members to the use of native 
labor in British industry. What is more likely, however, 
is that the Chinese were used judiciously, and in se­
lected areas, so as not to arouse the suspicions and 
emotions of the militants among the British labor estab­
lishment. The numbers of Chinese so used will probably 
never be known.
Some individual army commanders in France certainly 
used their Chinese to force the pace of substitution. One 
of the most bizarre cases on record instances the actions
261p.R.0./M.U. /Ministry of Munitions/ 2/28, Muni­
tions , "Chinese Labour," Report for the week ending Novem­
ber 10, 1917, p. 15.
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of a military "employer" of coolies in France who had 
succeeded in retaining them in a semi-skilled capacity, 
using them in a factory hut with a movable partition at 
one end. As the coolies became more skilled at their 
tasks of servicing and repairing machinery, the parti­
tion, behind which white workers lay, was moved down the 
hut, as the whites were literally squeezed out to be 
seconded to active units in the f i e l d . ^62 There is no 
case on record more blatant than this. Similar attempts, 
if and when made, usually involved very small numbers of 
skilled or semi-skilled men rather than the vast numbers 
the military planners in Whitehall had once so ambitious­
ly contemplated.
Whitehall and the army kept faith with the British
working man only insofar as they continued to pay open
lip service to the agreement of early 1917, and kept
use of the coolies in substitution plans to a carefully
calculated minimum. The Times was close to the truth
when after the war it suggested.
The coming of the Chinese Labour Corps to 
France relieved our men from an enormous
amount of heavy . . . work, and so helped
to release a much larger proportion than 
otherwise would have been possible for com­
batant d u t i e s . 263
262p,R,o /w 0 , 106/33, C.L.C. History, H.R. Wake­
field, "Chinese Labour in France," pp. Il-l2. (This is a 
manuscript, apparently written for private circulation.)
263"The C.L.C.: With the Coolie from China to
France," The Times (London), April 23, 1919, p. 5.
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Such a statement could not have slipped past Whitehall 
a year earlier. It amounted to an admission that the 
Chinese had been used to release men for combat; a move 
Middleton and his colleagues had been sure they had pre­
vented .
Whitehall prided itself on understanding the ethos 
of the working classes. It believed it knew what dogmas 
and shibboleths to avoid compromising. It was correct 
in believing that the working man and his leaders would 
care little for the use of coolies in France so long as 
the illusion of complete separateness from events in 
Britain were maintained. Had it not been proven on 
earlier occasions that when it came to the question of 
using natives, men in British labor circles rarely look­
ed beyond such cherished ideas as the exploitation no­
tion, or tried "to come to terms with the real diffi­
culties involved in the government of subject races."264 
Their outlook was parochial. Avoid the risk of confront­
ing them directly, and no emotional heat would be gener­
ated. Subjected to a belief in imperial splendor and 
racial superiority, no solid British working man was 
going to object to the use of native workers in France 
provided, and only provided, that he was quite satisfied 
that they posed no threat to his livelihood at home, or
264porter, Critics of Empire, p. 134.
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rendered him more liable to conscription. Talk of the 
brotherhood of the proletariat would pale into insig­
nificance once this fact were assured, and British work­
ing men could be relied upon to exact their pound of 
flesh from the coolies when placed over them as N.C.O.'s 
in the field.
For a while, in late 1916, some members of the Es­
tablishment seemed to have forgotten all of this; under 
the imagined exigencies of war, they had forged ahead 
with plans to import vast numbers of Chinese without 
first giving organized labor a few nebulous guarantees.
It must be remembered, though, that the men who forgot 
were not true members of the aristocratic Establishment, 
which prided itself so on knowing the mind of the common 
man, but a clique of professional soldiers like Robertson 
and Woodward led by the bourgeois, Lloyd George. Ever 
adroit, the latter had quickly modified his tactics and 
won sympathetic approval from working men fOf admitting 
the existence of a compromise aimed at keeping Chinese 
from British shores. Having won this approval, the Prime 
Minister could secretly continue to sanction the use of 
coolies in whatever manner he thought feasible. The 
illusion of non-involvement was maintained.
The ethos of imperialism was still strong enough 
to call working men back to their duty. Not until after
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the conflict, with grave doubts as to how it had been 
managed by their social s u p e r i o r s , 265 were the worst 
aspects of militarism and imperialism equated on a broad­
er scale than ever before. The protests of the British 
left in general against the use of Chinese labor had been 
the protests of self-interest. One looks in vain for any 
radical expressions, editorial, sentimental, or intel­
lectual, apropos the coolies' welfare, the morality of 
their use, or the conditions under which they worked 
after arrival in the spring of 1917.
References to the role of Chinese workers actually 
became patronizing, amused, or even sycophantic, once the 
pressure was off British l a b o r . 266 soon as it knew
of the government's willingness to compromise, the mer­
curial columns of the New Statesman, abandoning their 
transiently critical line on the proposed employment of 
Chinese by the British, remarked that the coolies employ­
ed by the French, while admittedly poorly paid, were after 
all allowed food, lodging, and clothing "free of c h a r g e . "267
265^.p. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and its Ene­
mies: A Study in British Power (Garden City: Doubleday,
1Ô68), p. 345 (quoting Grigg, The Faith of an Englishman, 
p. 291).
266poy example, see The Labour Leader, July 12, 1917,
p. 3.
267"chinese Labour in France," The New Statesman, 
January 13, 1917, p. 343. (The article, signed "A Chinese 
Correspondent," ended, "we are glad to be of use to the 
Allies.")
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Vague fears of the part Chinese workers might 
have played remained a muted theme in trades union 
gatherings for some years. It is amusing to trace some 
of the resolutions to which they led.^GS jjq one will 
know now whether British labor would ever violently have 
opposed the introduction of the Chinese into Britain, 
or their open use as substitutes in France. As the 
emergencies of war lessened, the question faded from 
men's minds. Once again the states had avoided con­
fronting British labor on a major issue, and both sides 
were content with the compromise effected.
268 See, for example. Report of Proceedings of the 
Fifty-first Annual Trades Union Congress, St. Andrew's 
Hall, Glasgow, September, 1919 (London: Co-operative
Printing Society, 191Ô), p. 573.
CHAPTER V 
THE CHINESE AT WORK: 1917-1918
In a very real sense, the Chinese Labour Corps is 
still alive today. Both in China and Great Britain, and 
probably elsewhere, there are men living who played a 
role in it. But when one arrives at the point of dis­
cussing exactly how the Chinese were employed in France, 
under what terms, and under what physical conditions, 
these living links form a tantalizing yet predictably 
disappointing thread.
The disappointment stems from uncertain and selec­
tive reminiscences about those days, and the voicing of 
opinions which are too biased or of too prejudicial a 
nature to incorporate in a survey of this nature. For 
obvious reasons it proved quite impossible to communi­
cate personally with any Chinese who formed the body of 
the Corps, although it is understood that some literate 
Chinese who acted as interpreters^®^ are still living.
It was possible to correspond with individuals in Britain
269t ^ o interpreters were to be assigned to thirty 
coolies. In practice this number was never approximated. 
See P.R.O./W.O. 32/5094, Substitution.
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who acted as officers and N.C.O.'s in the Corps.
Opinions offered by these men, many of whom are of ad­
vanced age, differed sharply as to the overall useful­
ness and efficiency of the Chinese. One former N.C.O. 
blamed the "poor performance" of the Corps' companies on 
the quality of the officers who held command. There is 
truth in this belief. There remained elements of a 
patronizing affection for the "Chinks," and a general 
feeling that among the native labor contingents employ­
ed by the British in the first war they were the best, 
and might have attained better results saving only ade­
quate direction.
The net results of these communications with the 
former white members of the Chinese Labour Corps, which 
were too few and sketchy to record formally, offered a 
feeling of the emotive nature that the one time existence 
of the Chinese in France still provokes among its former 
white personnel. There seems to be a prevalent fear 
that some journalist will employ the information garner­
ed from personal interviews to present to the public a 
sensationalist account of how an ethnic minority was 
cruelly exploited by colonialists and militarists in the 
Great War.
270-rhese men were reached primarily with the aid of 
a notice in The Journal of the Royal British Legion for 
the months of August and September, 1972.
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These fears are not so remote, for this situation 
has already transpired in the course of recent m o n t h s . 271 
It has helped to harden the opinion of survivors against 
communicating anything that may be used against them, so 
to speak, or stand as an indictment of their actions and 
the motives of the government which they served.
Of course there were strong elements of exploitation 
in the use of the Corps. One academic writer has called 
its use a purely business enterprise, adopted for profit 
and reasons of economic e x p e d i e n c y .272 gut in exploring 
this and other aspects of the Chinese Labour Corps it is 
prudent to avoid altogether any reliance upon the living 
element that survives and rely instead upon the recently 
revealed archival sources. This contention is particu­
larly authentic in terms of any discussion of the actual 
terms of work which governed the coolies' use in France.
The question of the contract under which they worked 
is a vexed one. It contained a number of ambiguities.
One of these revolved around what form of discipline 
would apply to the coolies at work. Sir Edward Grey had 
an impact here. His sometimes "puzzled- recitude," as it
271j, Hamilton-Paterson, "Chinese Dig Britain's 
Trenches," Sunday Times Magazine (London), April 30, 
1972, p. 45.
272j Blick, "The Chinese Labour Corps in World 
War I," p. 112.
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has been rather unkindly c a l l e d , s u r f a c e d  when he 
learned that the War Office and the military members of 
the Army Council assumed that the Chinese would be sub­
ject to the full rigors of military discipline, and that 
further they expressly doubted the need to explain this 
belief explicitly in the contract which the coolies 
were to sign or affirm in Wei-hai-Wei.
In fairness, and before elaborating on Grey’s at­
titude, it should be noted that the Army Council discussed 
the issue of military discipline in detail when deciding 
on a tentative format for the entire contract. The For­
eign Office learned of this when it received a communica­
tion from the Army Council explaining its consensus on 
the m a t t e r . 274 There had, in fact, been genuine concern 
on the part of some Council members that the Chinese 
would be ignorant of the fact that they would be subject 
to military discipline. But the remainder of the Council 
feared that if the contract were too explicit on the point 
the Chinese government, and the Germans in China, would 
receive an apparent confirmation of their fear that in 
fact the coolies were destined for some form of combat 
service.
273A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945 (Ox­
ford: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 4Ô9.
274p %  0 /w.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, Secretary of 
Army Council to Under Secretary, Foreign Office, London, 
November 23, 1916.
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In these circumstances, the entire Council had de­
cided to agree to the suggestion that the coolies be 
shipped to France "on the same lines as was done in the 
case of the importation of Chinese into South A f r i c a . "275  
Such an arrangement, it was felt, would maintain the 
civil appearance of the scheme, while the contract could 
be vaguely enough worded to cover the s i t u a t i o n ,276 pro­
vide "proof" of British goodwill, and yet still allow 
military discipline to apply. The thin line between 
legality, or the appearance of it, and exigency is quite 
plain.
Outside the Council there were those in the Army 
who expressed themselves with less delicacy. Among them 
was Major-General Woodward, who from his Whitehall office.
Ibid. (The Army Council had had before it copies 
of the old South African contract, and were aware of the 
contents of the current French one, too. The text of the 
South African "Labour Ordinance" bears some strong resem­
blances to the British contract of 1916, especially on 
matters of transport, hygiene, and segregation, but it was ' 
a more complicated document, and was not intended to be 
literally read or signed by the coolies, who merely affirm­
ed that they accepted its contents. Britain departed from 
precedent in insisting upon military discipline, while both 
the South African and French documents specified provisions 
of their respective civil codes as governing agents for 
Chinese behavior. See Chinese Labour Ordinance, as amended 
in committee, and submitted to the Legislative Council of 
the Transvaal by the Attorney-General (London: New Reform
Club, n.d.'))
276'j'he Council took the French example. Their con­
tract was "usefully vague on purpose" on the issue of dis­
cipline. See P.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Robert­
son, Peking, to D.M.I., London, October 5o, 1016.
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insisted that the coolies could not be expected to work 
adequately under military conditions unless subject to 
military law.^?? Whether the laborers were actually 
told of this intention in the simple contract it was in­
tended they should receive was to him a consideration 
of secondary importance. As it was presumed that the 
majority of the Chinese were illiterate anyway such 
niceties were surely pro forma, and merely wasted valu­
able time and effort. ’’Camps like those in South Africa 
would have to be built in France,” observed Woodward, 
and the strictest regime maintained within their con­
f i n e s . 278 This was adapting with a vengeance the stan­
dards of the governing race to those it ruled. Alston 
in Peking had already omitted from his copy of the draft 
contract ’’all mention of the coolies being under the 
Army Act for Discipline.”279
Some of Grey’s senior staff knew and approved of 
this deceptive practice^®® when, on November 25, 1916,
^^^P.R.O./W.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, minute sheets 
5 and 6, November /?/, 1916.
278ibid., Conference on Coloured Labour, November 
/?7, 1916.
279p,R_o./M,o, 106/33, C.L.C. History, Alston, Pe­
king, to D.M.I., London, November 24, 1916.
280p.R.O./W.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, Under Secre­
tary, Foreign Office, to Jordan, Peking, November 14, 1916 
(Here it was noted that omission of all references to dis­
cipline would have a ’’salutary effect” in calming the ex­
citable coolies.)
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the Foreign Secretary intervened in the situation by 
addressing a signed memorandum directly to the Army 
Council. In it he made his stand on the matter of dis­
cipline absolutely plain, and called for an end to pro­
crastination and deceit.281 jt appears, however, that 
Grey acted less from humanitarian motives than from a 
reluctance "to be charged with a breach of faith, should 
it not be made clear to the coolies before leaving China 
that they will be subject to Military Dsicipline on ar­
rival in F r a n c e . "282
Grey acted with consistent adherence to his fears 
of a revival of the outcry of 1 9 0 3  and 1 9 0 4 ,  and also on 
the advice of a still more tangible source, that of Mr. 
Gregory, his legal advisor, who told him categorically 
that it would be "breaking faith with the C h i n e s e " 2 8 3  
they were shipped to France in utter ignorance of their 
status. Grey knew that the French themselves were eager 
to see all British colored labor placed under the mili­
tary code, but he resisted these pressures for he rightly 
suspected that the rigor of army government in time of 
war was likely to be more severe than any direction ex-
281ibid., Grey to Secretary of Army Council, Lon­
don, November 2 5 ,  1 9 1 6 .
282ibid., copy of Foreign Office minute sheet, No­
vember 2 3 ,  1 9 1 6 .
283%bid.
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perienced by the coolies on the Rand ten years before,
Grey's intervention was futile. The contract 
eventually submitted for the coolies' acceptance in Wei- 
hai-Wei remained ambiguous on the question of discipline. 
Arthur Balfour, who succeeded Grey as Foreign Secretary 
in December of 1916, proved less willing to make stands 
on the coolie issue. As the supporter of the South Afri­
can scheme he had less to lose from invidious comparisons 
than Grey. He had little practical, and no moral, inter­
est in the fact that the coolies failed to understand the 
seriousness of the liability under which they enrolled.
It was not until they finally reached French soil that 
they had explained to them the extent to which military 
discipline would rule their a c t i o n s .
The contract they carried with them suggested that 
they were not to be employed under fire. It is fairly 
clear that this principle was adhered to whenever possi­
ble. But exceptions were bound to arise. It is possible 
to reconstruct to some degree the dimensions of this prob­
lem through a survey of the war diaries of units using
284Ten Chinese laborers were shot under the pro­
visions of British military law between June, 1917, and 
June, 1918, while three others won reprieves. This was 
much fewer than in other colored contingents. There are 
no reliable figures available for their convictions on 
non-capital crimes. See Statistics of the Military Ef- 
fort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914- 
1921 (London! H.M.S.O., 1922), p. 649.
171
using Chinese labor. This approach is limited by the 
fact that some diaries are too perfunctory to be of use, 
while in mid-1917 the 4th Army and some other branches 
of the service, ordered the cessation of all diary keep­
ing at the company level, and decreed instead that only 
group headquarters maintain r e c o r d s . ^^5 this way
much interesting detail about the Chinese Labour Corps 
and its exposure to enemy action has been lost.
Suggestive of the slender demarcation between le­
gality and expediency that existed on this as on other 
heads is the conscience searching among officers who 
attempted to decide whether air attack could be con­
strued as "coming under fire" in the accepted sense of 
the phrase. It was inevitable that, as the war pro­
gressed, the Chinese in their camps should run the risk 
of serial bombardment, and this circumstance was one 
of the first to involve what working construction could 
be placed upon the coolies' contract. But quite apart 
from the legal issue involved, the bombs had a decided 
impact upon the morale of the C h i n e s e , 286 and on a num­
ber of occasions left them restless and u n m a n a g e a b l e . 287
285gee P R 0 /W.O. 95/429, Order of Assistant Adju­
tant General,"4th Army H.Q., B.E.F., France, May 9, 1917.
SSBpor example, see P.R.O./W.O. 95/571, Labour Dia- 
ries. War Diary of 57th Labour Group H.Q., B.Ë.F., France, 
July 12, 1917.
^BTpor example, see P.R.O./W.O. 95/4173, War Diary 
of Lines of Communication, I Labour Group H.Q., B.Ë.F., 
France, September 2, 1Ô17.
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Sometimes after a bombing raid the coolies managed 
to break camp and flood the French countryside until 
rounded up and identified by means of their bracelet 
chains. Wiser officers seem to have ignored these de­
sertions, preferring to let the laborers filter back once 
their terror subsided. The open hostility of the French 
peasantry could sometimes hasten their r e t u r n . 288 ^o his 
credit, Colonel Fairfax, as Officer Commanding the Chi­
nese Labour Corps, foresaw the panic that would occur if 
the coolies were kept within the confines of tightly 
guarded and walled compounds, anf then subjected either 
to aerial attack or long range shellfire. He suggested 
that the Corps’ company commanders turn a blind eye to 
absenteeism from such camps, although he preferred to 
advocate instead the kind of mobility for the coolies 
that would avoid the necessity of having to shut them up 
in fixed compounds which could easily be determined and 
fixed as targets for German g u n s . 289 Such was the fear 
of the Chinese, and the rigid belief in segregation, that 
this wise policy was not implemented. A great deal of 
confusion resulted on occasions when coolies were de-
Ibid. But the French were not adverse to sel­
ling garlic and other items to coolies on the march. See 
S.H. Cox, London S.E. 27, letter to the writer, October 26, 
1972.
289p R  0 /w 0 106/33, C.L.C. History, Minutes of a
Conference at G.H.Q., B.E.F., France, to Consider Questions 
in Connexion with the Employment of Chinese Labour, Decem­
ber 29, 1916.
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liberately allowed to escape from their camps to avoid 
death from enemy attack.^®® Commanders who refused to 
practice the charity of allowing the Orientals to escape 
were obliged to strengthen the garrison guard surround­
ing the perimeters of their c a m p s , 291 and to issue 
strict orders concerning the maintenance of order. Some­
times full scale movements and relocations of coolie 
camps took place. But it was generally only after the 
Chinese had been subject to close or direct shelling or 
bombing for more than a few days that such action took
p l a c e . 29 2
Those laborers who managed to desert under fire, 
and who failed to return after a reasonable period of 
time, were designated "missing in action," and conven­
iently struck off their company's m u s t e r .293 is im­
possible to tell how many were lost in this way, and
290gee P.R.O./W.O. 95/4173, War Diary of Lines of 
Communication! Ï Labour Group tï.Q., B.È.F., France, Sep­
tember 7 and 12, 1917, and P.R.O./W.O. 95/4173, War Diary 
of Lines of Communication, II Labour Group H.Q., B.E.F., 
France, February, 1917, to September, 1917, passim.
291p.R.O / W . O . 95/4174, War Diary of Lines of Com- 
munication, 906 and S07 Companies, Area Employment Labour 
Corps Garrison Guard, September, 1917, to August, 1918, 
passim.
^®^P.R.0./W.0. 95/267, War Diary of 23rd Labour 
Group H.Q., B.E.F., France, June, 1917, passim.
O Q Q
*^P.R.O./W.O. 95/4173, War Diary of Lines of Com- 
munication! I Labour Group H.Q., B.E.F., France, Septem- 
ber“12! 1917.
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whether they did in fact ultimately succumb to the ef­
fects of enemy action. The shelters provided in some 
compounds proved quite i n a d e q u a t e , ^94 the provision
of machine guns to fend off enemy aircraft only added to 
the coolies' dismay, and actually seemed to attract the 
unwelcome attentions of belligerent a i r c r a f t . 295 ^o 
wonder many Chinese felt it better to take to the open 
country.
Frightened Chinese had one point in their favor if 
they remained. Most commanders liked to avoid their ex­
posure to even random shellfire on the job, not neces­
sarily from humanitarian or legal reasons, but because 
sometime bombardment, or even on occasions, sustained 
barrage, lowered the efficiency of the units so e x p o s e d .296 
Undoubtedly there were some Chinese Labour Corps comman­
ders who felt reasonably sure that their men could func­
tion if pushed further forward than was generally deemed 
allowable by the Labour Directorate or its successor,
Labour Control. But there was always the risk of loss 
of effort if work were interrupted by German fire. Wrote
2 9 4 p . R o . /W.O. 95/ 3984, War Diary of Assistant Di- 
rector of Supplies, B.Ë.F., Boulogne, November 21, 1917.
295p . R 0 . /W.O. 95/571, War Diaries, 5th Army Group 
H.Q., B.E.F., France, October, 1917, passim.
296The Corps of Royal Engineers particularly warned 
against the temptation to push coolies too far forward.
See P.R.O./W.O. 95/1641, War Diary of Commander, Royal En­
gineers 7th Division H.Q., B.E.F., France, October 26, Ï917
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one officer in his war diary,
59th Chinese Labour Corps ^company/ was 
shelled while at work in R.E. Dump . . ,
Coolies scattered and could not be induced 
to return to work . . .  it was decided not
to employ them in areas at all likely to
be subjected to shell fire.29?
And so the Chinese in this particular company won a re­
prieve in the interests of efficency and output.
The official history of the great war is matter of 
fact on the topic in one of its few references to colored
labor in general. It suggests that the confinement of
natives to fixed base camps would in most cases have pre­
vented their use to any great extent in forward zones, 
even if their morale under fire had been p r e d i c t a b l e . ^98 
No mention is made of the legal restraints in use under 
fire which appeared in most of the contracts issued to 
colored laborers of all origins.
But there can be little doubt that the Chinese con­
tract did provide a significant check on the activities 
of commanders who otherwise would have had no hesitation 
in employing the Chinese under fire, despite the risk of 
lowered output. After one Chinese company was literally 
shelled from its place of work, the senior officer in
297p.R.o /W.O. 95/571, War Diary of 57th Labour 
Group H.Q., B.E.F., France, September 1, 1917.
298c. Falls, History of the Great War based on 
Official Documents: Military Operations, France and Bel­
gium, 1917 (London: Macmillan, 1Ô4Ô), p. 17.
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charge of the dispositions of labor in that district
wrote petulantly,
considerable difficulties have arisen in 
the free use of Chinese Labour as accord­
ing to their contract they are not to be 
exposed to shellfire or in any places that 
are liable to be shelld.^®®
This officer knew as well as did most others that it was
impossible to find any place adjacent to the lines where
it was absolutely safe for the Chinese to work. But
there were places of comparative safety which seemed to
guarantee the promise made in the contract. Colonel
Wace's immediate organization always did its own best
to ensure that the Chinese were kept within these bounds.
The Colonel and his top aides were only too well aware of
the effect of shells upon the Orientals, and had no wish
to exacerbate the tensions this effect produced.300 But
they could not censor the moves nor examine the integrity
of every "employer" to whom they seconded coolies from
their p o o l . 301
200p.R.O./W.O. 95/571, War Diary of 57th Labour 
Group H.Q., B.E.F., France, August Ss, 1917.
300p.R.o./w.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Memorandum 
from Col." Fairfax to Directorate of Labour, December 25,
1917.
301por additional information on the effects of 
shelling on labor companies, see P.R.O./W.O. 95/358, War 
Diary of 37th Labour Group H.Q., B.E.F., France, July, 
1917, to October, 1917, passim, and P.R.O./W.OT 32/5188, 
Construction of Light Railways for the B.E.F. in France: 
Provision of Materiel and Personnel, Preliminary State­
ment , in which this problem is anticipated.
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Reported cases of the death or wounding of Chinese 
as a direct result of enemy action are f e w , 302 ^^d one 
must clearly differentiate as to the actual use of the 
men under fire, which was comparatively often, and the 
number of casualties sustained as a result. It was some­
times possible for a commander using his coolies too far 
forward to avoid the fatal consequences of a bombardment 
by constantly moving his men, or by allowing them to 
scatter whenever fire grew too intense.
As a rule, it was white labor companies that filled 
the hiatus caused by the withdrawal of Chinese from zones 
too far forward. This fact naturally caused some resent­
ment among the British workers, who paradoxically blamed 
the Chinese more than other natives because, with the ex­
ception of colonial troops, the coolies were always used 
further toward the front than any other native labor con­
tingents. Being so far forward, the coolies were also 
subject to gas attacks. But with the blanket compass of 
these episodes it is hard to see how the Chinese could 
have been much better shielded against the impact.303 
Nonetheless, the precautions taken on their behalf annoy-
302j>or an unusually detailed mention of the death 
and wounding of Chinese, see P.R.O./W.O. 95/571, War Diary 
of 18th Labour Group H.Q., B.E.F., France, September 1,1917,
303p.R.O./W.O. 95/4173, War Diary of Lines of Com- 
municatiorTJ I Labour Group H.Q., B.E.F., France, Septem­
ber 12, 1Ô17.
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ed the personnel of white labor companies, too. Why, 
they wanted to know, should such lengths be gone to to 
protect the " C h i n k s ? " 3 0 4
The War Office in London held an additional per­
spective on the exposure of coolies to enemy action.
True, it had composed the ambiguous phrasing of the con­
tract with its provocative "etc." after the enumeration 
of "safe" places in which the coolies were to work, and 
it was also well aware of the pressure of battlefield 
exigencies, and the effect these were likely to have on 
commanders forced perhaps in the heat of the moment to 
consider the nebulous wording under which their men were 
working. But quite apart from these considerations 
Whitehall had a more important reason to view with con­
cern the death or disablement of Chinese. Would their 
demise as a direct and provable result of enemy action 
obligate them to pay widows' benefits or dependency pay?
Although the contract did state sums that the army 
was prepared to pay to dependents under such circumstances, 
it was by no means certain whether or not the nebulous 
wording of the contract sufficiently freed the British 
government from any residual obligations. What if some 
Chinese widow were to claim the full benefits due to her
304p R  0 /W.O. 95/358, War Diary of 35th Labour 
Group H.Q., B.E.F., France, September 25, 1917.
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as the survivor of a regularly enlisted British soldier? 
Would the contract shield the government from having to 
construe the question legally? Although the question of 
this situation arising seemed extremely remote, the fact 
remains that the War Office was quite aware of the embar­
rassment that would arise were it actually to occur, per­
haps as the result of German intrigue. For this reason 
if for no other London preferred that as few Chinese as 
possible die from other than natural causes. Those exe­
cuted for "military" crimes forfeited their rights to de­
pendents’ benefits anyway.
A set of instructions drawn up under the aegis of 
the Labour Directorate in August, 1917, laid down in 
clear and simplified language the canons for application 
in cases of death of Chinese workers. It agreed that 
those killed as a result of immediate enemy actions were 
entitled to posthumous compensation for their families 
in amounts not exceeding one hundred Mexican d o l l a r s , 305 
but it also demanded that the strictest attention be paid 
to this entire angle. Detailed hospital reports and post 
mortems were to be studied to make sure that no cases of 
natural death were mistakenly reported, or even deliber­
ately misinterpreted, as being due to enemy action, for
305xhe reasons for the importance of this currency 
to the Chinese economy of the day are explained in W. L. 
Schurz, The Manila Galleon (New York: Dutton, 1939), p.
63 and passim.
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in the former case no compensation was due families, and 
no detailed disclosure of circumstances was n e c e s s a r y .306
The main Chinese base camp near Abbeville held a 
one thousand five hundred bed hospital. It was deemed 
the most suitable venue for determining such c a s e s , 307 
as fatal injuries and deaths in the field itself were 
likely to be subject to unsatisfactory ex post facto an­
alyses, sometimes by the coolies themselves, who were 
quick to blame their white overseers for any fatalities 
in the r a n k s . ^08 gy December, 1917, after the Chinese 
had been active in increasing numbers in France for over 
seven months, their senior commander. Colonel Fairfax, 
himself admitted that over sixty of them had been killed 
as a result of German fire, and that over one hundred 
had been w o u n d e d . 309 The figures were probably conserva­
tive .
Apart from the War Office, the military members of 
the Army Council seem to have been maintaining a close
306P.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Labour Direc­
torate Memorandum, August, 1917. (The memorandum also sug­
gested how other potentially ambiguous phrases in the con­
tract might be used to evade or avoid responsibilities.)
307p.R.o./W.O. 161/2, Provision of Hospitals, "Col­
oured Labour," p. 15.
308g .s .O., G.H.Q. (Montreuil-sur-Mer), p. 157.
309p.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Fairfax, C.L. 
C.H.Q., B.E.F., France, to Colonel Weatherall, War Office, 
London, December 25, 1917.
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watch on the effects of enemy action on the Chinese. They 
particularly disliked the influence upon the German pro­
paganda mills, which quickly made lurid use of any hints 
of death or injury in the ranks of the Chinese Labour 
Corps, Those members of the Council who hoped one day to 
see Chinese troops fighting in France also watched the 
reactions of the coolies with interest. They were soon 
disappointed at the way in which the better class Chinese 
reacted under direct fire or aerial bombardment, and used 
this disappointment later as a partial reason for refusing 
Chinese interpreters officer status in the Corps, even 
though it was agreed that the interpreters still be 
treated with more respect than the mere laborers,
There is no doubt that these better educated men 
suffered death and injury along with their less sophisti­
cated brothers,311 In October, 1917, when the value of 
skilled and semi-skilled Chinese had become more readily 
apparent, the Foreign Office took an interest in the 
question of exposure to enemy action. Realizing that 
such men could be of inestimable value in the war effort.
3lQjbid., Army Council to Under Secretary of State, 
Foreign Office, London, December 7, 1917, (The Council 
also feared what effect the elevation of Chinese person­
nel would have upon white officers and N,C,0,’s.)
311j, Webster, "With the Chinese in France," Year 
Book of the National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s for 1921, Re- 
port of the War Emergency Work of the Association from 
1914 to 19S0 (London! Y.M.C.A,, 1921), p. 33,
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it recommended Sir John Jordan in Peking further their 
enrollment, but with an element of candor that had not 
been present in the past negotiations. Perhaps a pri­
vate understanding could be made and about four hundred 
men "who would undertake to serve without restriction as 
to their employment in dangerous areas . . . exposed to 
shellf ire."312
This emendation in the contract conditions was to 
be strictly viva voce, and was to carry with it the ad­
ditional suggestion from London that men so engaged 
should in the first instance be hired as "ordinary cool- 
ies"^^^ so as to avoid any speculation as to their use. 
Apparently this recommendation for greater candor, albeit 
qualified, resulted in pressures generated in France. 
There the more vocal and literate members of the Chinese 
Labour Corps, some of whom found themselves working at 
skilled tasks in dangerous areas, had banded together to 
voice their resentment at the added dangers. This ele­
ment of political and social organization alarmed White­
hall. Were the mere coolies on the verge of bargaining 
collectively for better conditions? Some had actually 
used their subjection to fire as a means of demanding
312p.R.O./W.O. 1 0 6 / 3 5 ,  Employment, Foreign Office, 
London, to Sir John Jordan, Peking, October 2 2 ,  1 9 1 7 .
SlSlbid.
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more p a y .314
And so it was that the Foreign Office joined its 
Army Council and War Office colleagues in agreeing on 
the need to restrict deaths and injuries in the Corps, 
or at least to prevent news of them leaking out. Al­
though it also agreed in private that it was quite ludi­
crous to describe as non-dangerous the places in which 
the majority of Chinese w o r k e d , t h e  Foreign Office 
urged Jordan to see that efforts to impugn British in­
tegrity on this score be ended at all costs, and sub­
versive broadsheets collected and destroyed without de-
l a y . 3 1 6
The Foreign Office was worried, too, about keeping 
Chinese diplomats in London satisfied with the status of 
their nationals in F r a n c e . 317 For this reason if for no
314g .S.O., G.H.Q. (Montreuil-sur-Mer), p. 156. (The 
Directorate of Labour also recognized this state of af­
fairs and reminded its Chinese Labour Corps officers that 
the coolie in general was "a rigid adherent to his Con­
tract, though agreeable to modifications . . .  if advan­
tageous to him." See P.R.O./W.O. 107/37, Labour Report, 
Appendix to Notes for Officers of Labour Companies: Chi­
nese Labour, October, 1917, p. 4.
315p.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Foreign Of­
fice, London, to Jordan, Peking, December 7, 1917.
^^®T. J. Bourne resented this aspersion on his se­
curity arrangements. See Ibid., Bourne, Wei-hai-Wei, to 
War Office, London, December 14, 1917.
317
H. G. MacNair, "The Chinese as Contract Labour­
ers," China Weekly Review, Vol. XXV, June 2, 1923.
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other it discouraged the gratuitous exposure of the 
coolies to the effects of enemy action. It also made 
quite sure that the army adequately censored all their 
letters home so that no mention of actual conditions 
could emerge. It might appear from all this that the 
coolies were preserved from greater risk purely in 
order to avoid embarrassment in London.
And yet self interest was not the only force at 
work. There existed elements of moral concern, too.
For example, in the early months of 1918, when the col­
lapse of Russia necessitated the urgent deepening and 
strengthening of the lines of defense. Field Marshall 
Haig expressed the greatest anxiety about how this task 
was to be accomplished. He told the war cabinet that 
his "whole difficulty"^^® was one of labor. Now, if 
ever, would have been the time for the army establish­
ment to throw its integrity to the wind and to employ 
the Chinese and other natives in a massive effort to 
strengthen the crucial defense network against any pro­
jected German thrust. Exigency of war could have been 
claimed in defense. And yet this did not occur.
When General Jan C. Smuts, as an advisor to, and 
member of, Lloyd George's war cabinet visited France to
318p.R.O./W.O. 158/45, Minutes of War Cabinet Meet­
ings, 1917-1918, Downing St., January 7, 1918.
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assess the problem presented by Haig's need, he comment­
ed in a memorandum to his colleagues in London that al­
though the need for additional labor was indeed as press­
ing and vast as the commander in chief maintained, the 
possibility of using Chinese or colored labor "to any 
considerable extent"^^^ was out of the question owing to 
the risk such contingents might run of coming under di­
rect and sustained enemy fire. It is true that large 
numbers^^O of Chinese were immediately seconded to de­
fensive works as a result of Haig's plea, but their 
tasks consisted for the most part in construction of se­
condary rings of defense like those surrounding General 
Headquarters, or 2nd Army Corps Headquarters.
Records do exist of some Chinese Labour Corps com­
panies working on lines which were, according to the map 
coordinates of the sectors involved, classified as fire 
zones. But one need not deduce from this information 
that they were actually on hand when shells fell, or 
that they experienced casual ties. One thing is certain. 
Without the coolies' help in digging, trenching, and
^l^Ibid., Memorandum of a Visit to the Western Front 
by General Smuts, January 27, 1918.
April, 1918, the following Chinese Labour Corps 
companies were working on defensive lines for G.H.Q. and 
the 2nd Army; 41st, 54th, 57th, 56th, 92nd, 8th, 73rd, 172nd, 
66th, 167th, 179th, 58th, 181st, and 180th. With officers 
this totaled about 7,000 men. Most of the companies were 
seconded direct from Labour Control's pool. See P.R.O./W.O. 
95/292, War Diaries of 2nd Army H.Q., B.E.F., France, en­
try of Assistant Director of Labour, April 13, 1918.
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mining, these crucial defenses might never have been 
completed in time.
D u r i n g 3 2 1  and after the war there appeared a quant­
ity of mistaken and conjectural material concerning the 
Chinese under fire. Journalists employed superlatives 
too freely, and spoke, as did the columns of The Times 
in April, 1 9 1 9 ,  of "a fair number of Chinese killed and 
wounded by enemy action."32% What did "a fair number" 
mean? It was easy to extrapolate from such generaliza­
tions and to think in terms of hundreds killed and thou­
sands wounded. But the existing documentary evidence on 
this very important point, although admittedly only par­
tial, seems to confirm that while different and even 
sinister intent may sometimes have been present, the cool­
ies of the Chinese Labour Corps were as a rule kept as 
far from enemy action as was reasonably practicable under 
the stresses generated by war, and that they sustained 
fewer casualties than might have been expected.
In December, 1917, The Times rather injudicious­
ly spoke of C.L.C. units coming under fire. This refer­
ence was in one of a series of three articles sanctioned 
by the War Office itself. See "An Array of Labour in France," 
The Times (London), December 26, 1917, p. 8. (In the last 
article, the newspaper reversed itself, and stressed that 
only British labor ever came under fire. See The Times 
(London), December 28, 1917, p. 7.)
322nThe C.L.C.; With the Coolie from China to France," 
The Times (London), April 23, 1919, p. 8.
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Naturally, many Chinese died from common causes 
while in Europe. The turn from violent to natural death 
still involves questions of the conditions under which 
the coolies worked, however. Could the incidence of 
fatalities have been lessened? Was there an element of 
indifference to their needs? There is no doubt that the 
Flanders winter, despite the hardier constitutions of 
these Chinese from the North, had a profound effect upon 
their health to an extent which their employers had not 
calculated. The laborers never got used to the damp of 
the climate in winter, despite The Times' officially 
phrased insistencies to the c o n t r a r y . 3^3 pthises and 
other respiratory diseases unknown to them at home ap­
peared and flourished in their ranks.
The truth is that in addition to the unpleasantness 
of the climate and the generally poor provision for their 
subjection to it, many of the workers who arrived from 
Wei-hai-Wei were too ill or weak to cope with the cli­
matic change in the first place, and should never have 
been allowed to leave China. The medical examinations 
they underwent in Wei-hai-Wei before embarkation were far 
too perfunctory, and unhappily were governed by economic
3"3"Workers from Distant Shores," The Times (Lon­
don), December 2 7 ,  1 9 1 7 .  (The newspaper remarked reas­
suringly that the Chinese were "not likely to suffer much 
from the mild rigours of the French winter.")
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considerations, too. T. J. Bourne, who was rejecting 
many of the incoming coolies on the grounds of indif­
ferent or poor health, found to his honest dismay that 
the original contractors, once having supplied the men 
at a set figure, were totally unwilling to take them 
back at cost to themselves. Constantly urged by the War 
Office in London to economize. Bourne was reluctant to 
foot the bill for returning coolies. His operating bud­
get was slender at the best of times. To his credit. 
Bourne often did clothe, feed, and return numbers of men 
whom he considered completely unacceptable. But many 
others slipped through. All Bourne could do was beg the 
War Office to allow the supply of some unusually expen­
sive raincoats^^^ for each man to help mitigate the dam­
aging effects which he quite early foresaw would be the 
probable result of the laborers' first winter in the mud.
Unfortunately the War Office, with bland unimagina­
tiveness, had decreed that the same medical procedures 
be laid down for the selection of the coolies in 1916 and 
1917 as had been employed a decade earlier in the immi­
gration to South Africa where the possibility of latent 
respiratory ailments or weaknesses had been of minor
QQ4
P.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Robertson, 
Peking, to D.M.I., London, October 24, l9l6.
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significance.325 The same thinking applied to the ship­
ping of the Chinese, which was carried out under condi­
tions calculated to compound any incipient medical prob­
lems. The only consolation in all this is that of the 
natives employed by the British army during the war, the 
Chinese probably fared better than most in that they were 
to some degree physiologically fitted for the e n c o u n t e r .326 
One of the most unpleasant medical problems which 
the Chinese brought with them to Europe was the compara­
tively innocuous yet potentially damaging eye disease 
known as infectious trachoma. This condition, which could 
and should have been noted among greater numbers of men 
before they left China, seemed to worsen considerably in 
France. In each Chinese Labour Corps company of about 
four hundred and ninety Chinese, it became common to find 
as many as fifty men who s u f f e r e d . 327 The War Office was 
obliged to request a senior medical officer and eye sur­
geon serving in France, Colonel Lister, to assess the pro-
32 "Proposed Employ­
ment of Chinese as Fighting Troops," Memorandum of Military 
Intelligence, February 24, 1917.
^^®An official report on imported Indian workers 
found many "too degenerate" even to form the nuclei of la­
bor corps. See P.R.O./W.O. 32/5110, Arrangements for In­
dian Sick and Wounded.
^^^P.R.0./W.O. 95/4174, Labour Corps Diaries, 1917, 
Diary of 4th Labour Company, C.L.C., May 10, 1917. And 
see P.R.O./W.O. 95/571, War Diaries of 5th Army Labour 
Group H.Q., B.E.F., France, 1917, passim.
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portions of the problem and to make recommendations ac­
cordingly. The Colonel’s findings revealed the serious 
and ubiquitous nature of the illness, and incidentally 
pointed up the extent of such kindred diseases as con­
junctivitis
These findings were a blow both to the War Office 
and to Colonel Wace's Labour Directorate. Already dis­
turbed over the allotment of all his reserves, Wace now 
had to see the Chinese form an additional problem, for it 
became necessary to divide the coolies into "clean" and 
"dirty" companies according to the levels of infection. 
This action, he remarked with asperity, "complicated the
q O Q
task of distribution." Indeed, the whole question of 
the ill health of Chinese personnel can be seen as a sig­
nificant element in the Chinese Labour Corps' failure to 
achieve the optimum levels of efficiency laid down for 
it by its white directors.
Quite apart from the physical and hereditary de­
ficiencies listed above, the Chinese in France were also 
exposed to the consequences associated with inadequate 
diet. It is proper to point out that the War Office de­
voted a great deal of discussion to the question of feed-
328 P.R.O./W.O. 107/37, Labour Report, p. 47. 
329lbid., p. 48.
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ing the imported w o r k e r s . Back in 1916  when the whole 
scheme was being planned the aim had been to provide the 
minimum food levels compatible with the maintenance of 
health. Exotic foods or their preparation were ruled 
out as too expensive, and dietary supplements were thought 
unnecessary. But the coolies were expected to work at 
heavy tasks under harsh and alien conditions along with 
the accompaniment of a damp climate. Weaknesses showed up 
quickly. Some men were to strike or mutiny because they 
regarded their food as stinted or badly prepared. Others 
were found to be " e m a c i a t e d " 2 3 1  by a visiting Royal Army 
Medical Corps investigator. As a result, the rice ration 
for the entire Chinese Labour Corps was increased by half 
a pound during 1 9 1 7 .  But a lively controversy ensued as 
to the standards and quality of food supplied the Chinese, 
and reports of the men being physically unable to carry 
out their tasks, presumably because of under nourishment, 
can be found recorded.
Colonel Fairfax, as senior officer commanding the 
Chinese Labour Corps, at one point had to intervene on
SSOihe basic ration was fixed at l| lbs. of rice,
I lb. of dried meat or fish, -g lb. of vegetables, g o z . 
of tea, and | oz. of oil. This, it was concluded, was the 
mean average available to coolies in China. See P.R.O./ 
W.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, "Directions for the Employment 
of Chinese Labour," October 27, 1916.
331p.R.O./W.O. 95/4174, Labour Corps Diaries, 1917, 
Diary of 4th Labour Company, C.L.C., Calais, May 28 and 
29, 1917.
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the issue of the coolies’ diet and its adequacy. He was 
forced to circulate a sharply worded directive among his 
company commanders in the field in which he outlined the 
officially specified food quotas, and warned "it is the 
duty of all officers to accept this scale and not to 
criticise it, or solicit criticism from the Chinese, which 
only causes unrest."33% Privately, Fairfax suspected 
that the food might indeed be inadequate for hard workers 
in unusual surroundings and uncongenial weather.
Conditions in the hospitals to which ailing Chinese 
were sent were reasonably good, but here again one finds 
that during the first year of operation these facilities 
left a good deal to be desired, especially by way of con­
struction. The tents used initially were eventually re­
placed by wooden barracks similar in overall design to 
those built for white personnel, but designed to hold a 
far larger number of men within the same space. Plans 
for a hospital capacity of one thousand beds had been 
tentatively suggested as early as August, 1916, when the
plan to import the Chinese was still in its preliminary 
333stages. However, by early 1918, there was a ten thou­
sand bed capacity for the Chinese. This figure represent-
332p.R.o./w.o. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Order of Col. 
Fairfax to C.L.C. Officers, August /?/, 1917.
333p.R.O./W.O. 32/11345, Recruitment, minute sheet, 
August, 1917.
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ed approximately ten percent of the Chinese Labour Corps
at that time. And yet the capacity was still insuffi-
3 3 4cient and had to be supplemented. This alone suggests
the dimensions of the problem of keeping the Chinese 
healthy in an alien environment.
A notable feature which distinguished the Chinese 
hospitals from others which housed whites was the barbed 
wire fence, eight feet high, which surrounded each peri­
meter. These fences were patrolled and guarded. They 
served the double function of preventing Chinese escapes 
and limiting fraternization between coolies and inquisi­
tive outsiders. The same atmosphere of rigid security, 
censorship, and suspicion pervaded the hospitals as it 
did the camps where the Orientals usually lay. One rea­
son for the lack of contemporary journalistic documenta­
tion about the conditions under which the Chinese worked 
or lived stems from the fact that, unless officially 
sanctioned, visits to camps or hospitals were totally 
impossible. Chinese Labour Corps officers were warned
that "entry of all strangers to the camps . . . should be
3 3 5strictly forbidden." Far from wanting to expose the
334
P.R.O./W.O. 161/2, The Historical Narrative of 
the Works Directorate^ p"! 22, "Hospitals for Coloured La- 
bour."
o./W.O. 107/37, Labour Report, Appendix to
Notes for Officers of Labour Companies; ^Chinese Labour,"
Issued by Directorate of Labour, 1917.
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Chinese to the advantages of Western culture, the army 
establishment had every intention of keeping its Chinese 
in one of the tightest quarantines on record.
The points discussed above are of a general nature 
and cover the entire Chinese Labour Corps. But one must 
always recall that the nucleus of the Chinese labor estab­
lishment was the individual company, where a sole commander 
could ameliorate, exacerbate, or even ignore the kind of 
conditions that have been described. So long as the com­
pany functioned as a unit he and his white subordinates 
could have a profound impact upon the life of a Chinese 
laborer.
The white staff of each company generally comprised 
a captain, three or four subalterns, a sergeant major, six 
sergeants, and eight corporals. The five hundred or so 
laborers did not receive commands directly from any of 
these men, even when some of their white overseers did 
speak some Mandarin Chinese, but rather through the med­
ium of their own "gangers." The gangers were Chinese 
chosen from the ranks of the coolies and given slightly 
more than the one franc a day^^® paid the ordinary 
workers.
The elevation to ganger was not a popular promotion 
among the Chinese. It meant translating and implementing
qqc
^"Amounting to approximately nine or ten pence in
those days.
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the orders of the white officers. The whites in turn 
had to be careful not to compromise the position of their 
gangers by allowing any of them to lose face among their 
compatriots, for once a ganger was humiliated in front 
of his countrymen his use was over since the men refused 
to obey his orders, and a new ganger had to be chosen.
Even at this most fundamental level one may see how the 
development of a delicate situation could result in dan­
gerous misunderstandings upon which the efficiency of a 
whole company might depend. The unenviable position of 
the ganger as intermediary between his compatriots and 
the master race which governed them emphasized the racial 
tensions present throughout the whole Corps.
Later in the war the Americans discovered just how 
delicately balanced the command structure of the average 
coolie company really was. The New York Times once ex­
ulted that with the arrival of American engineers and 
the coincidental materialization of coolies, a unique 
opportunity would arise for a combination "of Chinese 
labor and American bosses."33? Such a conjunction was 
bound, in the newpaper's opinion, to produce "the most 
satisfactory issue for getting work expeditiously done."338
New York Times, July 2 1 ,  1 9 1 7 ,  p. 5 .
33Blbid.
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Although Britain had no intention of entirely relin­
quishing any of her Chinese workers to American control, 
she did allow a few of them to become attached to a corps 
of some ten thousand coolies placed at the disposal of 
the United States by the French in the closing months 
of the war.339 It was then that the Americans, eager to 
exercise their own brand of capitalist management tech­
niques, discovered the importance of understanding the 
psychology and capacity of the raw material they had been 
loaned. They turned then to observe British methods of 
direction and handling of the "Raw Importation."
For most of the time the average Chinese Labour 
Corps company lived in a vacuum. When in base camp and 
forming part of the Labour Director's pool, it remained
339t . Chen, Chinese Migrations, With Special Refer­
ence to Labor Conditions (Washington: Bureau of Labor Sta­
tistics , 1923), p^ l21. (There is no doubt that America 
canvassed the idea of forming its own Chinese labor corps. 
The Foreign Office in London ordered its ambassador in 
Washington, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, to discourage the idea
of allowing this competitive angle to develop. There was
a real fear that it might open an American sphere of in­
fluence in the Far East after hostilities in Europe had 
concluded. "It would be as well," noted the Foreign Of­
fice dryly, "if China were left to the French and us."
See P.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Foreign Office, 
London, to Sir C. Spring-Rice, Washington, October 1,
1917.) There were also plans to raise an extra command of 
40,000 Chinese "sappers" for work "in or near" the front 
line, the effort to be financed with American money and 
agreed to by the Chinese government. See P.R.O./W.O. 106/ 
35, Chinese Troops, "Note pour le Conseil Supérieur de 
Guerre, par Mission Militaire Britannique, January 15,
1918.
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isolated even from other Chinese units, and was especial­
ly forbidden to see even from a distance the camps in 
which white laborers or troops l i v e d . ^40 This latter 
insistence was for fear that the coolies would be in a 
position "to judge or criticise the same class or work"^^! 
or standard of living enjoyed by white personnel in France. 
The largest Chinese base camp at Noyelles-sur-Mer was a 
virtual ghetto through whose gates no one could pass 
without searching examination.
When in the field, the subordinate attachment of the 
Chinese Labour Corps company to the unit for which it wor­
ked ensured its continued isolation. Chinese were not al­
lowed to mix with whites. White company officers shared 
this enforced isolation. Few were considered profession­
ally acceptable in messes that they visited while on as­
signment in the field.
From this description it may be imagined what kind 
of intense and introverted psychology grew up in the indi­
vidual companies which constituted the Corps. Mutual 
suspicions flourished. White officers began to find 
their Oriental charges far shrewder than they had pre­
sumed. Some feared the growth of the Tong or other se­
^^^P.R.O./W.O. 107/37, Labour Report, Appendix to
Notes for Officers of Labour Companies: "Chinese Labour,”
Issued by Directorate of Labour, 1917.
341%bid.
198
cret societies, some of which undoubtedly flourished 
within the confines of Chinese c o m p a n i e s . ^42 Other 
white captains and subalterns, used perhaps to the me­
thods of the Raj, attempted to apply colonialist tech­
niques to the direction of the Chinese. This procedure, 
based on the arrogant emphasis of racial superiority, 
usually failed where the Chinese were concerned. They 
were willing to be subordinate, but not subject, and re­
fused to respond readily to such arbitrary means of con­
trol. Besides, many of the coolies had a stubborn be­
lief in the superiority of their own culture and proved 
perceptive judges of the British dilemma caused by the en­
counter of the two r a c e s . 343
Despite all the fears and disappointment associated 
with the direction of the Chinese at work, the fascina­
tion for the exploitation of Chinese manpower resources 
continued to exert a very considerable influence on pol­
icy making in some quarters of the British military es­
tablishment. Controversy on the topic remained heated.
One officer in a capacity of some importance could re­
mark that he was unalterably opposed to the use of Chi-
342(}eorge Horn, Rainhill, Lancashire, letter to the 
writer, September 20, 1972.
342p R 0  /w  0  ^ 1 0 7 /3 7 , Labour Report, Appendix to
Notes for Officers of Labour Companies: ^Chinese Labour,"
Issued by Directorate of Labour, 1917.
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nese as anything but the merest c o o l i e s , 344 another 
could remark that if properly officered there was no 
reason why Chinese of the same coolie type should not 
make excellent s o l d i e r s . 345 The Foreign Office, which 
shared the optimistic view of the Corps' performance 
held by some of its colleagues in the army establish­
ment, was on one occasion moved by an unusual exurber- 
ance to remark that the activities of the coolies in 
France were "an unqualified s u c c e s s ,"346 although this 
assessment was admittedly made on the basis of the most 
slender information.
These conflicts of opinion over the exploitability 
of the Chinese received a heightening of importance when 
China entered the war on the Allied side. China felt 
that if she could now send fighting contingents to Eur­
ope, the gratitude of the Entente Powers, especially 
Britain, would be such as to assist her to free herself 
from continued German influence after the war, and to 
help her escape from the aggressive intentions of Japan.
Editorials appeared in leading and influential 
Peking newspapers close to government circles. In them 
was emphasized the importance of Chinese manpower. It
^‘^ ^Ibid. , Memorandum on Proposed Employment of Chi­
nese as Fighting Troops, Robertson, Peking, to M.I.2, Lon­
don, 1917.
346p R o^/W.o. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Foreign Office, 
London, to Sir C . Spring-Rice, Washington, October 1, 1917.
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had already been demonstrated that Chinese could sup­
port the Allied cause as laborers. Now, as a matter of 
honor, the British at least ought to consider allowing 
Chinese troops to fight side by side with white soldiers 
in France and Flanders. To continue to regard China as 
a resource for crude labor alone was now an insupport­
able i n s u l t . 347 Such was the content of the arguments 
heard in the Peking press.
Understandably, perhaps, this line of reasoning 
met with a mixed response in Whitehall. The notion of 
using Chinese troops to bolster Oriental prestige was 
not exactly what the strategists there had had in mind. 
The Chinese Labour Corps always occupied a very different 
position in their estimation. It had always been under­
stood as an article of faith that it would melt away 
rapidly, with no lingering residual liabilities or re­
c r i m i n a t i o n s  . 348 The thought of employing Chinese troops 
on a parity with British, while still intriguing, seemed 
to entail dangerous obligations for the future of Bri­
tish politics and diplomacy in the Far East.
347The Peking Daily News, October 6, 1917, p. 1.
And see L.T. Chen, "The Chinese Labour Battalions," Chi­
nese Students' Monthly, April, 1918, p. 299, and The North 
China Herald, May 18, 1918, p. 5.
348^3 early as 1905 the War Office had accepted that 
this ad hoc quality was essential if any natives were to 
be employed in war. See P.R.O./W.O. 32/6805, Royal En- 
gineers Organisation for War, Memorandum of Col. R. Kenyon, 
1905.
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But the Chinese government continued to stress the 
parallels between what the Chinese Labour Corps had done, 
and what China's additional and vast manpower resources 
might do, to turn the tide in Europe. In August, 1918, 
when China under President Feng Kuo-Chang rather belated­
ly announced its formal adherence to the Allied cause, 
her Prime Minister and War Minister, Tuan Chi-jui, openly 
declared that his nation's supply of manual labor to Eur­
ope decisively proved that her resources fitted her for 
the task of combat s u p p o r t . 3 4 9
Diplomats and military men alike found this insis­
tence embarrassing. They looked with relief to the com­
ing cessation of hostilities after which they would be 
able to avoid considering China's offer with the serious­
ness that she demanded. In the meantime, it was urged 
that everything be done to keep the Chinese Labour Corps 
on its current and cheap "free contract" basis with 
China neutral, rather than risk her asking for retro­
active changes in wages and conditions as part of a quid 
pro quo for entry into the w a r . 350
There were men who ignored the delicate questions 
raised by China's status as an ally. Colonel Robertson 
in Peking still hoped to arrange for an increased influx
349xhe North China Herald, August /?7, 1918, p. 1.
350p.R.o./w.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Alston, Pe­
king, to D.M.I., London, August 13, 1918.
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of Chinese into Europe for use both as troops and labor­
ers. He had been planning all along for what he called 
"the cut and dried scheme for the role we wish China to 
play."351 When it became apparent that London had no 
intention of widening the scope of the immigration, Rob­
ertson and those who shared his mind had to content them­
selves with the observation that at least the Chinese 
Labour Corps had, in the idiom of the day, "done its 
bit."
Was this "bit" formally appreciated at the war's 
conclusion? Its attendant rigors, some of which have 
been dicussed in the preceding pages, were flippantly 
dismissed at the peace conference at Versailles. Mr. 
Lloyd George, whose own inspiration played such a large 
part in calling the Chinese Labour Corps into being, re­
marked acidly that with a population of four hundred mil­
lions behind her, the assistance China rendered the 
Allied cause had been "insignificant."^52 How dare the 
Orientals demand a memorial to their sacrifices.
351p.R.O./W.O. 106/35, Employment, Robertson, Pe­
king, to D.M.I., London, May 17, 1918.
352d  Lloyd George, Memories of the Peace Confer- 
ence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939) , p"! 134.
CHAPTER VI
THE CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY EFFORT: ITS EFFECT UPON
THE CHINESE LABOUR CORPS: 1918-1920
In the months following their arrival in Europe, 
the men of the Chinese Labour Corps were increasingly 
subject to the influence of Christian missionary work 
in their ranks. This effort, which was designed to im­
press upon the Chinese the virtues of Western cultural 
and religious patterns, the need to control their some­
times volatile emotions, and the wisdom of cooperation 
with their white overseers, persisted until the time of 
the coolies' final repatriation. An examination of the 
dimensions of the Christian missionary impact upon the 
Chinese therefore forms a logical part of a continuation 
of the last chapter's discussion of the coolies at work, 
and serves to carry that discussion up to the period of 
their return to China.
It is difficult today to find an adequate vantage 
point from which to view historically the work of Christ­
ian missionaries among underprivileged or alien g r o u p s . 353
353Attempts to see the Christian missionary out­
reach of the colonial era in an authentic perspective are 
becoming more frequent as passions on the issue cool, or
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It is often hard not to condemn outright the imposition 
of the Judaic-Christian persuasion on native cultures, 
especially those like the Chinese which had a well de­
veloped pedigree of its own. A distaste for this "Christ­
ian pedantry"354 gj^ows when it is seen in the service of 
national interests, automatically equating paganism with 
savagery and Christianity with civilization. But on the 
positive side one also has to accept the fact that much 
in the way of alleviation of poverty, misery, and dis­
content was accomplished by the whole missionary out­
reach. Besides which, the modern missionary approach 
has greatly changed.
These ambivalent emotions are sure to surface in a 
discussion of the Chinese Labour Corps. One learns, for 
instance, that missionaries in Shantung were used by the 
War Office both to assist in the enrollment of the coolies 
by presenting the Allied war effort to them in terms of a 
Christian moral conflict to which the Chinese believer 
should subscribe, and in the important task of damping 
down the passions, frustrations, and even sexual desires 
of the Chinese laborers once they had arrived in Europe.
In Europe, too, some missionaries, either as officers in
are regarded as irrelevant. For example, see P. Barr, To 
China With Love (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1972), passim.
^^^A. Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, p. 11.
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the Chinese Labour Corps or as private citizens attached 
to it, glorified war and also the heroic effort needed 
to pursue it,355
It must be noted, too, that missionary organiza­
tions involved in work for the Chinese in France looked 
for very concrete benefits in terms of increased con­
tributions to their post war work in China, an increase 
in converts to the faith, and greater respectability as 
a result of the work of their members in the coolie camps 
in Europe. These comments apply especially to the Bri­
tish Baptists, whose major concern in China was the pro­
vince of Shantung.
This does not mean that the rate of conversions to 
Christianity was high. On the contrary, groups of be­
lievers were small. But these groups, and those who ad­
hered to them in Europe, acted as nuclei of stability 
and social order in the ranks of individual labor com­
p a n i e s , 356 g y  their willingness to listen to and assimi­
late the basic tenets of subservience demanded of them
355white labor corps were subjected to the same ex­
hortations. See Memorandum from Sir George Askwith to 
Members of the National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s, (London : 
YMCA Archives), April 21, 1918, p. 5l
356geverend R. M. Gibbon, Glasgow, letter to Baptist 
Missionary Society, London (London: B.M.S. Archives),
March 14, 1918. (Gibbon provides an interesting view of 
the Reverend Shields, one of the most tireless and contro­
versial Baptists in France, and his efforts to convert the 
Chinese to Christianity.)
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by their missionary teachers, they offered a solid proof 
to their fellow Chinese that tractability and coopera­
tion with the British paid clear dividends. No wonder 
the War Office became increasingly interested in the 
work of missionaries in the Corps.
The question of the use of Christian missionaries 
had arisen very early in the discussions of the practica­
bility of raising Chinese workers. The War Office and 
its advisors regarded them as the perfect propagandists 
for the scheme. The Chinese attached to missionaries 
none of the distrust that they had on previous occasions 
manifested for the paid recruiters and propagandists of, 
say, the French and South African labor syndicates. The 
missionaries were free from any taint of corruption. While 
few in number, and the shepards of comparatively small 
flocks, the Baptists in particular had won a degree of 
respect, and even affection, among the populace of Shan­
tung, Shansi, and Shensi provinces that placed them in an 
excellent position to act as spokesmen for Whitehall's 
plans.357
In December, 1916, Colonel Robertson wrote from 
Peking to Captain Denny, his friend in Military Intelli­
gence in London, reminding him of earlier correspondence
357shantung, Shansi, and Shensi were the exclusive 
preserve of the Baptists. In Shantung, their work was 
highly organized and divided into four geographically con­
tiguous associations. See "China Report, The Baptist Her­
ald, Vol. XCVIII, May, 1916, p. 120.
207
on the topic of missionaries, and emphasizing the advan­
tage which the Christian pastors in Shantung could be to 
the War Office in the furtherance of its desires to raise 
men t h e r e . ^^8 Robertson was to remain an outspoken advo­
cate of the need to enlist all missionaries in the effort 
to raise the coolies and to pacify their apprehensiveness.
As early as July, 1916, it had been he who mentioned to 
Foreign Secretary Grey the tremendous work the mission­
aries could accomplish in relation to quietening Chinese 
fears concerning the proposed importation. No one in 
China would doubt the integrity of such assurances, and 
the anticipated plan could proceed with minimal opposi­
t i o n . 3 5 9
All along it seemed obvious to Robertson and to 
his colleagues in the Peking legation that the Baptists, 
many of whom lived along the Shantung railway line, could 
provide this perfect medium for advertising the War Office's 
needs and the moral nature of the crusade against the Ger­
mans in Europe. Attache Alston agreed, but recommended 
caution in the selection of missionaries called to aid 
the labor scheme.^®® Those whose views were too liberal
3^^P.R.0./W.0. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Robertson, 
Peking, to D.M.I., London, December 26, 1916.
35^P.R.0./W.0. 106/35, Employment, "Memorandum on 
the Employment of Chinese for War," Robertson, Peking, to 
D.M.I., London, July 23, 1916.
360p.R.o./w.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Alston, Pe­
king, to D.M.I., London, January 15, 19Ï7.
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or progressive, or who entertained pacifist views, were 
better left alone.
And so it was that when the labor enrollment plans 
began to advance, and T. J. Bourne arrived in China to 
implement them, the missionaries deemed suitable as re­
presentatives were approached and asked to serve. One 
or two seemed reluctant to do so until assured by the 
British legation in Peking, or by Bourne in Wei-hai-Wei, 
that the request made of them was compatible with their 
calling. They received assurances that their actions 
would aid the Allied war effort and could only redound to 
the credit of themselves and the faith they served. The 
coolies that they helped to enroll would return to China 
after the war burning with a zeal to adopt the Christian 
doctrine, having seen it everywhere at work in Europe.
With yet more Candide-like optimism, the War Office as­
sured the ten or so missionaries initially involved 
that no violence would be done their Chinese flocks while 
serving the British. All of this was in line with the 
ethos that has been described in an earlier chapter, and 
represents the sentiments popularized by Cromer and others 
before the war.
By January of 1917 the British ambassador in Pe­
king could inform London through one of his attaches that
361Supra., p. 17.
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"we have recently started recruiting propaganda through
the medium of Local British M i s s i o n a r i e s . "362 ^he awk­
ward phrasing concealed the belief that much advantage 
was expected from this move, which it was felt was bound 
to lull the coolies' suspicions as to their use, and act 
as a valuable counterweight to the already accelerating 
German counter propaganda effort. Sir John Jordan ad­
vised that more generous pay scales be offered by the 
War Office to tempt missionaries into volunteering for 
service with the Chinese in the corps that was being form­
ed by Bourne in W e i - h a i - W e i . 363
In London, the Baptist Missionary Society enter­
tained some doubts as to the advisability of such whole­
hearted cooperation with Whitehall's efforts. The Bap­
tists had no wish to jeopardize their relations with the 
Peking government by compromising it in any way. This 
might lead to a limiting of missionary activity in China 
after the war. The Christian Missionary Society and the 
China Inland Mission supported these reservations. Be­
sides, there was the question of what to do with the 
families of missionaries who went further than mere aid
362p_R,o_/w.o. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Alston, Pe­
king, to D.M.I,, London, January 8, l9l7
363ibid., Jordan, Peking, to Foreign Office and War 
Office, London, January 10, 1917.
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in recruiting coolies, and decided to seek commissions 
in the Chinese Labour Corps, To ship them home would 
cost money, as the War Office ruefully admitted.
A compromise was reached with the suggestion that 
Baptist missionaries in Shantung be allowed to resign 
temporarily from their parent Society in order to aid 
the enrollment drive t h e r e . ^^5 But the problem persist­
ed. In May, 1917, when efforts to raise coolies were
at their peak, Alston in Peking wrote to London, ob­
serving that.
Cases occur in which Home Mission Boards re­
fuse permission to Missionaries in China to 
serve with the coolies. Missionaries ^ r e  
forming? one of the main sources of Chinese 
speaking officers . . .  I trust Chinese Mis­
sion Boards at home . . . will be given every
encouragement by War Office to release as 
many men out here as possible. . . .366
The historian of the Baptists' role in China during 
this period has proudly suggested the magnitude of their 
accomplishments for the government in relation to the 
raising of coolies. He declares that of an estimated 
seventy thousand men enrolled from Shantung province, 
many thousands owed their decision to serve the British
3G4ibid., Robertson, Peking, to Denny, M.I.2, Lon­
don, December 8, 1916.
^®^Ibid., Alston, Peking, to D.M.I., London, Febru­
ary 2, 19Î7T"
366ibid., Alston, Peking, to D.M.I., London, May 
31, 1917.
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to the influence of local Baptist c l e r g y . 3^7 These 
services were much appreciated in London. They also 
provided missionaries with expanded opportunities for 
evangelism among the coolie c l a s s . ^68
When it came to seeing some of these same mission­
aries in uniform, accompanying the Chinese to France, the 
War Office and its advisors in China confessed to some­
thing of a dilemma. Of course they desperately needed 
men who could speak the language, and who had a degree 
of rapport with the ill understood and unpredictable 
Chinese. But they feared also that the religious pres­
ence would constitute a threat to commanders in France, 
and limit the attempts of labor directors to utilize 
the Chinese to the maximum degree. Were ex-missionaries 
to take leading company command positions themselves, 
perhaps as a result of former military experience, the 
limitations might be heightened to a degree.
Accordingly, at first only thirteen former Baptist 
missionaries were allowed to accompany the Chinese to 
France as uniformed officers,^®® although the War Office
367^ R Williamson , British Baptists in China : 
1845-1952 (London: Carey Kingsgate Press, 1957), p^ 100.
368These opportunities were eagerly ’’’bought u p,’ 
both in France and China during and after the War.” Ibid. 
See too Minutes of Baptist Missionary Society Executive 
Committee (London: B.M.S. Archives), July, 1917.
3G9Reverend A, J. Gamier, Sevenoaks, Kent, letter 
to the writer, September 4, 1972. (Gamier was one of the
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accepted as a recommendation for commission the reli­
gious qualifications of a number of applicants for com­
mand positions in the Chinese Labour Corps. Later, after 
the Corps became established in France and the potential 
and actual value of the religious presence in the labor 
camps was fully realized, the War Office congratulated 
itself on its prescience in accepting these requests for 
commissions, and conveniently forgot some the the reserva­
tions that had been expressed b e f o r e . 370
A typical applicant for officer status in the Corps 
who, by January of 1918, could be regarded by the War Of­
fice as "very suitable i n d e e d , ”371 was a public school 
educated priest of the Church of England, aged thirty, 
who had been conducting an active and aggressive mission­
ary work in Vancouver, British Columbia. This individual 
applied direct to the War Office in London. Other pro­
spective officers applied to the British legation in Pe­
king, where Sir John Jordan, advised by Colonel Robertson,
thirteen chosen. And see Williamson, British Baptists in 
China, p. 100.)
370colonel Fairfax was eventually to ask that more 
missionaries be used to control and officer the Chinese, 
although he always remained dubious about the military com­
petence of these men. See P.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. His­
tory, Report of Col. Fairfax to Labour Directorate, 1917.
371ibid., Applications for Officer Commissions in the 
C.L.C., Application of Mr. N. Lascelles-Ward, Vancouver, 
January 8, 1918. And see P.R.O./W.O. 106/29, Commissions 
for Chinese Labour Corps Commanders and Others, passim.
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handled their requests. The two began to use the same 
criteria as London. Religious orthodoxy and doctrinal 
dependability, solid Anglo-Saxon cultural background, 
and desire to participate in the mission of "civilizing" 
and controlling the Chinese whom the applicants were 
being chosen to direct were the qualities most looked 
for.
Although many of the candidates selected as a re­
sult of this process undeniably possessed attractive and 
creditable personal qualities, they were frequently re­
garded by their service colleagues in France as rank 
amateurs, or worse. Their employment was a deliberate 
gamble. Both Peking and London came to the frank conclu­
sion that the choosing of men on a partly religious basis 
was explainable in terms of their affect on the coolies, 
but admittedly not defensible in professional military 
terms.
Quite apart from its consideration of individuals, 
the War Office was becoming progressively more aware of 
the part that organizations like the Young M en’s Christian 
Association (YMCA) could play in keeping the Chinese in 
France quiet, docile, and cooperative. The full impact 
of this realization was slow to materialize, but initial 
approaches to the YMCA were made as early as December, 
1916, before the coolies arrived in France. These ap-
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proaches were very tentative, however, and were designed 
only to get a hint of what recreational activities the 
Association might provide.
The National Council of the YMCA maintained very 
close ties with the War Office. Two of its executive 
members, Major Barclay and Major Sir T. Sturmy-Cave, were 
well known and accepted in Whitehall c i r c l e s . B u t  it 
appears that the first really serious requests for YMCA 
help with the Chinese could have originated in General 
Headquarters in F r a n c e . A t  today's juncture it may 
be impossible to determine with complete accuracy where 
the initiative lay for the Association's eventual exten­
sive involvement with the Chinese Labour Corps. A report 
from the Association's War Emergency Committee that might 
have thrown more light upon this issue is no longer ex­
tant in the YMCA archives in L o n d o n . I t  is safe to 
say, though, that the Association needed little prompting 
to initiate a far-reaching program of aid, comfort, and 
education for the Chinese in France.
^^^Minutes of the National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s, 
"Report of War Emergency Committee," London, December l6, 
1916, p. 6.
^^^Minutes of the Proceedings of the National Council 
of Y.M.C.A.'s , London, July 24, 1Ô17.
374Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National Coun­
cil of Y.M.C.A.'s,"Foreign Committee Reports," London, De­
cember 5, 1919, p. 9.
Ronald Howe, National Council of YMCA's, London, 
letter to the writer, July 25, 1972.
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Before leaving the question of how the YMCA got 
involved with the Chinese one should cite a source with­
in the Association which has put a more dramatic com­
plexion on the origins of that involvement. It is sug­
gested that, having initially come forward of its own 
volition to offer the usual helpful subsidary services, 
the Association found its offer declined. It is not said 
by whom or what. Then, the source goes on to explain, 
having insinuated themselves into the camps operated for 
the Chinese in France by means of "stealthy efforts,"^76 
helped the Chinese to settle down to their alien and 
forbidding environment, and assisted them also to adjust 
to the unusual confinement and the subjection to military 
discipline, the YMCA workers suddenly found "all opposi- 
tion"377 to their semi-clandestine presence withdrawn, 
and the cooperation of the army with their work becoming 
official.
The full truth of the matter may lie in between. 
Probably the War Office sanctioned the presence of some 
YMCA workers in the first coolie camps as dispensers of 
sundries like soap and tobacco. This was normal proce­
dure. It is hard to see how the Association could have
^76Report of the War Emergency Work of the Y.M.C.A 




gained entry to the tightly guarded compounds without 
some official support. The "opposition" referred to 
above may have come from the officers and staffs of the 
armies in whose sectors the coolies were employed, or 
perhaps initially from members of Colonel Wace's organi­
zation. The YMCA and its activities were never popular 
with commanders in the field, and the Association has 
on record instances of its work being approved in Lon­
don only to be obstructed and hindered in France.
One may go on to opine that when the field commanders 
saw the positive impact of the Association's presence re­
vealed in improved discipline and greater efficiency, 
"stealthy efforts" were no longer necessary, the Asso­
ciation's activities could expand, and cinema shows, 
reading lessons, Bible study seminars and tutorials, and 
snack bars could materialize.
The Association's workers proved most dedicated in 
their devotion to the Chinese Labour Corps. They remain­
ed with the Orientals, sometimes enduring discomfort and 
danger, until at last they assisted in the belated re­
patriation program, and were even on hand in China to 
assist in resettlement attempts.
378see, for example. Minutes of the Annual Meeting 
of the National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s , London, December 
1 6 , 1916, p. 6 .
379t _ Chen, Chinese Migrations, p. 155.
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There were strong elements of legitimate self in­
terest in all of this activity. By early 1919, for ex­
ample, the executive meeting of the National Council of 
YMCA's learned that in part as a result of the work with 
the Chinese "there was never a time when the Association 
had before it a greater opportunity of extension and 
consolidation of work. New fields of service were open­
ing of tremendous i m p o r t a n c e . "380 principles which
should govern this amplified outreach were clearly re­
cognized by the Council's chairman, Sir George A s k w i t h . 3 8 1  
They were in mind when in 1919 the Annual Meeting of the 
National Council heard encouraging tidings on the results 
to be expected from participation in the Chinese labor 
scheme. The responsibility it had undertaken for the 
recreation, pacification, and education of the coolies 
was described as,
an undertaking of the greatest interest,/which? 
has contributed materially to the morale of the 
men. Without doubt it has had a profound ef­
fect on these men collected from Northern China, 
who, on returning to their native country, will 
face the appeal of missions from an altogether
n e w  s t a n d p o i n t .382
380Minutes of Executive Meeting of National Council 
of Y.M.C.A.'s, London, November 2, 1917, p. 5.
381"Memorandum from Sir George Askwith to Members of 
the National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s," (London, Y.M.C.A. Ar­
chives), April 21, 1918.
^^^Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National 
Council of Y.M.C.A.'s^ "Foreign Committee Reports," Lon- 
don, December 5, 1919, p. 10.
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There can be no doubt, then, that the YMCA did see 
its role among the Chinese in France as an unrivalled 
opportunity to extend its post war influence, but so did 
Baptists, Anglicans, and Presbyterians, many of whom 
worked in the labor camps under the general aegis of 
the Association.383 The Anglican Church Times was par­
ticularly vehement fn defence of this missionary oppor­
tunity, and openly castigated organized British labor 
when it opposed the use of Chinese and other natives, as 
this stand was bound to make the work of "Christianizing' 
the heathen more difficult s t i l l . 384 Whether all of 
those who worked for the YMCA in the coolie camps shared 
this degree of commitment to the missionary aspect of 
their work is a moot p o i n t . 385 Qne supposes not.
Some of the Association's workers apparently re­
garded their actions merely as a routine means of fur­
thering the Allied war effort by providing the coolies 
with a means of channeling their potentially explosive 
energies into more creative streams, thus avoiding dis­
affection, or even violent confrontation between them
383j Shields, "With the Chinese in France," The 
Baptist Herald, Vol. C, June, 1918, pp. 88-89. (Shields 
operated a Y.M.C.A. center in a large compound housing
2,500 Chinese near Dunkirk; he reveals that most of the 
Christians in the camp were either Baptists or Presbyter­
ians . )
384»rhe Church Times, February 1, 1917, p. 5.
385e . Thompson, "The Chinese Labour Corps and the 
Missionary Effort," East and West, October, 1920, pp. 313- 
315.
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and their white overseers. Colonel Wace seconded this 
view, but had no doubts about the value of the YMCA pre­
sence, which he came to regard as of "incalculable"^®® 
value in filling the laborers' spare time with recrea­
tional and educational pursuits.
The Association wanted to open more and more cen­
ters for the Chinese, both in France and to cater for 
the reception of repatriated c o o l i e s . 3®? But where was 
the money to come from? The outreach in France alone 
cost substantial sums of money. The huts or canteens 
which provided refreshments, sundries, and literature, 
and which later were to serve as locations for discussion 
and study groups, all had to be built, maintained, and 
stocked by the Association. A few huts, it is true, were 
donated by private benefactors, but not enough to sub­
stantially defray the mounting outlay.
The Association's investment in the Chinese alone 
was particularly heavy by comparison with its outlay on 
other ventures in France. In October, 1917, for example, 
it spent 18,000 pounds on providing the Chinese with fa­
cilities at the major base camp at Noyelles.^®® This
3®6p.R.O./W.O. 107/37, Labour Report, p. 54.
3®?Minutes of Half-Yearly Meeting of the National 
Council of Y.M.C.A.'s! "foreign Committee Report," London, 
June l4, 1918, p. 4.
3®®Report of Y.M.C.A. Finance Committee, London, 
October 2, 1917.
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included two cinemas at a cost of 1,200 pounds each.389 
By February, 1919, the Y.M.C.A. maintained in France a 
staff of 1,024 men and 735 women. This represented a 
major increase over early 1917, when only 641 workers of 
both sexes were active, and was largely necessitated by 
the ministry to the C h i n e s e . B y  July of 1918, fifty 
canteens of varying degrees of size and design catered 
to the needs of the C h i n e s e , 391. but plans were on hand 
for the extension of this number to eighty, and the Bap­
tist Missionary Society had already been approached with 
a view to its providing some of the staff required.
It is not surprising that as a result of the cir­
cumstances narrated above the economics of continuing 
the work for the Chinese had become by 1918 a major fac­
tor in the YMCA's anxious assessment of its current fis-
389rpbese and other coolie camp cinemas showed re­
ligious and propaganda films. They were sometimes run 
by women. The material presented relieved the boredom, 
and was apparently received with great enthusiasm. See 
"A Coolie Colony in France," The Morning Post, London, 
September 28, 1917, p. 3.
390"Qeneral Secretary’s Report," (London: Y.M.C.A.
Archives), para. 6, April 29, 1919.
391
Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, National 
Council of Y.M.C.A.*s~ "General Secretary's Report," Lon­
don, July 5, 1918, p. 5.
"Executive Committee Minutes” (London: B.M.S.
Archives), March 19, 1918.
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cal status. The work with the Orientals now demanded a 
stinting of services to other groups. The bulk of each 
month's supplies to France, worth about 150,000 pounds, 
was earmarked for the Chinese Labour Corps. In view of 
the War Office's obvious interest in the continuation of 
the Association's work, the directors of the YMCA felt 
free to ask for government help.
The government had already aided the Association 
with a loan as a result of representations to the War 
Office in late 1917. The work for the Chinese had formed 
a significant element in the Association's plea for aid 
at that time.393 The War Office had also provided for 
free shipping of supplies to France, and was collecting 
some of those supplies from its own c o n t r a c t o r s .394 ^11 
this had been appreciated. But it was not sufficient.
It was time, felt the Association, to approach the gov­
ernment again, this time for a substantial interest free 
loan or grant outright.
Accordingly, it was resolved that the Minister for 
War, Mr. Winston Churchill, be approached. It was known 
that Churchill was sympathetic to the work of the Associa­
tion among the Chinese, and the directors of the Associa-
3 93Report of Y.M.C.A. Finance Committee, London, 
December 4, 1917.
394jjeport of Y.M.C.A.'s Trading Committee, London, 
March 6, 1918.
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tion were sanguine about the outcome of any meeting 
with him.395 Their optimism was justified. Churchill 
proved even more amenable than had been hoped. Of course 
the Association should receive direct subsidization to 
continue its work among the Chinese, even though the war 
was officially over. He apparently spoke of a sum in 
the region of 500,000 pounds, with no strings attached.
The directors were elated. But this suggested sum, the 
result of Churchill's usual ardor, was considered too 
large by the War Office and the Treasury, and only half 
of it was immediately f o r t h c o m i n g , 396 although the ma­
terialization of the remainder was not ruled out.
This was a great gain for the Association. It 
proved at once the importance of its work among the Chi­
nese, and the extent of possible government support. The 
quarter million pounds helped sustain the work of the 
YMCA among the Chinese long after the organization had 
ceased to be of service to other branches of the army, 
thus enabling the Christian influence to pervade the very 
last days of the Corps' sojourn in Europe. The War Office
395Report of Y.M.C.A. Finance Committee, London, 
January 2T~, 1919. "/The feeling was/ that in view of 
the services rendered by the Association, and in view 
of the increased importance of the work to the Army .
. . the Government might reasonably be expected to as­
sist the Association."
396Minutes of Half-Yearly Council Meeting of Na- 
tional of Y.M.C.A.'s, London, June 6, 19l9, p. 8.
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had every reason to be pleased with its bargain.39?
The Association with its reward.
Quite apart from the quietening influence they 
exerted, or the overt proselytizing they conducted, the 
workers of the YMCA offered the Chinese serious oppor­
tunities for self improvement. Chinese who had been 
students before the war, and who had enrolled in the 
Corps, were offered the opportunity to do clerical tasks 
and administrative chores for the Association.^^® Others 
were exposed to an educational program that was ambi­
tiously broadened to cater to the fundamental needs of 
the coolies, was geared to improve literacy rates, and 
aimed to introduce them to a fundamental appreciation of
Western art and l i t e r a t u r e . ^99
This latter aspect of the Association's work cer­
tainly appealed to those army officers who felt that the 
civilizing of the Chinese was a major goal. Surely, it 
was thought, "when these men go back they will want an
397p,R,o./w.O. 32/11345, Use of Chinese Labour, 
Memorandum of D.M.I., January, 1Ô1Ô.
398Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National 
Council of Y.M.C.A.'s, London, December 6, 1618, p. 4.
399"With the Chinese Labour Corps," The Christian 
Missionary Society Gleaner, Vol. XLV, July, 1Ô1Ô, p. 104, 
(*'There is no doubt that the native labourers in France 
are receiving a remarkably rapid Western education." A 
book. The Churches' Welcome to the Chinese Labourers at 
the Front, formed the basis for indoctrination.)
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existence more akin to our Western ideas and ideals of 
l i f e . "400 The sight of King George V among them, demo­
cratically eating a cheese sandwich, was presumed to 
have encouraged this d e s i r e . 401 Having proved the cool­
ies educable, the Association opened the door to an 
increasing preoccupation with the task of "civilizing" 
the Chinese. For example, officers of Corps companies 
now began to decide which of their Oriental charges of­
fered the most in potential returns for an investment of 
interest and encouragement in learning.
Accordingly, three classes of coolie were recog­
nized. There was the "pukka" coolie, or beast of burden, 
who was likely to remain entirely ignorant. There was 
the semi-skilled petty tradesman, or village artisan, 
who was partially or wholly literate, and who had proven 
in France that he could learn the intricacies of modern 
technology. And there was the skilled tradesman from 
the city, familiar with mechanical and electrical equip­
ment and modern industrial p r o c e s s e s .402 To these three
400D. Klein, With the 'Chinks' in the C.L.C.,p. 248.
401"King's Visit to C.L.C. Units," The British Week­
ly, January 8, 1919, p. 4. (The coolies were very care­
fully schooled for the visit, and the best disciplined 
alone chosen.)
402p.R.O./W.O. 107/37, Labour Report, p. 49. (Men 
in this class were eventually given two dollars and fifty 
cents Mexican per day as against the mere coolies one. In 
January, 1918, the War Office urged Bourne to find more 
men of this sort, and asked specifically for 170 plumbers.
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basic categories or classes was reluctantly added a 
fourth composed of heterogeneous elements from the 
Corps' total strength. These latter were regarded as 
educated already, or at least educable to the fullest 
benefits of Western civilization. This latter class 
was small and numbered perhaps five hundred men in 1918. 
Some found their way into officers' messes, were trans­
formed into personal servants or staff, and remained in 
Europe after the repatriation of their fellows.
The importance to Britain of the whole education 
effort mounted by the Association became increasingly 
apparent to London. The benefits of civilizing the Chi­
nese could have important political repercussions as 
well as merely fulfilling Britain's need to advertise 
its cultural supremacy. Attaché Alston in Peking had 
seen this as early as 1917, when he wrote direct to the 
then-Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, as follows,
I venture to think the time has come to con­
sider the very important political effect 
which the sojourn of some hundred thousand 
Chinese in France . . .  is likely to have on 
British prestige in North China. There can 
be little doubt the effect must be highly 
beneficial and that the returning coolies 
will form a not inconsiderable body of apos­
tles of British enlightenment. By raising 
the standard of village living and the know­
ledge of a wider life even in an infinitesimal 
degree we shall be rendering a great benefit
1,500 carpenters, 280 tinsmiths, 170 fitters, 1,360 fire­
men, 30 molders, and so forth. A sanction for special 
rates of pay was made in the fall of 1917.)
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. . . /EwtV the most important complement 
is the enlisting of the educated portion 
of the Chinese personnel who will become 
preachers and exponents of British fair­
ness and efficiency.403
This is one of the clearest statements in the sources of 
what Britain aimed for in the education, "civilization," 
and christianizing of the Chinese. It reveals the com­
ponents of that ethos to which reference has already 
been made in this paper, with its elements of self-inter­
est, chauvinism, and oddly sentimental altruism.
Alston went on to encourage Balfour to institute at 
least one hundred scholarships for men picked from the 
Chinese Labour Corps so that these individuals could be 
thoroughly indoctrinated in the manners and ways of the 
West, and of Britain in particular. The Army Council, 
to which the matter was referred, eventually vetoed the 
suggestion, and the Foreign Office informed the legation 
in Peking that the War Office had decided that "however 
expedient the scheme might be from a political point of 
view its disadvantages and practical diff i c u l t i e s " 4 ® 4  
outweighed such considerations.
But this was in 1917. The work of the Association
403p.R.o./w.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Alston, Pe­
king, to A. J. Balfour, Foreign Office, London, August 
20, 1917.
^^^Ibid., Foreign Office, London, to Jordan, Pe­
king, December 11, 1917.
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during the latter part of that year and into 1918 show­
ed how unequalled was the opportunity to open Oriental 
eyes to the extent and value of British culture. By 
July, 1919, the question of opening broader educational 
facilities for the Chinese again came into prominence. 
Again, it was the political advantages to Britain and 
the cultural advantages to the Chinese that were stress­
ed. This time, however, it was money that proved the 
greatest drawback. Earl Curzon, who was by then Foreign 
Secretary, gave the final word on the matter.^05
The War Office, especially its military intelli­
gence branch, remained intrigued with the idea of edu­
cating coolies to the British way of life. Once the 
Corps received its class distinctions it grew easier to 
sort out those men whom it might be worthwhile to influ­
ence and conciliate. Indeed, the intelligence establish­
ment went so far as to suggest that these men should con­
stitute a new and elite stratum in the Corps. The Chi­
nese selected for entry into this class were to be fully 
amenable to the idea of establishing intellectual con­
tacts with Britain, so that ultimately the Empire’s in-
405"if Earl Curzon . . . considers it desirable for 
propaganda purposes that the scheme should be carried into 
effect . . . the ^ r m y 7  Council are ready to facilitate 
it." Ibid., Memorandum of Army Council to Under Secretary, 
Foreign Office, London, July 7, 1919.
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terests in the Far East would be greatly b e n e f itted.406 
Colonel Fairfax' aid had already been enlisted to en­
sure that such potential material for education was bet­
ter treated.407
One wonders quite speculatively what impact upon 
the future of S?no-British relations the efforts to con­
ciliate, educate, or propagandize the Chinese might have 
had had they been followed through as energetically as 
many Britons wished. With the turmoil which China was 
to endure in the decade following 1919 it is doubtful 
whether much in the way of tangible benefit could have 
been expected. The men who suggested schemes like those 
outlined above, while practical in many respects, indulged 
in colonialist daydreams quite untranslatable into sub­
stantive reality when they spoke of building up reserves 
of Chinese goodwill by such means.
4Q^Ibid., Memorandum of Capt. J. H. Kisch, M.I.2c, 
October iW, T917.
407ibid., Directive of Colonel Fairfax, August 4, 
1917. (The French, by comparison with the British, early 
discovered the potential in their own corps of Chinese 
laborers. The French government even responded to pres­
sure from Chinese intellectuals in France who urged that 
some technical education be offered the better class of 
worker so that he might be fitted to participate more 
fully in China's post war development pattern. See "Chi­
nese Labour in France," The New Statesman, January 13, 
1917, p. 343, and P. Wou, Les Travailleurs Chinois et la 
Grande Guerre (Paris; Pedone, 1938). It has not proven 
possible to determine whether the Catholic Church in 
France had the same interest in Christianizing the Chi­
nese as their Protestant counterparts in the British Chi­
nese Labour Corps.)
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It is true that after the war a union for return­
ed laborers was formed under Occidental tutelage in 
China. It was hoped to continue the indoctrination pro­
cess in this way. But the union was a failure, and ap­
parently gained fewer than sixteen hundred members at 
its peak.408 The suggestion that the impact of the 
educated repatriated Chinese contributed to the develop­
ment of forms of modern political practice in China 
rests on a weak foundation.409
In fact, the work of the YMCA offers the only rea­
sonably objective measure of the success of the process 
of education and indoctrination among the members of the 
Chinese Labour Corps. Its work with the second class of 
petty traders and artisans indicates that the literacy 
rate among these men improved in three years from a 
basic twenty per cent to just over thirty eight per c e n t . 410 
This phenomenon was almost entirely due to the efforts 
of the YMCA workers. At least it enabled the coolies to 
pen in English suggestions or complaints for the petition
408gheldon K. Tso, "The Labour Movement in China" 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (University of Indiana, 
1928), pp. 131-132.
409# Wales, /Eelen F. Snow7, The Chinese Labour 
Movement, p. 25. (The assertion in regard to modern ideas 
appears to rest solely on the propaganda article by B. 
Manico Gull already cited on page 70 of this paper.)
410t . Chen, Chinese Migrations, p. 154.
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boxes that eventually occupied the center of each of 
their compounds.
Just as the War Office and its advisors had sus­
pected when originally discussing the role of the mis­
sionaries, it became almost inevitable that a few of 
these active Christians should make efforts to improve 
the lot of the coolies amongst whom they worked. It 
took courage to lobby for better living conditions and 
some protection against exploitation of the Orientals. 
There were missionaries who had this courage. The ac­
tions of one man will serve as an illustration.
The Reverend Seward, a member of the Christian 
Missionary Society, joined the educational effort of 
the YMCA and worked in a large coolie camp. His social 
conscience was aroused by the conditions in which he had 
to instruct his Chinese pupils. Only three stools were 
to be found in the wooden huts which housed five hundred 
men apiece. Many coolies had to lie and sleep on the 
damp and muddy f l o o r s . Incidence of respiratory di­
sease was high. How could the men be persuaded of the 
superiority of British culture under such circumstances?
^Reverend Seward, no. 78 Labour Group Tank Head­
quarters, B.E.F., France, letter to F . Baylis, Christian 
Missionary Society, London (Christian Missionary Society 
Archives, London), August 6, 1918. See, too. Reverend 
Scholes, Mesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, Chinese 
Y.M.C.A., le Havre, letter to Christian Missionary Society, 
London (Christian Missionary Society Archives, London), 
December 4, 1918.
231
Seward made strenuous representations to those in charge 
of the Chinese. Not surprisingly, his vocal stand failed 
to endear him to the coolies' immediate directors, but so 
valuable was Seward's work in calming the Chinese that 
he was listened to and, "in particular was allowed to 
pursue his persistent desire to improve their environ­
ment u n h i n d e r e d ."412
Seward was lucky. Few fared so well. Tensions 
between Christian missionaries and the army persisted 
at the local level,throughout the coolies' stay in Eur­
ope. When individual missionaries or YMCA worker tried 
to pacify the Chinese by attempting to ameliorate their 
conditions, they knew that they had the tacit albeit pas­
sive support of the War Office and the Labour Director­
ate.413 The major opposition to their efforts regularly 
came from the white company commanders, and from labor 
camp N.C.G.'s, who regarded the religious presence as a 
nuisance and a limitation. Comapny commanders sometimes 
blamed their YMCA staff for breakdowns in discipline.
One instance exists of an officer who was also a former
412?. P. James, Y.M.C.A. Headquarters, Abbeville 
Area, B.E.F., France, letter to F. Baylis, Christian Mis­
sionary Society, London (Christian Missionary Society 
Archives, London), February 4, 1919.
4^^Colonel Fairfax was willing to see one or two of 
the best missionaries on his proposed Inspectorate. See 
P.R.O./W.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Fairfax, H.Q., C.L.C., 
B.E.F., France, to Weatherall, War Office, London, Decem­
ber 28, 1917.
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missionary being forbidden by his company superior to 
speak to the coolies for fear that their attitude toward 
rigid discipline would suffer as a result of some Chris­
tian comfort.
Generally, however, the missionary presence en­
couraged the Chinese to put up with their lot rather than 
to oppose it. This was the attitude which met most 
favor from the army and London. As the white officers 
and N.C.O.'s of the Chinese Labour Corps became pro­
gressively more and more discouraged and frustrated with 
their lot, it was this ironic aspect of the missionary 
work which became most crucially important. The mission­
aries and YMCA workers began to form a central and stable 
core in each company and camp around which the Chinese 
naturally tended to congregate in the absence of direc­
tion from their white overseers. This situation led to 
increased friction between the Christian workers and the 
white labor commanders at company level. The same pheno­
menon existed in the Chinese hospitals as the months fol­
lowing the conclusion of the Armistice still failed to 
bring with them the demobilization of the C o r p s . 415
414j, Shields, "With the Chinese in France," p. 89.
41^The Chinese hospitals were the particular con­
cern of the Baptist Missionary Society. See "Annual Re­
port: A Survey," The Baptist Herald, Vol. Cl., May,
1919, p. 54.
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This was the time when the Christian appeal to the 
Chinese proved most successful in terms of concrete 
achievements. It is not too much to suggest that the 
demobilization and repatriation of the Chinese would 
not have been accomplished without force or bloodshed 
but for the human touch which the various Christian 
denominations brought to the dismal confines of the labor 
camps, where the Chinese waited long months for the re­
turn home. There is no need to sentimentalize this role. 
It was practically conceived, and carried out in a busi­
ness-like manner. But one missionary put his finger on 
the importance of this contribution when he observed, 
apropos the coolies,
I think they will remember. I am sure they 
appreciated. It made them feel at least 
that they were men and not mere quarry slaves, 
driven to their dungeon when the day was done 
. . .416
The memories of the Chinese proved shorter than 
optimists hoped. YMCA workers and missionaries who re­
turned to their work in China to await expectantly^!? 
the returning influx of interested and grateful men were 
disappointed. Reliable figures indicate that the major-
4!^Report of the War Emergency Work of the Y.M.C.A. 
from 1914 to 1926, Year Book of the National Council of 
Y.M.C.A.'s, "With the Chinese in France," London, 1921, p.34.
4!?Annual letter of the Reverend A. E. Seward, Teh- 
Yang Station, Szechwan Province, letter to Christian Mis­
sionary Society, London (Christian Missionary Society 
Archives, London), November 15, 1919.
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ity of repatriated Chinese came again to Shantung.
There, in 1918, the Baptist Missionary Society record­
ed the community of Christian believers as 10,718 souls. 
This compared with 1,586 for Shansi province, and 13,010 
for Chensi province, the other two areas in which the 
Baptists enjoyed absolute p r e d o m i n a n c e .418 Society’s
superintendant for the region wrote hopefully that "the 
demand for Chinese labour in France has had more re­
sponse Æ e r e 7  than from any other ^ r e ^ .  "419 Surely 
their exposure to Christianity in Europe must have had 
an impact that would be reflected in China upon their re­
turn .
But the figures for the active Christian community 
in Shantung began to fall as the coolies returned, not 
rise, as had been confidently foreseen. In 1920 and 
1921, the numbers dropped to 10,170 for Shantung, while 
in Shensi the figure of practicing Christians was 8,490.420 
True, there was a slight initial rise in Shansi province, 
but only to 1,896. By 1923 and 1924, when all the coolies
418i26th Annual Report of the Baptist Missionary 
Society, London, 1918-1919, 2 i .
419lbid. (Converts tothe Baptist persuasion in 
Shantung from 1914 through 1916 had totalled only 76, so 
there was room for optimism. See "China Report," The 
Baptist Herald, Vol. IIC., May, 1916, p. 120.
420i29th Annual Report of the Baptist Missionary 
Society, London, 192o-192l, p"! 123.
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had returned, the number in Shantung who confessed Chris­
tianity fell dramatically to 8,078, while at the same 
time neighboring Shensi stood at 1,810, and Shensi at 
5,790.421
All this was a very grave disappointment to many of 
the pious souls who had seen their own activities in 
France as a groundwork for a vast new missionary action 
in the Far E a s t . 422 j j q  doubt natural apathy, the accel­
eration of civil strife in China, and the development of 
nationalist and xenophobic sentiments all played a part 
in the reasons for this disappointment. And, too, there 
can be no doubt that the Chinese regarded their own cul­
tural patterns as preferable or superior to those to 
which they had been exposed while the property of the 
British in Europe.
In terms of lasting impact, then, the influence of 
the missionaries on the Chinese was slender. Neither had 
any cultural changes of lasting significance been wrought. 
But so far as the War Office was concerned, the calculated 
risk of placing missionaries and Christian workers in the 
Chinese labor camps had paid useful if short term divi­
dends, and had been worth the gamble.
421132nd Annual Report of the Baptist Missionary 
Society, London, 1023-1924, p. 67.
422iiReport on China Missions," The Baptist Herald, 
Vol. CII, April, 1920, pp. 72-73.
CHAPTER VII
THE DEMOBILIZATION AND REPATRIATION OF THE 
CHINESE LABOUR CORPS
In March, 1918, the decision was taken to suspend 
further shipments of coolies to F r a n c e .^23 There can 
be no question that the scheme would have continued had 
it not been for the great need for transport ships to 
convey American troops to Europe in unprecedented num­
b e r s . 424 Just how large the final number of Chinese 
brought to Europe would have been is impossible to sug­
gest. Perhaps the figures would have approximated the 
two hundred thousand originally envisaged by Mr. Lloyd 
George.425
Despite the missionary influence, the coolies had 
been growing restive long before this date. There had 
been a real fear in late 1917 that many of them were on
4^ 3-j.jjg order to Jordan in Peking to stop the scheme 
is dated from the Foreign Office, March 5, 1918. See 
P.R.O./F.O. 2509/33, Demobilization of Coolies.
424p R o_/F.o. 371/5331, T. J. Bourne's Report on 
Demobilization and Repatriation of Coolies.
425 G.S.O., S.H.Q., Montreuil-sur-Mer, p. 161,
236
237
the point of becoming unmanageable. Outbreaks of dis­
content and anger had become widespread. Colonel Fair­
fax, ordinarily quite humane, remarked to his superiors 
at the Labour Directorate that disturbances among the 
Chinese could be put down by drastic measures "like 
shooting those who are temporarily out of hand,"^^® al­
though he admitted that this procedure "ir-ght seriously 
endanger our prestige in China and may lead to still 
further u n r e s t . H o w e v e r ,  tighter discipline was 
urged, and if death sentences were carried out the bodies 
of the condemned were to be handed to their former com­
pany companions for b u r i a l . 428 Compound guards were 
strengthened. Tighter censorship was applied to mail 
leaving camps and compounds. Even stricter efforts were 
made to keep groups of Corps companies isolated from one 
another for fear that disaffection would spread, and an 
amalgamation of dissident Chinese cause a minor revolu­
tion behind the lines in France. British coolies were 
to stay well north of the Somme so that there could be
426p,R,o,/w.o. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Memorandum 
of Col. Fairfax to Labour Directorate, December 25, 1917.
427lbid.
428ibid., Circular Memorandum on Discipline of Col­
oured Labour Units (Chinese Labour Corps), signed Lt. Gen. 
G. H. Fowke, Adjutant General, G.H.Q., B.E.F., France,
July 3, 1917. (This memorandum was prepared in case trouble 
among the coolies should arise. It was put into effect by 
December, 1917.)
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no possibility of them linking up with the French cool­
ies in the south.
This is how matters stood in the spring of 1918 
when the decision was made to discontinue shipments. One 
may well imagine that in certain quarters there was re­
lief that no more coolies were to appear in France. The 
situation was eased considerably by the onset of the last 
German offensive, which lasted from March, 1918, until it 
trickled out in June. The sudden mobility of the war 
called for frequent moves by the Chinese, and they found 
themselves hard at work building railway spurs, repairing 
plant and equipment, burying the dead, and salvaging war 
materiel.
But then the sudden burst of frenzied activity 
ceased, and the coolies again became discouraged. The 
calibre of their officers did not help either. The High 
Command in France was largely to blame for this. In the 
past it had kept an eye on the younger officers commanding 
in the Chinese Labour Corps, and whenever it discerned 
bright and purposeful men, it had assigned them to the 
leadership of combat units unless they could plead some 
exceptional talent like a knowledge of the language and 
customs of Northern China. So at the time of greatest 
need for good leadership, the Corps was more poverty 
stricken than ever before in terms of professional excel­
lence .
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The officers left in charge in mid-1918 proved to 
have little to recommend them apart from the occasional 
ability to speak Mandarin Chinese. Most of them were 
older men, some were missionaries in uniform, and others 
had signed up after periods of retirement or colonial 
service. Even the Peking legation, which had originally 
helped to raise some of the men now left in command, be­
gan to have second thoughts, and itself complained of 
their poor quality, "both socially and r a c i a l l y . "429 The  
men were far from "the pukka officer, the officer who is 
at once a fearless sahib to be obeyed and a father with 
a sympathetic understanding."430
The quality of the N.C.O.'s seems to have deter­
iorated, too. Colonel Fairfax had had occasion already 
to complain of "rough handlers" among the non-commission­
ed whites, some of whom had been drawn from the Royal Ma­
r i n e s .  431 Now that the quality of man in this stratum 
had lessened, the discipline of the white command struc-
429lbid., Robertson, Peking, to D.M.I., London, Janu­
ary 30, 1918. (The "racial" reference appears to have been 
to a Portuguese officer.)
430j.c., "With the Chinks in France: Stories of
Loyal Helpers from the Far East," The War Illustrated,
J. A. Hammerton, ed., (London: Amalgamated Press), Vol.
IX, November 9, 1918, p. 205.
431p.R.o./w.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Memorandum 
from Col. Fairfax, H.Q., C.L.C., France, to Weatherall,
War Office, London, December 25, 1917.
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ture was imperilled. In place of leadership and direc­
tion, some N.C.O.'s substituted a kind of rough familiar­
ity which alarmed Whitehall. This familiarity between 
British personnel and Chinese was considered "too com­
mon . . . every effort should be made to put it d o w n . " 4 3 2  
At a time when the maintenance of discipline among the 
common soldiers was of the first importance, the War Of­
fice had no intention of seeing the Chinese Labour Corps 
as a haven for potential dissidents, colored or white.
By late 1918, with the Armistice already behind 
them, the Chinese in France agitated to be allowed to 
return home as soon as possible. But their contract was 
flexible enough to allow the British to determine exactly 
when demobilization would occur. Although nominally op­
erative for the "duration" of the war, however long, the 
contract contained an ambiguous termination clause which 
the Treasury Solicitor, when approached on its validity, 
had pronounced sound. This clause allowed the army to 
determine when the war actually "ended," and to keep the 
coolies for up to six months after that date.^33
What legally constituted the end of the war? Was 
it the formal Armistice? Or was it the final establish-
4^^P.R.0./W.C. 107/37, Labour Report, Notes on Chi­
nese Labour, August â, 1918, para. 3.
433p.R.o./w.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, A History of 
War Committee Report, June S, 1919, ''Formation of Labour 
Corps."
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ment of peace by treaty? Nobody seemed willing to offer 
an immediate interpretation so far as the Chinese were 
concerned. The War Office staff on the whole seemed 
agreed, though, that the bulk of the coolies ought to be­
gin their journey home at any time during the six month 
period which followed the signing of the Armistice by 
Germany early in the morning of November 11, 1918.
But it had taken nearly eighteen months to ship the 
Chinese to Europe in the first place. Was it logistical- 
ly possible, even desirable, to accomplish their return 
in a shorter period? The answer was no. Even despite 
the influence of the euphoria of victory, which promised 
to submerge all thought for the welfare of the Chinese 
anyway, the ships needed for the task of massive and 
simultaneous repatriation to China were just not avail­
able. The Chinese would have to wait their turn. They 
became the forgotten men, even though eighteen hundred of 
them supposedly left Europe in late December of 1918, 
clutching their bonuses of twenty Mexican d o l l a r s . 434 
Instances exist of entire Chinese Labour Corps companies 
being virtually abandoned by their "employers" and told 
to find their own way back to the nearest labor pool.
lËiÉ*' Extract from Sir John Jordan’s Report on 
China, no. 31, 1919: ’X , ’ "Chinese Labour Corps." (An of­
ficial Report on Repatriation in the same file suggests 
January, 1919, as the first month in which coolies began 
to return.)
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even before the formal Armistice came into b e i n g . 435 
Clearly, the coolies had served their purpose.
The army establishment fell back upon an interpre­
tation of the six month termination clause in an effort 
to disguise its dilemma over what to do with the Chinese. 
The solution eventually arrived at was to keep them 
hard at work, well disciplined, and send them back as 
and when any opportunity presented itself. There was 
no coherent scheme to ship the Chinese home. There was 
no T. J. Bourne in Europe to make sure that each repa­
triation ship got away on schedule. It was during this 
period of their existence in Europe that the Chinese 
came closest to being "slaves" in the definition of Sir 
Edward G r e y . 434 They were put to work salvaging war 
materiel for the profit of the British government and 
private salvage contractors. This task alternated with 
the grim business of re-burying the war dead in the neat 
rows which today dot the Flanders' countryside.
A minor controversy on the continued use of the 
Chinese surfaced in the London press, with one correspon-
435por example, the 60th Chinese Labour Corps com­
pany was left without direction at a railhead which it had 
been servicing, and which acted as a supply station for it. 
Reluctantly, the army depot at Boulogne agreed to feed the 
men, but refused transport arrangements. See P.R.O./W.O. 
95/3984, War Diary of Assistant Director of Supplies, Lines 
of Communication, B.E.F., France, October 9, 1918.
436supra., p. 6.
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dent, coyly identifying himself only as "In the Know," 
vigorously defending the economic contribution that the 
coolies made by salvaging vast quantities of war time 
impediments. This contribution was supposedly worth 
"millions of pounds"43? to the national wealth. The 
government noted the anonymous writer, had every inten­
tion of sending the Chinese back to the East, but only 
when this important work was completed and boats were
available for t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . ^38 The letter appeared
nearly a year after the signing of the Armistice.
Recovering some vestiges of concern for the Chi­
nese, the New Statesman maintained that the continued 
presence of the Chinese in Europe was blatantly and de- 
liberatly contrived by Colonel, now Brigadier-General,
Wace and his friends at Labour Control. The newspaper's 
lengthy indictment went on to suggest that the officers 
of the Corps could now be divided into two classes as a 
result of this fact; those who were furious at failing 
to win demobilization, and those who, lacking prospects 
for civilian employment, wanted to hang on to their berths 
in the Corps for as long as possible. In pursuit of some­
thing to do, the article went on, coolies had not been 
employed exclusively on salvage work or grave digging,
43?The Times (London), August 11, 1919, p. 6.
438ibid.
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but had often been given whimsical or fatuous tasks to 
perform while their white directors filled in false 
estimates of the coolies’ contribution to the nation's 
economy. It was not surprising if, under these circum­
stances, the workers became resentful and a series of 
incidents, some of them serious, ensued at the camps in 
which they were now collected.439 The article must have 
struck a raw nerve or two both in Whitehall and on the 
continent.
The New Statesman was certainly correct about one 
thing, though. The coolies were getting angrier and more 
unmanageable every day. In view of their earlier bouts 
of misbehavior, some very real fears as to their inten­
tions arose. A Canadian woman, angry and resentful that 
Chinese hands should still be responsible under such 
circumstances for the reburial of her late officer son, 
wrote to The Times after a visit to Europe to suggest 
that the coolies were an imminent danger to the community. 
"Their officers are afraid of them, and, while living on 
the fat of the land, they do very little w o r k . "440 All 
the latent fears of the "Chinks," and vague dreads of a 
"Yellow Peril," seemed about to materialize in scared 
minds .
439"The Art of Wangling," The New Statesman, p. 586 
440The Times (London), August 5, 1919, p. 6.
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Was there justification for some fear of insur­
rection among the coolies? Probably so, if that fear 
was based upon the numbers of Orientals still present 
within a relatively small area of North-Eastern France 
and of Belgium. There are no reliable figures. Compari­
son with archival sources reveals the official figures 
published in The Times to be u n r e l i a b l e . 441 ^ recent
estimate, which it has proven impossible to authenti­
cate, suggests that in October of 1919 some sixty-five 
thousand coolies still remained at w o r k .442 The guess 
is plausible. The number may have been greater. If one 
bears in mind the repatriation shipments that took place 
before October, 1919 (and, although there are no reli­
able sources, it is apparent that they were few), it is 
hard to see how more than from ten to thirteen thousand 
men could have been returned at the rate of a thousand 
or so a shipment. Perhaps as many as eighty thousand 
Chinese were still in Europe by the fall of 1919, although 
one would have to deduct from any number the usual ten 
percent of invalides. Certainly there was a large enough 
"army" of Chinese to have caused trouble had it been able 
to galvanize the elements of its discontent in any con-
441por example, see The Times (London), October 16, 
1919, p. 9, and The Times (London), October 13, 1919, p. 11
442j Hamilton-Paterson, "Chinese Dig Britain’s 
Trenches," p. 45.
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certed thrust against its white guardians.
In July, 1919, news of a threatening outbreak of 
rioting did filter through to the London p r e s s , 443  al­
though publication of any details was officially dis­
couraged. The small print reveals that from time to 
time other disquieting news was heard concerning the 
C h i n e s e . 444 Harsh measures were taken to quell these 
mutinies. It was as late as February, 1920, that the 
last Chinaman was shot in Europe for unspecified " c r i m e s " 4 4 5  
on the Somme.
The lawlessness of some of the Oriental workers 
obviously persisted and even grew worse during the 
course of their eventual voyages of repatriation. The 
press is generally silent on the topic. But it could 
not fail to report one of the worst riots among the Chi­
nese. This took place at Victoria, British Columbia, in 
March, 1920. Here over eight thousand coolies lay in 
camp pending the arrival of transports in which to com­
plete the tedious journey home to China. The Times noted 
briefly that some two thousand men succeeded in escaping 
into the surrounding countryside, from which only a few 
had been apprehended to d a t e . 446 The Times had always
443The Times(London), July 21, 1919, p. 9.
444The North China Herald, November 8, 1919, p. 3 
445The Times (London), February 19, 1920, p. 13. 
446t h 6 Times (London), March 13, 1920, p. 15.
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been the favored recipient of news of the Chinese it is 
fair to assume that this brief coverage was "leaked" 
to avoid any sensationalization of what had become a 
potentially newsworthy story. The remainder of the 
press kept quiet. These were the grim days for the 
Chinese Labour Corps, the days which some pessimists 
had prophesied would come to pass once all shadow of 
discipline collapsed in the face of the loss of the ra­
tionale for the Corps' continued existence.
Back in China, however, provision had been made at 
Wei-hai-Wei to receive the returning coolies. A new 
"Victory Pier" was opened on November 18, 1918, by Com­
missioner Lockhart.447 Designed in part to serve as a 
debarkation point for the workers from France, the pier 
was dedicated not to their efforts, but to the martial 
triumphs of Britain, France, and the United States. Upon 
the occasion of the ceremony at the pier in Wei-hai-Wei, 
the Colonial Office in London telegraphed Lockhart "the 
Labour Force, recruited through the efforts of the staff 
at Wei-hei-Wei /s"ic7, has performed services of great 
value."448
447"Motes on the Chinese and Wei-hai-Wei," The Em- 
pire at War, C. Lucas, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1926), Vol. V., p. 156.
448p R 0 /c 0 521/32, Wei-hai-Wei Correspondence,
Colonial Office, London, to Commissioner, Wei-hai-Wei, 
November 17, 1918.
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In Peking, Jordan was not concerned with London's 
approbation. He was sharing some of the anxiety of his 
European superiors concerning the temper of the return­
ing Chinese. Would they be as militant in China as they 
had been in Europe? Jordan advocated some form of public 
works project designed at once to pacify the coolies and 
continue their u s e f u l n e s s . 449 There seems to have been 
genuine fear among whites in China that the lessons in 
military organization taught the coolies while in France 
would be applied by them upon their return.
There need have been no concern. The bulk of work­
ers slipped back quietly enough into Shantung and Chihli 
provinces, although not completely into that anonymity 
from which they had emerged in 1916 and 1917. The work­
ers were temporarily saved from total disappearance as a 
result of a vast postal network, devised while they were 
in Europe, to ensure that the men's nominees in China 
received their pay.
The inauguration of such a scheme on so large a 
scale had not formed a part of the original intention of 
the army. It transpired, however, that the Chinese were 
inveterate gamblers, and could rarely hold the small 
sums paid them while in France. They were therefore
449p.R.o./w.O. 106/33, C.L.C. History, Extract from 
Sir John Jordan's Report on China, no. 3l, 1919; 'X,* 
"Chinese Labour Corps."
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encouraged to nominate recipients in China to whom their 
pay could be sent. For those who would or could not do 
this, a bank was instituted in France so that Chinese 
could deposit their wages or savings. The British pro­
mised to distribute the accrued savings to the men once 
they returned to China. As fully seventy-five per cent 
of the Chinese elected this alternative, the army found 
itself faced with the task of distributing money orders 
over half a dozen Chinese provinces.
All of this called for the keeping of fairly ac­
curate records of where the majority of Chinese intended 
to settle after their release from the British. G. S.
Moss, the War Office representative who succeeded T. J. 
Bourne, bore the brunt of arranging and expanding this 
postal effort. He operated from a specially provided 
Emigration Agency set up in the coolie depot at Tsingtao.450
Moss faced a unique situation. On former occasions 
in history when Chinese coolies worked for Western powers 
the respective nations had had wages or bonuses paid di­
rectly through the contractors who originally hired or 
recruited the men. This process was never successful. 
Contractors proved lax in fulfilling their obligations, 
and as a result an atmosphere as confusing as it was deli-
450pR.O./W.O. 083/5032, Tsingtao Barracks, "Pro­
posed Building of New Consulate at Tsingtao," memorandum 
of M.I. 2c, n.d.
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cate seemed to pervade most fiscal relationships with 
coolies. Moss refused to be daunted. He saw his chal­
lenge as an opportunity to prove to the returned laborers 
that British fair play and justice could work in China 
to get their money to them.
Moss consulted M. Picard Destelan, French director 
of the Chinese Postal Service. Destelan readily agreed 
that special money orders, advices, and address codes 
whould be devised. He further instructed his postal com­
missioner in Shantung province, the Norwegian, Tollefsen, 
to use every means available to implement the plan in 
that p r o v i n c e .451 A travelling inspector was appointed 
from among the ranks of the helpful and ubiquitous mis­
sionary population there, and a huge chain of communica­
tions, including fifty-five extra money order offices, 
was set up to cater to the increased demand.
It is not possible to offer anything approximating 
a balance sheet as a result of a survey of the material 
which remains to cover the activities described above.
One can only confirm that the majority of coolies enrolled 
in the Chinese Labour Corps did in fact originate from 
Shantung province, with Chihli province falling s e c o n d .452
451p.R.o,/c,0 . 873/578, Report of War Office Emigra­
tion Agency, Tsingtao, September, 1919.
4^^Ibid. (Actually, 67% of all coolie money orders 
in 1918 were paid in Chihli province, but later repatria­
tions of former Shantung residents seem to have redressed 
the balance.)
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Only five per cent of wages paid by post were addressed 
to recipients outside these two areas, and most of this 
residue was directed to Honan province.
As a result of this distributive system, the Chi­
nese postal services were lastingly improved. Ironically, 
the British were responsible for the unexpected long term 
benefit of linking hitherto inaccessible villages in the 
remote hinterland of China with the world outside. And 
the promptness and relative efficiency with which the 
coolies' money was always delivered, first to their nom­
inees and then to them, had a positive, if transient, 
impact upon the attitudes with which the British were 
viewed in parts of rural northern C h i n a . ^53
If the comments above seem to offer only a pedes­
trian and anti-climactic picture of the Chinese Labour 
Corps' last days, it is because the facts warrant such an 
interpretation. The coolies began to vanish from sight 
once they returned to China, and would have vanished 
more quickly and entirely had it not been for the postal 
system attanged for their benefit. The British only 
wanted to forget the whole scheme as quickly as possible. 
There can be no exotic description of these events. The 
Corps merely vanished from sight.
453j. Blick, "The Chinese Labour Corps in World 
War I," p. 119.
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The last coolies left in Europe, apart from those 
who left the Corps of their own volition to seek academic 
or technical educations, or who merely slipped away by 
some clandestine means, were sixty men left behind to 
carve inscriptions on the tombstones of their dead fel­
low w o r k e r s . 454 j they, one wonders, carve at all 
Labor Vincit Omnia, the motto of the labor establishment 
in which they had served for so long?
454Report of the War Emergency Work of the Y.M.C.A., 
'With the Chinese in France," p. 33.
CONCLUSION
An attempt has been made during the course of this 
examination of the Chinese Labour Corps to keep in pro­
minence some of the personalities involved in the Corps' 
appearance, function, and eventual disbandment. This 
attempt has involved a conscious avoidance of allotting 
too much space to the ideological or purely abstract in­
terpretations which may be placed upon the role of this 
Oriental labor establishment. It has, it is true, been 
suggested during the course of this paper that the use 
of Chinese workers by the British armies in France repre­
sented an authentic picture of the ethos of the colonial­
ist and imperialist era as it drew to a close. This, it 
is felt, remains a valid contention.
Likewise, the conflict between modern management 
techniques, as exemplified by the progressive work of 
Colonel Wace and others, and primitive capitalist ideas, 
has also been suggested in the body of the work as a 
reason for the poor utilization of the Chinese as a labor 
resource. But again, it is hoped that this discussion of 
the disposition of labor and the internal economy of 
Chinese work units will not be viewed as unfolding within 
what may appear to be a rigid or dogmatic framework, for
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this was not intended. The actual intention was merely 
to show that the Chinese Labour Corps represents in 
microcosm a battle between old and new ways of handling 
a specific and endemic problem in capitalist society ir- 
self. That problem, labor and management relations, ap­
pears here during a period of unusual stress, change, 
and uniqueness. The thesis is that something valid can 
be said here about, and understood from, the attitudes 
which emerged during these admittedly unusual circum­
stances .
The chapter in which the actual raising of the 
Corps is dealt with has remained almost entirely narra­
tive in character. It was felt to be essential that the 
facts whould speak for themselves, insofar as that ideal 
proved possible of approximation. Not that any excep­
tional degree of objectivity is claimed in the composi­
tion of this part of the work. On the contrary. A good 
deal of selection was required to eliminate repetitive 
or peripheral material, and at the same time still pre­
sent a reasonably brief yet telling account of how the 
initiative, rationale, and responsibility for getting 
and using the coolies actually emerged and were distri­
buted among the parties involved.
The emphasis laid on the roles of leading politicians 
like Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Sir Edward Grey, or Arthur
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Balfour should not provoke a distorted view of their 
participation. By any calculations, their roles in the 
planning and raising of the Corps were minor as compared 
with the other tasks and decisions that confronted them 
in the troubled years of 1916 and 1917. Their actions 
represent a final stamp of approval rather than the re­
sult of much considered and well digested critical an­
alyses of the work to be done by the Chinese. But the 
decay of political idealism represented, especially by 
the Liberals' participation in the Chinese labor scheme, 
forms part of an inevitable indictment for which they 
must assume responsibility.
Mr. Lloyd George's constant insistence upon the 
construction of a Chinese labor organization has been 
stressed because this is indeed how his role appeared 
in the sources consulted. As a result of his pressure, 
his part in the raising of the Corps is important enough 
to be even more worth recording and remembering.
Sir Edward Grey's reservations concerning the uses 
to which the Chinese were to be put have similarly been 
brought to the fore. They offer some estimate of the 
man's unusual character, but also they show how clearly 
aware this controversial individual was of the possible 
political and moral impact of the exploitation of the 
coolies in France.
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Today care must be taken in presenting a picture 
of the Chinese at work. Over emphasis of their exploita­
tion and of their subjugation to the imperialist mental­
ity could add too damaging a contribution to the in­
creasing amount of literature condemnatory of the period 
in which they flourished. The almost complete lack of 
sentiment shown by those who directed the Chinese, the 
violence with which the coolies' basic human rights and 
cultural patterns were attacked, and the irony of at­
tempts to "civilize" them in the middle of one of his­
tory's most futile and inhumane conflicts, can easily 
form a cloudy and generalized ingredient for a blanket 
indictment of the men and the era involved.
Britain's role in the treatment of the Chinese is 
not one of which anyone can be in the least bit proud.
The fact that some will say the Chinese shared the com­
mon lot must not be allowed to obscure the fact that the 
coolies were raised and brought to Europe to participate 
in a conflict that had no significance for them. They 
were bought and used. But there is no need to adopt a 
relativist approach in assessing the work of the Chinese 
in France, and compare the concrete conditions of their 
actual existence with abstract moral reservations which 
spring to mind so easily today. The coolies signify 
well within the context of their times. The secrets which
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governed their use can only be understood if this is 
grasped. There was in the ethos of the period enough 
morality of a contemporary sort to prevent their white 
masters from treating them without some decency and con­
cern. The behavior of individual commanders, the occa­
sional deliberate indifference to the protection of the 
Chinese in the field, or the frank desire sometimes to 
puch the men beyond reasonable physical limits, should 
be seen always in the light of that basic, intrinsic, 
and cometimes subconscious respect for justice and fair 
play that has so often prevented the British, both as 
individuals and a nation, from abandoning all integrity 
in their treatment of themselves and others.
This does not mean, it must be reiterated, that cer­
tain officers and men could not have been more humane in 
their treatment of the Chinese, nor that visions of the 
need to maintain Imperial splendor and racial superiority 
did not warp judgments. It would have been strange in­
deed had not elements of this now repudiated chauvinism 
been found during any study of this watershed period in 
British history.
There can be little doubt that when Lloyd George, 
Field Marshall Haig, and others recommended the use of 
Chinese and native labor in France, they did so with a 
sense of urgency borne of the dread fear of possible de-
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feat at the hands of the German empire. This unplea­
sant realization would have seemed inconceivable, even 
incongruous, in 1913. But not in 1916. For a few cru­
cial and chaotic months the British High Command in 
France and its Whitehall colleagues in London faced the 
cruel dividends of unpreparedness, lack of planning, 
and failure to provide for an adequate establishment of 
war. No wonder that in some quarters the Chinese were 
regarded as a Godsend. But it has been demonstrated 
how their eventual arrival in Europe was delayed and, 
more importantly, how once arrived, the rivalries and 
incompetencies which dogged their use compromised their 
efficiency.
Even as arguments as to the use of the Chinese La­
bour Corps continued to agitate senior officers in the
British army's labor establishment, the very rationale 
for the coolies' use was fading. Americans began to 
provide additional manpower resources, and technology 
found new ways to replace the muscle of manual laborers. 
The concept of the role of the Chinese, as has been sug­
gested before, was a unique and transitory one. The Chi­
nese laborers were on the verge of redundancy and risked 
becoming an anachronism almost before they had been in 
France for the space of a year.
By early 1918 the Chinese Labour Corps presented
259
an embarrassing reminder of the grim anxieties that had 
haunted the strategists and soldiers of 1916. Only its 
work on the inner defenses in the spring of 1918 preserved 
the Corps' usefulness for a month or two more. By mid- 
1918, the politicians too could see the Corps as both a 
painful reminder and a disturbing factor in the potential­
ly roseate path they now planned for the politics of vic­
tory.
It would be too simplistic to picture the coolies 
as a football, by 1918 passed unwillingly between the 
army, the civil service, and the government. But the gen­
eral desire to dispose of them, their memory, and the re­
cord of their existence, without lasting responsibility 
or onus being attributed to any one sector of the Estab­
lishment, does lend some substance to this plain analogy.
If the last two hundred or so pages are looked back
upon retrospectively it will, perhaps, be appreciated
that the Chinese never really fitted into the military
system. They were not an organic part of the service as
a whole, despite constant insistence upon their amenabil­
ity to military method and discipline. The Chinese re­
mained always a part of the pool disposed of by the La­
bour Directorate and its successor. Labour Control. The 
Chinese Labour Corps WLS the kind of contrived creation 
that can very conveniently be used, exploited for a period.
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and then relinquished. It is a testimony to the sur­
prising substantiality of the Corps while it lasted 
that the men who filled its ranks succeeded while to­
gether in providing a microcosmic world in which the 
prejudices and principles of the latter period of the 
colonialist and imperialist ethos were mirrored.
The above suggestion may confirm the importance of 
even transient historical phenomena in assisting the pro­
cess of assessing the temper of an era. At the same 
time, the complete and unlamented disappearance of the 
Chinese Labour Corps until today's revival of interest 
presents a further testimony, this time to the residual 
resoluteness of the Establishment which disbanded it.
The processes of demobilization and repatriation may 
have lacked much in the way of efficient operation, but 
the almost complete success with which the memory, 
function, and rationale of the Corps were obliterated 
proves at once the thoroughness with which the official 
mind of the time repudiated episodes of which it was not 
proud, and the pattern of changing thinking in Whitehall 
and government in general, which had begun to sense in­
stinctively the coming public repudiation of Empire and 
its mission, a repudiation that has formed a pattern to 
our own day. There is no doubt on this view that the Chi­
nese Labour Corps was part of an epochal transition in 




DISTRIBUTION OF CHINESE LABOUR COMPANIES AT PEAK 
STRENGTH, JULY 27, 1918*
Locations of Unskilled Companies 
with Armies in the Field
1st Army 





Railheads, Dumps . . .  |
R o a d s ................... I
Q u a r r i e s ................1^
U n s p e c i f i e d ........... l|









Directorate Gen. of 
Transportation . . . . 1^
Railways ..............  4
Unspecified .........  2
TOTAL : .................. 23
Ilird Army
Defences ..............  5
Forests ..............  2
Burials .............. &
R o a d s ................... &
R a i l w a y s ................l|
T O T A L : ..................9&
IVth Army
Defences ...............11
Forests ..............  2
R o a d s ................... &
Railways ..............  |
Quarries ..............  2
TOTAL : .................. 16
Carried forward . . . 59&
♦Total numbers in each company not specified, but ap­
proximately 490 Chinese.
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Ammunition Depots . . . .  |
R o a d s ........................ ^
Quarries ................... |
TOTAL : .......................7
TOTAL : ........... 66&
Locations of Unskilled and Semi-Skilled Chinese 
Companies Allocated Lines of Communication and G.H.Q.
Royal Engineers (Construction) .......................  16|
Workshops ...............................................  2
Royal Air Force and Tank C o r p s ..........................3%
Forests .................................................  2
R a i l w a y s ................................................... 19&
Depots on Lines of Communication ......................  34&
Laundries ...............................................  |
Directorate General of Transportation (Roads) . . .  1
Railway Maintenance and Shops ....................... 13
D o c k s ..................................................... 27&
Miscellaneous............ ................................  ^
TOTAL .................................................... 120&
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Locations of Skilled Companies of Chinese
Royal E n g i n e e r s ......................................... 3
Royal Air Force and Tank C o r p s .......................2
Lines of C o m m u n i c a t i o n ............................... (^?)
TOTAL : ....................................................5
Grand Total ; . . 192
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Appendix 'B'
LIST OF VESSELS CARRYING COOLIES TO FRANCE, AND 
NUMBERS OF MEN REPORTED ON EACH*
Name of 
V6SSG1
Departure Arrival On Board
Port Date Port Date Offers Chinese
"Teucer" W-h-W 18-1-17 Havre 19-4-17 7 1,086
"Premius" HK 20-2-17 DPort 25-4-17 7 1,184
"Antilochus" W-h-W 7-3-17 DPort 10-6-17 5 1,104
"Hong Moh" W-h-W 10-3-17 M 13-5-17 5 1,201
"Empress of 
Russia" W-h-W 19-3-17 Lpool 14-5-17 9 2,006
"Empress of 
Japan" W-h-W 2-4-17 Lpool 1-6-17 4 950
"Kaiping" W-h-W 2-4-17 Lpool 1-6-17 5 1,950
"Agapenor" T-tao 4-4-17 DPort 25-6-17 6 1,861
"Helenas" W-h-W 9-4-17 DPort 25-6-17 7 1,950
"Empress of 
Asia" W-h-W 16-4-17 Lpool 1-6-17 9 2,400
"Protesilaus KChow 17-4-17 Lpool 1-6-17 11 3,000
"Monteagle" W-h-W 30-4-17 Lpool 30-6-17 8 1,600
"Demodocus" T-tao 1-5-17 DPort 27-7-17 6 1,700
TOTAL : 89 21,092
♦Name is of original vessel on which Chinese embarked. No 
mention is made of transhipment from Egypt or Canada on differ­
ent ships. Date is last on which Chinese arrived in France. Ab­
breviations as follows: "W-h-W" = Wei-hai-Wei; "HK" = Hong Kong; 
"T-tao" = Tsingtao; "DPort" = Devonport; "M" = Marseilles; 




Departure Arrival On Board
Port Date Port Date Offers Chinese
Brought fwd. 89 21,092
"Empress of 
Russia" W-h-W 14-5-17 Lpool 30-6-17 9 2,027
"Ixion" T-tao 22-5-17 Lpool 30-6-17 13 3,237
"Empress of 
Japan" W-h-W 28-5-17 Lpool 4-7-17 5 950
"Empress of 
Asia" W-h-W 12-6-17 Lpool 28-7-17 8 2,268
"Talthybius" T-tao 13-6-17 Lpool 22-7-17 ? 3,303
"Bessie
Dollar" T-tao 21-6-17 Lpool 15-8-17 5 1,706
"Monteagle" W-h-W 6-7-17 Lpool 15-8-17 5 1,653
"Empress of 
Russia" T-tao 9-7-17 Lpool 15-8-17 9 2,297
"Empress of 
Japan" T-tao 22-7-17 Lpool 1-9-17 ? 937
"Coconada" W-h-W 24-7-17 Lpool 1-9-17 9 2,337
"Harold
Dollar" W-h-W 1-8-17 Lpool 15-9-17 8 1,785
"Empress of 
Asia" KChow 7-8-17 Lpool 15-9-17 ? 2,256
"Empress of 
Russia" W-h-W 3-9-17 Lpool 23-10-17 9 2,280
"Bessie
Dollar" T-tao 9-9-17 Lpool 23-10-17 ? 1,702
"Empress of 
Japan" W-h-W 16-9-17 Lpool 23-10-17 3 926
"Monteagle" T-tao 23-9-17 Lpool 7-12-17 ? 1,681




Departure Arrival On Board
Port Date Port Date Offers Chinese
Brought Fwd. 172 52,277
"Coconada" W-h-W 23-9-17 Lpool 7-12-17 7 2,250
"Empress of 
Asia" T-tao 1-10-17 Lpool 19-11-17 5 1,738
"Teesta" W-h-W 5-10-17 Lpool 19-11-17 6 2,051
"Empress of 
Russia" W-h-W 29-10-17 Lpool 7-12-17 4 2,291
"Harold
Dollar" T-tao 9-11-17 Lpool 7-1-18 6 1,760
"Empress of 
Japan" T-tao 13-11-17 Lpool 24-1-18 ? 924
"Empress of 
Asia" W-h-W 25-11-17 Lpool 15—1—18 6 2,690
"Tyndareus" T-tao 26-11-17 Lpool 24-1-18 ? 4,167
"Monteagle" W-h-W 3-12-17 Lpool 24—1—18 4 1,669
"Antilochus" T-tao 6-12-17 Lpool 24—1—18 ? 3,410
"Coconada" T-tao 16-12-17 Lpool 6—2—18 ? 2,244
"Protesilaus W-h-W 21-12-17 Lpool 10-3-18 10 3,742
"Empress of 
Russia" T-tao 24-12-17 Lpool 16-1-18 7 1,503
"Empress of 
Japan" W-h-W 7-1-18 Neyland 10-3-18 5 913
"Teesta" T-tao 16-1-18 Neylanc 10-3-18 ? 1,960
"Empress of 
Asia" T-tao 18-2-18 ? ? ? 2,639
"Tyndareus" T-tao 26-2-18 ? ? ? 4,171
"Coconada" T-tao 2-3-18 ? ? o 1,899
GRAND TOTAL: 225 94,458
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of labor* A B A B A B A B A B A B
Ammunition 3 l4 1 2 2& l4 3i 4 1 44
General
Supplies 1% 2 1^ 3 li 1& 1% 2 1^ 1^
Forage 2 2| 1 1% 2 1^ I'i 3i 4 %
R.E. Stores 
and Timber iH 2 1^ 5 1^ 3 2 1% 2i 3 1 H
Ordinance
Stores ih 2 1 4 1% 2 1 % 1% 2 1 h
Stone li li 2 1% li 1& 2& 1% 1% 2 1& I4
*'A' = Chinese labor, ’B' = White labor. White labor in above 
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